Truth Behind Bars
colombian paramilitary leaders in u.s. custody
February 2010
International Human Rights Law Clinic
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
Introduction:
On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to
Colombia, William Brownfield, announced the
extradition to the United States of fourteen
leaders of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC)31 to face drug
charges.32 In total, thirty former paramilitaries
(Defendants), including most of the AUC’s top
commanders,33 are in U.S. custody in Florida,
New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington
D.C.34 The AUC, formed from paramilitary
groups created in the 1980s to fight left-wing
guerillas, has become a powerful network of
Colombian drug traffickers and warlords. Over
the last thirty years, AUC members are alleged to
have massacred, forcibly disappeared, tortured,
and raped thousands of civilians.35 By 2002, at the
height of paramilitary violence in Colombia, the
United States estimated that the group carried
out approximately seventy percent of the killings
and forced disappearances in that country.36
At a press conference announcing the May
2008 extraditions, Ambassador Brownfield
pledged that the transfer of Defendants to
the United States would not interfere with
Colombia’s efforts to hold paramilitaries
accountable for their crimes in Colombia. The
United States will “facilitate all access, all of
the information, and all of the opportunities
to the
victims, the victims’
representatives and to the
prosecutors,”37 stated the ambassador. Three
years earlier, in 2005, Colombia’s Congress
approved Law 975, also known as the “Justice
and Peace Law,” which offered leniency and
public benefits to paramilitary members in
exchange for an agreement to disarm, forfeit
assets, and tell the truth about human rights
abuses they committed.38 All of the extradited
AUC leaders were participants in the Justice
and Peace program, and had begun to disclose
details about their crimes and the identities of
their accomplices. They gave details about AUC
responsibility for crimes against civilians as
well as its role in rigging Colombian elections.39
Defendants’ disclosures created an opportunity
to dismantle paramilitary networks by prompting
domestic investigations into AUC crimes and the
criminal investigation of elected officials.
However, since their extraditions, the paramilitary
leaders’ cooperation with Colombian
investigators effectively has ceased. Logistical difficulties
have been compounded by the absence of a
written agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
to coordinate judicial cooperation. Colombian
prosecutors and judges face limited access to
Defendants in U.S. custody. U.S. prosecutors also
have rejected the efforts of Colombian victims to
intervene in U.S. prosecutions to compel AUC
Defendants to divulge information about their
crimes.40
Further, the plea agreements that the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has reached with thirteen
of the extradited Defendants do not contain
incentives for Defendants to cooperate with Colombian
law enforcement or to reveal the details
of their human rights crimes.41 Eight Defendants
have been sentenced to terms ranging from four
to thirty-one years for drug-related crimes.42 The
potential for AUC Defendants to help obtain
convictions of corrupt Colombian politicians,
dismantle drug trafficking networks, and reform
the Colombian military is diminishing.
In light of these developments, the International
Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRLC) evaluated
the consequences of extradition of the AUC
leaders from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy
interests. The specific goals of this report are:
(1) To identify the impact of extraditions on
Colombia’s on-going human rights and
corruption investigations;
(2) To evaluate U.S. foreign policy interests in
promoting the cooperation of extradited
Colombian paramilitaries with Colombian
law enforcement; and
(3) To make policy recommendations to
better utilize the U.S. prosecutions of
Colombian paramilitary leaders to advance
U.S. foreign policy interests in Colombia.
In preparation of this report, we consulted
primary documents, including U.S. court records
regarding the extradited Defendants, Department
of State reports on human rights conditions
in Colombia, and testimony from current and
former U.S. officials regarding Colombia as
well as the U.S. interests in promoting the
rule of law there. We also reviewed documents
released by Colombian government agencies,
including the Attorney General’s Office, the
High Commissioner for Peace, and the National
Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation.
International legal materials were also consulted.
In addition, we reviewed secondary sources
including newspaper accounts from U.S. and
Colombian outlets, as well as documentation
compiled by international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups in
Colombia.
Our analysis is limited by the availability
of U.S. and Colombian court documents. The
complete case records of U.S. prosecutions of
eighteen extradited AUC leaders are not publicly
accessible.43 Thus we were unable to verify the
current legal status of each of the cases against
AUC leaders including whether a Defendant
has reached a plea agreement. Similarly, official
transcripts of the statements by Defendants
before proceedings conducted under the Justice
and Peace Law in Colombia are not publicly
available. However, Colombian newspapers
published reports of these statements, which we
consulted. Finally, the participation of some of the
researchers in legal actions related to this report
may have influenced the analysis.44 Every effort
was made to minimize research bias by training
researchers and by consulting multiple sources.
The benefit of researcher involvement in some
of the court proceedings against Defendants is
a deeper understanding of the legal and factual
issues involved.
Background
PARAMILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES
The extradited Defendants include most of
the former leaders of the AUC.45 In the 1980s,
wealthy Colombian landowners created militias
to wage a “dirty war” against left-wing guerilla
groups and suspected sympathizers.46 Financed
by the drug trade, the independent militias
formed a national network in 1997, the AUC,
to advance their common goals of controlling
territory and drug trafficking routes. Often
acting with the support or acquiescence of the
Colombian military, the AUC used brutal and
violent methods to wrest territory from guerilla
control. AUC combatants forcibly displaced,
disappeared, tortured, and killed thousands of
campesinos, Afro-Colombians, indigenous persons,
trade unionists, human rights advocates, religious
leaders, and other civilians.47
AUC commanders colluded with the political,
military, and business sectors to ensure control of
their areas of operation. In 2000, Human Rights
Watch, a U.S.-based NGO, documented that half
of Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units
regularly collaborated in paramilitary activity.48
Military personnel directly participated in several
high-profile massacres committed by paramilitary
groups.49
In exchange for political protection, Colombian
officials used paramilitaries to intimidate
citizens and secure votes.50 In the 2000s, several
paramilitary leaders boasted that the AUC
“controlled” thirty to thirty-five percent of the
members of Colombia’s Congress.51 International
and domestic businesses operating in Colombia
have provided the AUC with financial backing
and logistical support.52
After the United States indicted several
AUC commanders for drug-related crimes
in 2002,53 paramilitary leaders announced a
unilateral ceasefire and entered into talks with
the Colombian government. These resulted in an
agreement to demobilize AUC combatants.54 In
2005, Colombia’s Congress passed the Justice and
Peace Law which established a legal framework
for the demobilization of paramilitary members
who had committed serious human rights abuses.
The new law offered legal leniency and public
benefits to any paramilitary member—from foot
soldiers to the high command—in exchange
for an agreement to disarm, forfeit assets, and
tell the truth about human rights abuses they
committed.55 If paramilitaries fulfilled the
requirements of the Justice and Peace Law, they
were eligible for sentences of five to eight years
regardless of the severity of their crimes, or their
rank or role in the AUC.56
JUSTICE AND PEACE PROCESS
According to the Colombian government,
approximately 31,000 paramilitary fighters had
demobilized by 2006.57 Of these, 3,712 applied
for benefits under the Justice and Peace Law.58
Applicants were required to provide information
about the structure and hierarchy of their former
organization, their rank and role, and to confess
to their crimes. Victims of paramilitary violence
were permitted to attend the hearings and pose
questions to the perpetrators.59 The Colombian
government reports that as of June 2009,
more than 27,000 victims had attended 1,836
hearings.60
At the time of their extraditions, all of the
extradited paramilitary commanders were participating
in the Justice and Peace process. Most
were revealing details about their atrocities and
the identity of their accomplices.61 (See text box)
Because of their roles and lengthy histories with
5 the organization, Defendants had unparalleled
knowledge of AUC’s ties to Colombian officials.
The testimony of AUC commanders was particularly
important because relatively few paramilitaries
had come forward to divulge their crimes,
let alone had the ability to reveal involvement of
government officials as accomplices.62
The Justice and Peace hearings progressed in
two stages. First, the applicant testified without
restriction about his experience (referred
to in Spanish as version libre). Second, state
prosecutors had the opportunity to directly
question paramilitary commanders about their
crimes and could ask questions supplied by
victims.63 Because Defendants’ extraditions came
during the first stage of the process, the record
of their crimes is partial and incomplete. Some
Defendants disclosed information about their
crimes, as well as details of military complicity
and political corruption. Paramilitary commander
Salvatore Mancuso, for example, used an eightyseven-
slide PowerPoint presentation to detail
his role in killing 336 victims.64 However, most
Defendants avoided testifying about certain
categories of crimes, such as forced recruitment
of child combatants, forced displacement, sexual
violence, kidnapping, torture, voter intimidation,
and smuggling.65
SUPREME COURT INVESTIGATIONS
Alongside the Justice and Peace process,
Colombia’s Supreme Court is investigating
paramilitaries’ alliances. The Supreme Court,
which has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
sitting members of Colombia’s Congress,66 has
initiated investigations of representatives accused
of working with paramilitary groups to commit
crimes ranging from electoral fraud to kidnapping
and murder.67
The Supreme Court investigations were
prompted in 2005, after AUC members made a
series of statements to the media about the extent
of the group’s influence on Colombia’s Congress.68
The investigations gained speed in 2006, after
the discovery of a political pact signed in 2001 by
paramilitary commanders and thirty-one politicians.
69 Known as the parapolítica or paragate
scandal, one third of Colombia’s congressional
representatives have come under investigation for
their ties to illegal armed groups.70 Of the 133 current
and former members of Congress implicated
in the investigations, Colombian authorities have
subpoenaed seventy-one to testify and detained
fifty.71 Nearly all the legislators under investigation
are members of President Uribe’s governing coalition.
72 Allegations of illegal conduct extend to the
vice-president73 and even to the president.74
Defendants possess evidence crucial to these
investigations. For example, files discovered
on a laptop belonging to extradited AUC
commander Rodrigo Tovar Pupo were used in
the investigations of eighteen politicians.75 Yet
the evidentiary value of extradited paramilitary
testimony has not been fully exploited. Defendant
Salvatore Mancuso is a potential witness in
proceedings against twenty-six elected officials,
however his extradition has limited his availability
as a witness.76 Similarly, Defendant Carlos
Jiménez Naranjo is suspected of having conspired
with seventeen politicians but has only provided
testimony relevant to one investigation.77
OTHER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The Colombia Attorney General’s Office is
prosecuting crimes committed by extradited
paramilitaries as well as investigating ties
between paramilitary groups and public officials.
The Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Unit of the Attorney General’s Office and the
criminal courts retain jurisdiction over criminal
investigations begun before paramilitary leaders
demobilized and entered into the Justice and Peace
process. Defendants face multiple indictments and
convictions in Colombia for serious human rights
abuses including massacres, forced disappearances,
and murders.78
Colombia’s Attorney General reports that
prosecutors have opened 276 cases against public
officials.79 The vast majority of these cases involves
allegations of public officials conspiring with
paramilitary groups (in a few cases to commit
murder) and is in an early phase of investigation.80
The extradited AUC leaders are witnesses and
accomplices in many of these cases.
More:
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Truthbehindbars.pdf
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