...
Diplomacy had an effect. In exchanges beginning in February 1996, Sudanese officials
began approaching U.S. officials, asking what they could do to ease the pressure. During
the winter and spring of 1996, Sudan’s defense minister visited Washington and had a
series of meetings with representatives of the U.S. government. To test Sudan’s
willingness to cooperate on terrorism the United States presented eight demands to their
Sudanese contact. The one that concerned Bin Ladin was a request for intelligence
information about Bin Ladin’s contacts in Sudan.
These contacts with Sudan, which went on for years, have become a source of
controversy. Former Sudanese officials claim that Sudan offered to expel Bin Ladin to
the United States. Clinton administration officials deny ever receiving such an offer. We
have not found any reliable evidence to support the Sudanese claim.
Sudan did offer to expel Bin Ladin to Saudi Arabia and asked the Saudis to pardon him.
U.S. officials became aware of these secret discussions, certainly by March 1996. The
evidence suggests that the Saudi government wanted Bin Ladin expelled from Sudan, but
would not agree to pardon him. The Saudis did not want Bin Ladin back in their country
at all.
U.S. officials also wanted Bin Ladin expelled from Sudan. They knew the Sudanese
were considering it. The U.S. government did not ask Sudan to render him into U.S.
custody.
According to Samuel Berger, who was then the deputy national security adviser, the
interagency Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) chaired by Richard Clarke had a
hypothetical discussion about bringing Bin Ladin to the United States. In that discussion
a Justice Department representative reportedly said there was no basis for bringing him to
the United States since there was no way to hold him here, absent an indictment. Berger
adds that in 1996 he was not aware of any intelligence that said Bin Ladin was
responsible for any act against an American citizen. No rendition plan targeting Bin
Ladin, who was still perceived as a terrorist financier, was requested by or presented to
senior policymakers during 1996.
Yet both Berger and Clarke also said the lack of an indictment made no difference.
Instead they said the idea was not worth pursuing because there was no chance that
Sudan would ever turn Bin Ladin over to a hostile country. If Sudan had been serious,
Clarke said, the United States would have worked something out.
However, the U.S. government did approach other countries hostile to Sudan and Bin
Ladin about whether they would take Bin Ladin. One was apparently interested. No
handover took place.
...
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_5.pdf