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from closed caption. starting a few seconds after it started, saying the report was prepared for for the generals in afghanistan.
richard engel and rachel
And it talks about the readiness of the afghan security forces, primarily, the afghan national army, to understand the context of this, the main mission of the united states army, all of the different forces that are there, is to train the afghan security forces so that american forces can ultimately leave.
>> That is the main point of what we're doing?
>> That is the number one priority. The reason 30,000 extra troops are going there is to try to create enough security so that an afghan army can be built. I was told this by numerous commanders. Number one priority, this report says that that priority is facing serious, serious problems, and the military knows it. This was an independent study if i could just read a few things, it talks about how -- the opening statement, the ana, which is afghan national army, above company level is not at war. Now, company level means the small unit. The soldiers on the ground they're fighting, above 150 soldiers, anything colonel, general, anything at that level, according to this report doesn't believe he's at war. They talk about corruption. Nepotism, corruption, absenteeism among ana leaders makes success impossible. Change must come quickly. Another line, if afghan political leaders do not place competent people in charge, no amount of coalition support will suffice in the long term. It's more than sobering. It says that this is a serious challenge. It goes on to say that rehabilitating the afghan security forces will not take one year, it will take a long time.
>> So they give a time frame about how long it would take if it was going to happen?
>> No, I heard they're thinking about four years, and the reason that the dates are important is there is this key speech by president obama, he said he wants to start dialling back the surge 18, roughly 18 months, the summer of 2011. 18 months from when he announced it. That is impossible according to this study to get the afghan security forces u and running and in place. And even with some sort of semblance. Another key finding in this report says that the numbers of afghan troops and police that are on the ground are inaccurate. That some battalions will overreport by 40 to 50%, inflate their numbers. It's a sobering --
>> In short, this internal assessment which was not meant for zrib burks which has been made available to you, which is in itself a story, says that what we know about the current strength of afghan army and police is wrong? That it's -- it's been overstated?
>> It's been overstated.
>> Everyone the time line that the president laid out.
>> It can't work.
>> Can't work. It explicitly says this can't happen in 18 months?
>> There's a line that says, cannot take a year to fix this problem. And they go on and on describing the problems with the leadership. Many ana leaders work short days, are often absent and place personal gain above national survival. So when you hear all of these things, it should raise a degree of concern. If the primary mission, and I've been told the primary mission is to train the afghan security forces, it is more than a sober accessment. It shows we have a lot of work to do.
>> If this reflects the view of the military, this says that the military does not believe it is possible to do what president obama says the mission is in afghanistan.
>> This was prepared for the military.
>> Yes.
>> The top commanders want and I've been told this, that general petrais wants realistic, not optimistic assessments, that's a quote from a spokesman tonight about this. They say this report is not complete yet, it's a report in progress, and they -- but they do recognize there are serious shortcomings in the afghan security forces.
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