From Mark Crispin Miller via Email:Note that this analysis confirms Eric Hoogland's observation re: the rural voters in Iran.
MCM
Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran's 2009 Election
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14234_iranelection0609.pdfThe 19 page pdf file should be attached. (not attached, but linked at bottom)
Jim Soper
www.CountedAsCast.com
Executive Summary
---------------------
Working from the province by province breakdowns of the 2009 and 2005
results, released by the Iranian Ministry of Interior on the Farsi pages of their
website shortly after the election, and from the 2006 census as published by
the official Statistical Centre of Iran, the following observations about the
official data and the debates surrounding it can be made.
· In two conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a turnout of
more than 100% was recorded.
· If Ahmadinejad's victory was primarily caused by the increase in voter
turnout, one would expect the data to show that the provinces where
there was the greatest 'swing' in support towards Ahmadinejad would
also be the provinces with the greatest increase in voter turnout. This
is not the case.
· In a third of all provinces, the official results would require that
Ahmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, all former
centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former
reformist voters, despite a decade of conflict between these two
groups.
· In 2005, as in 2001 and 1997, conservative candidates, and
Ahmadinejad in particular, were markedly unpopular in rural areas.
That the countryside always votes conservative is a myth. The claim
that this year Ahmadinejad swept the board in more rural provinces
flies in the face of these trends.
Last paragraphs
------------------
The 2009 data suggests a sudden shift in political support with precisely these
rural provinces, which had not previously supported Ahmadinejad or any other
conservative (Fig.5), showing substantial swings to Ahmadinejad (Fig.6). At
the same time, the official data suggests that the vote for Mehdi Karrubi, who
was extremely popular in these rural, ethnic minority areas in 2005, has
collapsed entirely even in his home province of Lorestan, where his vote has
gone from 440,247 (55.5%) in 2005 to just 44,036 (4.6%) in 2009. This is
paralleled by an overall swing of 50.9% to Ahmadinejad, with official results
suggesting that he has captured the support of 47.5% of those who cast their
ballots for reformist candidates in 2005. This, more than any other result, is
highly implausible, and has been the subject of much debate in Iran.
This increase in support for Ahmadinejad amongst rural and ethnic minoritiy
voters is out of step with previous trends, extremely large in scale, and central
to the question of how the credibility of Ahmadinejad's victory has been
perceived within Iran.