March 2, 2009, 8:43 am
Failing the test
It’s a depressing spectacle: on both sides of the Atlantic, policy-makers just keep falling short — and the odds that this slump really will turn into Great Depression II keep rising.
In Europe, leaders rejected pleas for a comprehensive rescue plan for troubled East European economies, promising instead to provide “case-by-case” support. That means a slow dribble of funds, with no chance of reversing the downward spiral.
Oh, and Jean-Claude Trichet says that there is no deflation threat in Europe. What’s the weather like on his planet?
On this side of the Atlantic, Tim Geithner seems committed to the view that banks should stay private even if they’re bankrupt, because — well, just because. James Kwak is driven to exasperation:
To be blunt, it sounded like the “private is better” mantra we heard from the Bush administration, and (to a slightly less extent) the Clinton administration before them. Sure, most people agree you don’t want all individual lending decisions being made by bureaucrats in Washington, but that’s just a straw man. There are valid reasons to debate whether nationalization is the best solution; in particular, if you were to take over Citigroup, even for a short period of time, would that immediately weaken Bank of America so much that you would be forced to take it over the next day? And what about JPMorgan Chase? But that’s not what Geithner said. He said “private is better.”
And so is the extremely moderate Tim Duy, over the insistence of policymakers that the “true value” of assets is higher than anything the market is actually willing to pay:
Policymakers are assuming that restoring proper functioning in credit markets - and confidence in general - is equivalent to a housing price rebound. They seem incapable of envisioning a world in which this is not the case. This tunnel vision prevents policymakers of trying to devise policy which assumes that the many of the assets in the banking system are simply “bad.” For Bernanke and Geithner, there are no bad assets. Only misunderstood assets.
And we have the spectacle of James Baker — James Baker! — attacking the Obama administration from the left, calling for temporary nationalization of zombie banks as part of the recapitalization process.
The sickening feeling of drift — the sense that policymakers are refusing to face hard facts, and are dithering while the world economy burns — just keeps getting stronger.
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/failing-the-test/Right winger James Baker is now calling for temporary nationalization....or as he states it "temporary injection of public funds to clean up problem banks and return them to private ownership as soon as possible."
How Washington can prevent ‘zombie banks’
By James Baker
Published: March 1 2009 19:38 | Last updated: March 1 2009 19:38
Beginning in 1990, Japan suffered a collapse in real estate and stock market prices that pushed major banks into insolvency. Rather than follow America’s tough recommendation – and close or recapitalise these banks – Japan took an easier approach. It kept banks marginally functional through explicit or implicit guarantees and piecemeal government bail-outs. The resulting “zombie banks” – neither alive nor dead – could not support economic growth.
A period of feeble economic performance called Japan’s “lost decade” resulted.
Unfortunately, the US may be repeating Japan’s mistake by viewing our current banking crisis as one of liquidity and not solvency. Most proposals advanced thus far assume that, once confidence in financial markets is restored, banks will recover.
But if their assumption is wrong, we risk perpetuating US zombie banks and suffering a lost American decade.
Evidence – a mountain of toxic assets, housing market declines, a sharp economic recession, rising unemployment and increasing taxpayer exposure through guarantees, loans, and infusion of capital – strongly suggests that some American banks face a solvency problem and not merely a liquidity one.
We should act decisively. First, we need to understand the scope of the problem. The Treasury department – working with the Federal Reserve – must swiftly analyse the solvency of big US banks. Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner’s proposed “stress tests” may work. Any analyses, however, should include worst-case scenarios. We can hope for the best but should be prepared for the worst.
Next, we should divide the banks into three groups: the healthy, the hopeless and the needy. Leave the healthy alone and quickly close the hopeless. The needy should be reorganised and recapitalised, preferably through private investment or debt-to-equity swaps but, if necessary, through public funds. It is time for triage.
To prevent a bank run, all depositors of recapitalised banks should be fully guaranteed, even if their deposit exceeds the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation maximum of $250,000 (€197,000, £175,000). But bank boards of directors and senior management should be replaced and, unfortunately, shareholders will lose their investment. Optimally, bondholders would be wiped out, too. But the risk of a crash in the bond market means that bondholders may receive only a haircut. All of this is harsh, but required if we are ultimately to return market discipline to our financial sector.
This is not a call for nationalisation but rather for a temporary injection of public funds to clean up problem banks and return them to private ownership as soon as possible. As president Ronald Reagan’s secretary of the Treasury, I abhor the idea of government ownership – either partial or full – even if only temporary. Unfortunately, we may have no choice. But we must be very careful. The government should hold equity no longer than necessary to restructure the banks, resume normal lending and recoup at least a portion of taxpayer investment.
After replacing bank management with new private managers, the government should have no say in banks’ day-to-day operations.
The FDIC can assist. Just this year, it has placed more than a dozen American banks – admittedly all small – into receivership. We might also consider setting up something akin to the Resolution Trust Corporation, created in 1989 to liquidate the assets of failed savings and loans. The RTC eventually disposed of almost $400bn in assets of more than 700 insolvent thrifts
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b3f299a6-0697-11de-ab0f-000077b07658.html