Texas election experience.

[flamin lib]

Texas had a constitutional amendment election 11/6/07. I was election judge for my precinct. Here is my experience and a question for others who have worked polls.

Leaving aside for a moment that there is no paper trail, how do you feel about how the electronic voting and tabulating machines were secured in your precinct? Where I am the county uses an integrated system consisting of paper ballots counted by an optical scanner and a DRE with assistance for vision and mobility impaired voters. Any voter can use either at their preference.

The equipment is issued to the election judge no earlier than three days before the election and remains in their possession for chain of custody purposes. Carrying cases for the equipment are sealed with serial numbered security seals. The equipment is unpacked in front of poll workers on the day of the election and signatures of at least three people attest to the seals being in-tact on that day and inside the polling place.

Upon set-up a count tape is run showing how many votes have been counted on the equipment in it’s lifetime and the number of votes cast after activation on election day. If the second count is not “0” the judge is required to get new equipment and to issue paper ballots to be held under lock until new equipment arrives.

At the end of the day after polls are closed the machines provide a tape of total number of votes cast and a tally report of votes for/against each ballot item. Three copies of the tapes are made and submitted to three different election officials, the precinct judge being one. They also maintain a complete record of all access to the equipment and poll worker interaction with the equipment from power-up to power down including power interruptions and the necessary re-boot. Battery backup maintains all records inside the equipment for up to 18 hours should power remain off.

Once the polls are closed and the tapes run the equipment is sealed inside the cases and at least three people attest to the sealing of the equipment. When the equipment is returned to the county the seals are inspected and signatures verified. Paper ballots are also sealed in a box with signatures of witnesses.

As for the machines themselves, every access point is sealed. Data ports are covered with metal plates and serial numbered seals. The cover is also secured with a serial numbered seal. There is no user access to any portion of the equipment that will not be detected upon return to the county election division or recorded in the data. I spent some time looking at the equipment when I first got it and at the steps during it’s use and after polls closed and could see no way that anyone could tamper with data being collected. As technology knowledge goes I’m probably 8 on a scale of 1-10.

At the end of the day every paper ballot is accounted for as is every voter access code for the DRE (how many issued, how many used, how many expired before use). All totals have to match: ballots used, votes cast, DRE access codes issued, voter’s names on the voter roll and tapes generated.

Anyone else what to comment on their experiences?

[NMDemDist2]

1. that's how we do it in our county too. the only concerns then are who

inputs the totals into the CTU (Central Tabulator) and hoping the counters on the scanners haven't been tampered with.

Our county in '06 had the 'chips' done by ES&S for the election, but it has since been moved to our county Clerk's staff to program the chips which hold the election data for each precinct (offices being voted on etc)

our county doesn't give the machines to the PCs though, they are set onsite up to 4 days prior to the election but the seals are in place and the covers locked down

we also randomly hand count 5% of the precincts to test against the tapes

[flamin lib]

2. The county where I am doesn't like having the equipment outside

a known, proved chain of custody. Having the equipment on sight, they feel, is less secure than having it in the hands of an election official for the same amount of time.

Any "programing" done for different ballots is done by county employees. For the sake of clarity, the only "programing" done is configuring the ballots to fit local propositions. The State Ballot is sent by the Secretary of State to the counties for loading into the equipment. Each locale will add propositions to that basic package. Once the memory card is set up with a final ballot the top is sealed and remains sealed until the election is settled. As far as I can tell there is no access to the memory that stores vote count during the "programing" process.

I know there is random physical count verification but I'm not sure what % are checked.

Personally I was impressed with the integrity of the hardware and the methods taken to preserve it.

[NMDemDist2]

3. the problem is that those 'memory cards' can be tampered with

they can have a 'code line' that tells it to change the percentages to a pre set rate (ie, 52% Repuke, 48% Dem)

it's easy to do, but would take the collusion of the electors. the State data or County data either one could be corrupted with a 'pre-set'

I'm not saying it happens but it could.

the other weak point is the CTU which is quite a bit easier to get to since all the County people can log on to add totals. it's the Central Tabulator that a Sec of State could mess with easily.

[flamin lib]

4. Well, my OP was about security of the hardware. I don't have expertise

in software. However it seems to me that it would take a large conspiracy to modify 4000 memory cards, assuming that it could be done without detection. It seems to me that random verifications of paper counts could easily detect tampering. Only 1% of voters in my precinct voted on DRE and the paper ballot is actually faster even with a short line.

Once the elections are over and everybody has time I'll see what I can find out about what happens at the CTU. I've got a feeling it isn't as easy as it sounds because of all the scrutiny generated by 2000 FL and 2004 OH.

Not saying it's impossible, but it seems unlikely in the extreme.

[MrCoffee]

5. i have no experience as an election judge, just wanted to thank you for your work.

:applause: :patriot:

[Bucky]

6. I judged back in the old "rip thru the multiple sign-in copies and chad ballots" days

In Texas too. It was lousy work, but with 3-4 poll workers it took all of 20 minutes. I just don't trust the computers. The first time I tried it, it flipped my vote to GOP and I had to go back through it twice.

[flamin lib]

7. Gee, only 20 minutes. It took five minutes to verify the serial numbers

on the equipment seals and get signatures.