http://conflictsforum.org/articlepdfs/time-to-talk.pdf EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The prospect of a nuclear Iran causes acute concern not only in
the United States and Israel, but also in Europe, the Middle East
and most of the rest of the world. This report does not seek to
quantify the likelihood of military action against Iran. It argues
that the consequences of any possible future military action could
be wholly counterproductive as well as highly dangerous. Diplomatic
solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue must be pursued resolutely.
Iran’s nuclear programme– a cause for international concern?
The Iranian administration insists that its nuclear activities are directed solely
towards a civil nuclear power programme. However, many states share the
conviction that Iran is dedicated to becoming a nuclear weapons power and
that it must not be allowed to develop the capability of producing nuclear weapon
materials. The problem is that a fully indigenous civil nuclear power programme
involves all the dual-use technology necessary to produce military fissile material.
Iran has enjoyed considerable domestic and some international support for its
refusal to relinquish its legal entitlements, including from the Arab League and the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), but its record of misleading International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors has eroded international confidence in Iran’s
intentions and its willingness to agree to watertight controls on its nuclear
programme.
Since the international community was alerted to Iran’s secret nuclear activities
in 2002, various diplomatic strategies have been pursued. Despite many setbacks
some important progress has been achieved, such as the involvement of the major
players (China, France, Russia, the US, the UK and Germany), albeit indirectly in
the case of the US, and the formulation of serious incentives to induce Iranian
cooperation. Still, many within the US and Israeli administrations remain sceptical
that diplomacy can deliver. Accordingly, the military option not only remains on
the table but is also a real possibility in 2007.
Though debate has largely centred on Iran’s uranium enrichment activities,
Iran could also build a nuclear weapon by reprocessing plutonium. To ensure
that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon capability, both of these routes
would have to be blocked. The civil nuclear power reactor in Bushehr is due
to be started in September 2007 (nuclear fuel supplied by Russia will be on site
from March 2007).1 Beyond this date, military strikes on Bushehr could unleash
nuclear contamination so severe that it is unlikely that such strikes would be
undertaken from that point forth. If Bushehr is on the list of targets, these
considerations could hasten any plans for military action.
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http://conflictsforum.org/articlepdfs/time-to-talk.pdf