Talk to Mullah Omar, if it saves British soldiers' lives

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http://politics.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1865734,00.html

Hamid Karzai admits what our leaders can't: to achieve security in Afghanistan, he must do a deal with the Taliban

Simon Jenkins
Wednesday September 6, 2006
The Guardian


This time there are no excuses. Every scrap of intelligence warned the government not to fight a war against insurgency in south Afghanistan. Ask the CIA, MI6, the former service chiefs Lord Inge and Lord Guthrie, and Nato allies who thought the then defence secretary, John Reid, was mad. Ask the Americans, who were losing more men than in Iraq and were wisely withdrawing. Read the reports published throughout 2004/5 that the Taliban were back in strength. These were veteran guerrillas, well armed, who could count on the tacit support of tens of thousands of tribal militias. What made Tony Blair think he could beat them with just 4,000 soldiers? The Soviets lost with 120,000.

This expedition ranks among the stupidest in recent British history - and there is serious competition. It was undertaken under the aegis of Nato, designed for a different purpose and notorious for incoherent decision. This meant British forces would not be masters of their fate but at the mercy of a caravanserai of some 36 nations in Kabul, most with no intention of getting hurt.

When I met the effervescent Lieutenant General David Richards, currently head of Nato operations, in June, I shared the view of all who visit British troops on the ground. I was impressed by their morale and technical competence. But such visits (which rarely stray off base) risk buying into the dangerous assumption that military competence can compensate for political folly. These British soldiers are not fighting "against terrorism" or dying "for democracy". They are dying because the Americans wanted out and George Robertson, the political head of Nato, craved a purpose in life. (The same Robertson, as defence secretary, protected the Eurofighter, aircraft carrier and Trident budgets at the expense of less glamorous kit now desperately needed in Helmand.)

What baffled me was Richards's naivete about the Taliban, on whom there was already a copious and alarming literature. He was full of "Malayan inkspot strategies", winning "hearts and minds" and not fighting the American way, such as bombing and strafing civilians. Richards said he had enough troops to do the job and was gung ho. I left his office in a daze. Was this how the British set off to the Dardenelles?

None of the objectives set by Reid in January was achievable. Commons bombast about gallant troops driving the "remnants of the Taliban ... into their last bastions", eradicating poppies and building schools, clinics and democracy, was drivel. So was Reid's talk of the "fundamental difference" between US counter-terrorism and British reconstruction. Semantics about rules of engagement and "not firing a shot" was equally hollow; in Helmand the British are consuming ammunition faster than at any time since the second world war.