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I do not think, for example, that there is any such thing as "trees" in an abstract sense: I recognize only that there are many particular objects, each of which might be called "a tree," though they differ so widely in their characteristics that no absolutely clear-cut definition is possible. I think particular instances are worth examining, and I will admit (say) that "redwoods" are closer to existing in any abstract sense than "trees" are, because the characteristics of "redwoods" are better defined than the characteristics of "trees"
In the same fashion, I do not think that there is any such thing as "fanatics" in an abstract sense: I recognize only that there are many particular persons, each of which might be called "a fanatic," though they differ so widely in their characteristics that no absolutely clear-cut definition is possible. Again, I think particular instances are worth examining; but the possibility of a useful typology for "fanatics" is somewhat less clear than the possibility of a useful typology of "trees." With "trees," one actually makes some progress by distinguishing "oaks," "maples," "birches," and so on -- with human "fanatics," a factually-based materially-useful classification seems rather harder to produce
If you label member of the Taliban, or of the so-called "Westboro Baptist Church" as fanatics, I will of course have a general sense of your criticism of them, and I will probably concur with the general flavor of that criticism. And in ordinary conversation, I am very unlikely to try to slice-n-dice philosophical niceties, since that sort of thing generally brings nothing useful to the table
But if the question is, How does one avoid fanaticism? and if one accepts (as examples of "fanatics") members of the Taliban or of "Westboro Baptist Church" -- then I begin to have some serious doubts. The Taliban appears in one particular economic, cultural, and historical context; "Westboro Baptist Church" occurs in a completely different economic, cultural, and historical context
If one wants to understand phenomena, then phenomena should first be studied in some particularity: abstraction can be a powerful tool, but abstractions are most useful when they are derived from a multitude of specific instances. Here, I should be concerned for the following reason: instead of beginning with the phenomena, trying to grasp the facts clearly, and then seeking to abstract by comparing various examples, one apparently begins from the abstraction and then attempts to overlay the abstraction onto the phenomena, in the hopes that the phenomena can thereby be explained. This, to me, seems "ass-backwards"
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