NC Transfer Error Misses 12,000 Votes

[jhgatiss]

I just ran across this in Google. I hadn't seen this PARTICULAR NC error yet.

http://www.charlotte.com/mld/observer/news/local/10192340.htm?1c

I find it interesting that the county pays a Diebold technician to run the system on election day.

[Demit]

1. could you provide a snip? 4 paragraphs? that's a site you have to

register for.

[WestHoustonDem]

2. Here's the whole thing

Gaston investigates election tally errors

Maker of vote-counting machinery asked to check equipment

BINYAMIN APPELBAUM

Staff Writer

GASTONIA - Gaston Elections Director Sandra Page said for the first time Monday that her office is investigating why more than 13,000 votes were excluded from the county's unofficial election results.

Page said the investigation so far pointed to an interrupted download as the likely cause of the exclusion of about 12,000 early votes. She said human error by poll workers probably resulted in the omission of 1,200 votes from a Dallas precinct.

The Gaston elections office has faced mounting criticism for its initial failure to count the votes and because almost a week passed after the Nov. 2 election before the errors were corrected. The errors were caught before the county submitted its official results to the state, and they did not change the outcome of any local race.

Monday was Page's first day at work since last Tuesday -- she has been home sick -- and she said she moved quickly to find out what went wrong.

Page said she has asked the company that manufactured Gaston's vote-counting machines, Diebold Election Systems of McKinney, Texas, to review the operation of its equipment. A spokesman for Diebold confirmed that the company is doing so.

The county pays a technician from Diebold to operate its systems on Election Day. That person was in charge of transferring early votes from electronic storage to the counting computer. Diebold believes the transmission was interrupted, said spokesman David Bear.

"It's understood that it was an interruption, and now the question is why didn't we" catch it, Bear said.

Page said she was also planning to speak with poll workers at the Dallas precinct about the possibility that they transmitted their votes incorrectly to the elections office on Election Day.

The laptop computer used to transmit results from the Dallas Civic Center recorded only a single vote from each of the precinct's voting machines, Page said.

The votes are transferred from the machines to the laptop by disk. Page believes the error occurred because poll workers removed the disks from the laptop too quickly.

"These aren't computer people," she said.

[CAcyclist]

4. A Technician From Diebold Operated The System on Election Day

"The county pays a technician from Diebold to operate its systems on Election Day. That person was in charge of transferring early votes from electronic storage to the counting computer. Diebold believes the transmission was interrupted, said spokesman David Bear."

[NewYorkerfromMass]

6. and I believe democracy was interrupted

it's ludicrous how much more prone the vote counting now is to error with these computers. and that is just an objective viewpoint.

[Demit]

11. thanks! Sometimes I just get registered out.

[Lil]

20. kick

[Streetdoc270]

3. use this

www.bugmenot.com

[glitch]

5. "These aren't computer people," she said.

Great...

[KurtNYC]

10. Then have the election on PAPER ballots

and count them by hand publicly!

[milkyway]

7. WTF?! A Diebold guy running the machines on election day? Great find!

[Demit]

12. and the fact the county PAID the Deibold tech is adding insult to injury.

[StephanieMarie]

8. I signed up and copied the whole thing. What a pile of crap!!!

Posted on Tue, Nov. 16, 2004

Gaston investigates election tally errors

Maker of vote-counting machinery asked to check equipment

BINYAMIN APPELBAUM

Staff Writer


GASTONIA - Gaston Elections Director Sandra Page said for the first time Monday that her office is investigating why more than 13,000 votes were excluded from the county's unofficial election results.

Page said the investigation so far pointed to an interrupted download as the likely cause of the exclusion of about 12,000 early votes. She said human error by poll workers probably resulted in the omission of 1,200 votes from a Dallas precinct.

The Gaston elections office has faced mounting criticism for its initial failure to count the votes and because almost a week passed after the Nov. 2 election before the errors were corrected. The errors were caught before the county submitted its official results to the state, and they did not change the outcome of any local race.

Monday was Page's first day at work since last Tuesday -- she has been home sick -- and she said she moved quickly to find out what went wrong.

Page said she has asked the company that manufactured Gaston's vote-counting machines, Diebold Election Systems of McKinney, Texas, to review the operation of its equipment. A spokesman for Diebold confirmed that the company is doing so.

The county pays a technician from Diebold to operate its systems on Election Day. That person was in charge of transferring early votes from electronic storage to the counting computer. Diebold believes the transmission was interrupted, said spokesman David Bear.

"It's understood that it was an interruption, and now the question is why didn't we" catch it, Bear said.

Page said she was also planning to speak with poll workers at the Dallas precinct about the possibility that they transmitted their votes incorrectly to the elections office on Election Day.

The laptop computer used to transmit results from the Dallas Civic Center recorded only a single vote from each of the precinct's voting machines, Page said.

The votes are transferred from the machines to the laptop by disk. Page believes the error occurred because poll workers removed the disks from the laptop too quickly.

"These aren't computer people," she said.

Binyamin Appelbaum: [phone]; [e-mail]

[aprillcm]

9. This is how we know

The fact that Main Steam Media the big three news people have ingored all the voting problems in my state is as we say around my house proof that They are NOT NOT NOT going to cover any election day fraud or error in any real way!

[jhgatiss]

13. Sorry all...

I found this on Google and I wasn't prompted for a registration. I wouldn't have registered. I get registered out too. It is interesting though!

[Blue in the face]

14. Gastonia

I have a friend that lives in Gastonia, NC. Does anyone think that a FOIA request would be helpful? I'll do it, but I would like to be able to get some feedback from some on the board that are more knowledgable about what to look for.

[milkyway]

15. Wow. One of the infamous Diebold memos from 2001 mentioned Gaston.

It's hard to believe that even after this internal Diebold memo became public, Diebold is allowed to operate the machines on election day in 2004. Were the Gaston officials unaware of this?

Also interesting is the reply from Finberg. He says that Metamor (Ciber), who certifies the machines, restricts the server password to authorized staff in the jurisdiction. Diebold people are not in the jurisdiction (by this I assume Metamor restricted access to only government officials of a particular jurisdiction). I wonder if this is still the case.

(The bold emphasis was added by me).

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00150.htm

__________

Reply from Ken Clark, principal engineer for Diebold Election Systems

RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access

To:
Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Ken Clark"
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700
Importance: Normal
In-reply-to:

Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course everyone knows perception is reality.

Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with progress and do the same. The same would go for anyone else's system using whatever database they are using. Hard drives are read-write entities. You can change their contents.

Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very *easy* to change the contents. Double click the .mdb file. Even technical wizards at Metamor (or Ciber, or whatever) can figure that one out.

It is possible to put a secret password on the .mdb file to prevent Metamor from opening it with Access. I've threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before.

Note however that even if we put a password on the file, it doesn't really prove much. Someone has to know the password, else how would GEMS open it. So this technically brings us back to square one: the audit log is modifiable by that person at least (read, me). Back to perception though, if you don't bring this up you might skate through Metamor.

There might be some clever crypto techniques to make it even harder to change the log (for me, they guy with the password that is). We're talking big changes here though, and at the moment largely theoretical ones. I'd doubt that any of our competitors are that clever.

By the way, all of this is why Texas gets its sh*t in a knot over the log printer. Log printers are not read-write, so you don't have the problem. Of course if I were Texas I would be more worried about modifications to our electronic ballots than to our electron logs, but that is another story I guess.

Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take to make them happy. You can try the old standard of the NT password gains access to the operating system, and that after that point all bets are off. You have to trust the person with the NT password at least. This is all about Florida, and we have had VTS certified in Florida under the status quo for nearly ten years.

I sense a loosing battle here though. The changes to put a password on the .mdb file are not trivial and probably not even backward compatible, but we'll do it if that is what it is going to take.

Ken

__________

Reply by Nel Finberg

RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access

To:
Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Nel Finberg"
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 14:48:16 -0700
Importance: Normal

Thanks for the response, Ken. For now Metamor accepts the requirement to restrict the server password to authorized staff in the jurisdiction, and that it should be the responsibility of the jurisdiction to restrict knowledge of this password. So no action is necessary in this matter, at this time. Nel

[milkyway]

16. The more you learn about Diebold, the more they seem like Enron.

The same business culture. Do whatever you can get away with.

[damntexdem]

17. Oh, how naive!

Expecting the votes cast to actually be counted!

What do they think this is -- a democracy?

[TexasLawyer]

18. A Great Summary of NC Voting Problems

(at least the problems discovered thus far since election
date).

The article pasted below is from today's PRWeb, www.prweb.com 


  
  
A Florida Style Nightmare - North Carolina Citizens Demand
Verified Voting Measures 

North Carolina "has the worst election problem in the
country RIGHT NOW according to Dr. David Dill of Stanford
University. Election Officials bamboozled by slick claims of
voting machine salesmen, salesmen failed to warn of flaws and
limitations that caused disaster on November 2

(PRWEB) November 17, 2004 -- "NC has the worst election
problem in the country RIGHT NOW." - November 11, 2004
Computer scientist Dr. David L. Dill of Stanford University.

"A Florida-style nightmare has unfolded in North Carolina
in the days since Election Day, with thousands of votes
missing and the outcome of two statewide races still up in the
air." Steve Hartsoe, AP Newswire, Nov 13, 2004 

How can we trust our key decision-makers when they ignore the
seriousness of the problem? 

"Except for the lost votes in Carteret County, Gary
Bartlett, executive director of the North Carolina State Board
of Elections, called the problems 'easily remedied and lessons
learned.' " AP Newswire, Nov 13, 2004. This is definitely
a rosy view to an election where citizens votes were lost,
public totals were mis-tabulated, thousands of provisional
ballots were generated, thousands of absentee and early
ballots were “misplaced“, and two state-wide races still
unresolved.

North Carolina’s election problems will not be so easily
remedied as Mr. Bartlett says. The degree and severity of
problems in North Carolina’s election system indicates the
need for serious study. Many of the problems are compounded by
the State’s reliance on non-verifiable voting systems.
Problems with voting machines, central tabulators using
outdated and secret software, registration confusion, poll
worker training, provisional ballots and absentee ballots are
not easily remedied. The Board of Elections must change its
focus towards election management. If the State insists on
being dependent on electronic voting, when it is clear that
the officials know very little or nothing about it.

Lost: 4,500 votes in Carteret County - this is the consequence
of e-voting without a proper paper trail. 

Omitted: entire precinct of 1,209 votes in Gaston County left
out of Nov 2 Count.

Missing: 12,000 votes not reported by Diebold Software in
Gaston County.

Bamboozled: In 2003 Guilford County bought vote tabulating
software that used over a decade old technology, it was
already obsolete when purchased. This software released
presidential vote totals that were off by 22,000 votes.

More votes than cast: Craven County reported 11,283 more votes
for president than cast, voting software same as in Guilford
County.

In the past, the NC BOE has relied on the advice of voting
machine salesmen and turned a deaf ear to the good advice and
warning of thousands of computer scientists across the
country. The voting machine vendors gain access to some of our
election officials via a private organization called The
Election Center. This is a private, non-profit whose “mission”
is to educate and inform election officials, yet this group
admits to accepting money from the voting machine companies.

Just this August “The Election Center” hosted a conference for
election officials. The voting machine salesmen wined and
dined election officials from across the country, giving them
parties, prizes and a dinner cruise on the Potomac. Gary
Bartlett sits on the Board of Directors of the Election
Center, an ethical situation that voting activists find
troubling.

Who are we trusting our democracy to? 
In 2002, Tom Eschberger, then at Global Business Systems
accepted immunity in reward for his testimony in the bribery
kickback conviction of then SOS of Arkansas, Bill McCuen.
Eshberger went on to be a key executive at the ES&S Voting
machinery company.

In 1999, two Sequoia (Voting Systems) executives, Phil Foster
and Pasquale Ricci, were indicted for paying Louisiana
Commissioner of Elections Jerry Fowler an $8 million bribe to
buy their voting machines. Fowler, is currently serving five
years in prison. Voter advocate Bev Harris alleged that
managers of a subsidiary of Diebold Inc. (voting machines),
included a cocaine trafficker, a man who conducted fraudulent
stock transactions, and a programmer jailed for falsifying
computer records, Jeffrey Dean, who served time in a
Washington correctional facility for stealing money and
tampering with computer files.

In March of this year, the BOE turned down the opportunity to
certify for state use a voting system that did provide a Voter
Verified Paper Ballot and used the highly desirable open
source operating system. 

Over 2000 technologists endorsed Verified Voting’s resolution
saying “Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject to
programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious
tampering...”

The continued computer breakdowns and mis-counts prove the
need for a voter verified paper ballot. This is not a receipt
that we ask for, but a paper printout of a ballot to be
verified by the voter and kept by the election officials in
case of recount, audit or computer breakdown. Any computerized
voting systems must have open source code that can be publicly
examined by computer scientists who have no financial interest
in our voting equipment. Funding from the Help America Vote
Act can be used to fund this solution. 

The North Carolina State Board of Elections can do the right
thing by consulting with recognized computer scientists such
as Dr. David Dill of Stanford University, Dr. Rebecca Mercuri
of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Dan Wallach of
Rice University, Professor Doug Jones of the University of
Iowa Computer Science Department.

These computer scientists are world renown and have availed
themselves to election officials across the nation in advisory
capacities regarding electronic voting.

The State can institute real requirements based on these
recommendations, including a VVPB, and allow sufficient time
for a thorough review,to ensure that North Carolina’s voting
system is the most secure and trustworthy in America.

###



Contact Information  
Joyce Mccloy
NORTH CAROLINA COALITION FOR VERIFIED VOTING
http://www.ncvoter.net
336-794-1240
 
 

 


 
  
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[newyawker99]

19. Hi TexasLawyer!!

Welcome to DU!! :toast:

[robicat]

21. 12,000 votes

Multiply that seemingly small glitch by 300 (assuming it happened in 300 precincts and you get a massive ....3.6 million.....

Any "glitch" or "fraud" that is exposed has massive significance.
A 300 vote error duplicated 500 times across the country = 150,000 votes.

Every error is important. Every one is a potential act of frauud.
Every one is potentially duplicable. There has to be an audit. And that can only mean a full recount by hand of ever race. If you can't overturn the result ypu aty least have to put the machines on trail.

I actually think this is the most marketable demand that this movement can make - for a full audit of electronic voting, so that there can be a real assessment of the worth of the machines.
That said i bet that one side of politics argue like hell against an audit.

2000 election, Enron, S11, WMD, Abu Gharib, job losses, the deficit and now this.....

Amazing what a government can get away with with a docile public and press. Great to see you dudes organising and mobilising.

[The Flaming Red Head]

22. kick