controlled by DRE business) people plus folks either uninformed or technically incapable.
You do not get such poor witness panels without trying.
Holt does control the lists through his committee staff - or he ignores his lack of management ability for a reason. I spoke to staff and faxed, etc - and could not get anything changed or even get change discussed - although they are very polite and friendly.
The stacking of the record was no accident - and audit sizes was but one of about 20 changes being needed. But it looked like the bill was being set up to bargain away the mandatory part and the random part and leave us with some ignorable percentage. I worked in DC for many many years and all this smelled too familiar.
As to a business model, DRE is not sold on need or excellence for function or work flow improvement or cost savings - it is sold on mandate plus getting the disabled scared.
The op-ed open letter does not appear to have any holes - do you see any?
The Holt HR811 smells like its been corrupted by the corporations - and it is the only thing moving on election reform.
Can you offer a "this is not a corrupted process" explanation for either the EAC no actions on a host of issues, or the Holt committee staff setting up panels that exclude well credentialed strong critics of the system? Since we last posted to each other a lot more election theft news has come out of Ohio. I agree with your (and Liz's) red shift analysis - the corruption was not nationwide and had no pattern except to be always in the GOP's favor (a comment not based on statistics - only on subsequent revelations by those that were there who actually reported the problems - you have to look very hard to find any real reports on Dems doing odd things and then getting good election results), and the data is too sparse to conclude anything about a given machine.
Indeed it is the corruption I saw in 1960 with Nixon's Illinois voter suppression so as to keep "unqualified" (read non GOP) voters from voting and with random polling stations getting ahead of the curve and actually changing voting counts and losing ballots (reported in the media 6 months later when ballot boxes floated to the surface in the Fox and DesPlaines River spring floods outside Chicago - reported in the Waukegan NewsSun but only in the obscure section that reported the various towns' police logs during the flood - and with not one actual story for follow up.
It has not changed in 50 years - the corrupt GOP steals elections as they yell about keeping elections clean - and with the Holt bill it seems there will not be real change - just a calming of the crowd.
as to the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) being in the pocket of the GOP/DRE company owners:
EXCLUSIVE: ES&S TOUCH-SCREEN VOTING SYSTEMS FOUND VULNERABLE TO 'SERIOUS' VIRAL VOTE-FLIPPING ATTACK; U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION REFUSES TO ISSUE WARNING
Scientific Report Finds 'Serious Security Vulnerability' Similar to 'Princeton Diebold Virus Hack' in Widely Used iVotronic System, Allowing a Single Person to Change Election Results Across Entire County Without Detection
Despite GAO Confirmed Mandate to Serve as Info 'Clearinghouse', Embattled EAC Says They Will Take No Action to Alert Elections Officials, Public
-- By Michael Richardson and Brad Friedman
While revelations surrounding the mysterious 18,000 "undervotes" in the November 2006 U.S. House election between Christine Jennings and Vern Buchanan in Florida's 13th Congressional district continue to inform the nation about the dangers of electronic voting machines, new information has recently come to light exposing a shocking lack of responsible oversight by those entrusted with overseeing the certification of electronic voting systems at the federal level.
An investigation into what may have gone wrong in that election has revealed a serious security vulnerability on all versions of the iVotronic touch-screen voting system widely used across the country. The iVotronic is a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) touch-screen voting machine manufactured by Elections Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S), the nation's largest distributor of such systems.
The vulnerability is said to allow for a single malicious user to introduce a virus into the system which "could potentially steal all the votes in that county, without being detected," according to a noted computer scientist and voting system expert who has reviewed the findings.
And yet, despite their federal mandate to serve as a "clearinghouse" to the nation for such information, a series of email exchanges between an Election Integrity advocate and officials at the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC), has revealed that the federal oversight body is refusing to notify states of the alarming security issue.
The recent email conversation shows that even in light of the EAC's review of the warning from the computer scientist who characterized the "security hole" as severe, needing to be "taken very seriously," and among the most serious ever discovered in a voting system, the EAC is unwilling to take action.
Recent reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have taken the EAC to task for a failure to meet their legislated mandate for informing the public and elections officials about such matters. However, a review of the email communications to and from the EAC's Jeannie Layson, show that the federal body is steadfast in their refusal to take action to alert either elections officials or the public about the security risk recently discovered by a team of eight noted computer scientists.
The EAC's current Chairwoman, Executive Director, Director of Voting System Certification and other top officials at both the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) and even the GAO were included in the series of email communications, The BRAD BLOG has learned.
The vulnerability was initially discovered by a panel of scientists convened by the State of Florida to study the possible causes for the FL-13 election debacle. The team's discovery revealed a design issue in the widely used iVotronic system could allow for a viral attack, by a single individual, which could then spread unnoticed throughout the electronic election infrastructure of an entire county.
A similar vulnerability was found in DRE touch-screen system made by Diebold last Summer by a team of computer scientists at Princeton University.
Attempts to seek information about EAC plans to notify other states and local jurisdictions who use the same vulnerable voting systems as the ones in FL-13 have been met with an astounding refusal, troubling denial, buck-passing, and a lack of accountability by the federal commission of Presidential-appointees. The agency has also come under fire in recent weeks for a number of questionably partisan decisions and other failures to perform as mandated by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002.
Of late, the EAC has been forced to respond to a great deal of controversy, on a number of different operational matters and policies, as revealed by a series of articles on this site and in mainstream outlets such as the New York Times and USA Today. Several of those matters have drawn Congressional notice, questioning of EAC officials and letters of inquiry. Thus, this latest revelation is likely to add to the rising concern of Congress members as new federal legislation introduced by Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), and currently facing mark-up by a Congressional committee, would permanently fund the now-embattled EAC. Funding for the agency was originally mandated by HAVA only through 2005.
The new ES&S iVotronic vulnerability first emerged on February 23, 2007, when the Florida Dept. of State released a report detailing their findings from the investigation into what happened in Sarasota's still-contested Jennings/Buchanan race. That election was ultimately decided by just 369 votes. The state's official findings included a report
conducted by an eight-member computer science and technology team under the auspices of Florida State University (FSU). The report sought, unsuccessfully, to determine the cause of the unexplained "undervotes" reported by the iVotronic touch-screen voting systems used in Sarasota's portion of the FL-13 race on Election Day and in early voting.
Although the reason thousands of votes turned up missing from those systems remained unknown, the study team did discover a serious security flaw in the iVotronic system that is used in Sarasota and many other jurisdictions across the country (and even the world, as France is set to use the same systems in their upcoming Presidential Election.)
Election integrity watchdog John Gideon, a frequent BRAD BLOG contributer and the Co-Director and Information Manager for VotersUnite.org, says that the security flaw pertains to "every ES&S iVotronic voting machine used in the US and overseas." A total of eight separate versions of the system --- without and without so-called "voter verified paper audit trail" (VVPAT)" printers --- all currently approved as qualified at the federal level, are affected, he explained...
COMPLETE EXCLUSIVE REPORT: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4396
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