Holts HR 811, where is it?

[FogerRox]

I spent a good 20 minutes, went to Thomas, Holts site, googled, nada.

I want to read this for myself. It is on the net yet?

Roger.

[OnTheOtherHand]

1. two or three ways

This link may work: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h811ih.txt.pdf

or else go to http://thomas.loc.gov and type HR 811 into the search box -- then select "bill number" not "word/phrase"

A third in a moment... EDIT TO ADD... ah, forget it, stick with authoritative sources.

[FogerRox]

8. Earlier this morning it was not @ Thomas or Holts site.

ah, forget it, stick with authoritative sources.

My thought- exactly.

Thomas posted it today, I dunnu how so may reviews came out prior.

[eomer]

2. Here it is:

Edit: DU doesn't like the link so I'm posting with smilies
disabled and with the plain text option.  You can copy the
link into the browser address bar.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d110:9:./temp/~bdNrMd::|/bss/d110query.html|

[FogerRox]

3. Great thanks, I guess thomas just put it up

I checked earlier this morning, all I got was HR 811 from the 109th Congress.

[FogerRox]

4. Section 1 & 2 & 247

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007'.

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

(a) Ballot Verification and Audit Capacity-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:

`(2) BALLOT VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL-

`(i) The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted. For purposes of this clause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election official (whether from a domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot created through the use of a ballot marking device or system, or a paper ballot produced by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so long as in each case the voter is permitted to verify the ballot in a paper form in accordance with this subparagraph.

`(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error made by the system in the voter-verified paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with subparagraph (B)(i).

`(iii) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verifiable paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter's vote.

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The permanent voter-verified paper ballot produced in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall be preserved--

`(I) in the case of votes cast at the polling place on the date of the election, within the polling place in the manner or method in which all other paper ballots are preserved within such polling place;

`(II) in the case of votes cast at the polling place prior to the date of the election or cast by mail, in a manner which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving such ballots in general; or

`(III) in the absence of either such manner or method, in a manner which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving paper ballots in general.

`(ii) Each paper ballot produced pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent to that of a paper ballot voting system.

`(iii) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), and subject to subparagraph (D), the individual permanent paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast and shall be used as the official ballots for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.

`(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR VOTES CAST BY ABSENT MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS- In the case of votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the ballots cast by such voters shall serve as the permanent paper ballot under subparagraph (A) in accordance with protocols established by the Commission, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense after notice and opportunity for public comment, which preserve the privacy of the voter and are consistent with the requirements of such Act and this Act, except that to the extent that such protocols permit the use of electronic mail in the delivery or submission of such ballots, paragraph (11) shall not apply with respect to the delivery or submission of the ballots.

`(D) SPECIAL RULE FOR TREATMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN PAPER BALLOTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE COMPROMISED- In the event of any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), any person seeking to show that the electronic vote tally should be given preference in determining the official count for the election shall be required to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the paper ballots have been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election would be changed. For purposes of the previous sentence, the paper ballots associated with each voting machine shall be considered on a voting-machine-by-voting-machine basis, and only the sets of paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered in the calculation of whether or not the election would be changed due to the compromised paper ballots.'.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT CLARIFYING APPLICABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE ACCESSIBILITY- Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(4)) is amended by inserting `(including the paper ballots required to be produced under paragraph (2) and the notice required under paragraph (8))' after `voting system'.

(3) OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(1)) is amended--

(A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)';

(B) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)';

(C) in subparagraph (A)(iii), as amended by paragraph (2), by striking `counted' each place it appears and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)'; and

(D) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)'.

(b) Accessibility and Ballot Verification for Individuals With Disabilities-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(3)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:

`(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place; and

`(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--

`(I) allows the voter to privately and independently verify the content of the permanent paper ballot through the conversion of the printed content into accessible media, and

`(II) ensures that the entire process of ballot verification and vote casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities.'.

(2) SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS-

(A) STUDY AND REPORTING- Subtitle C of title II of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15381 et seq.) is amended--

(i) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and

(ii) by inserting after section 246 the following new section:

`SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.

`(a) Study and Report- The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall study, test, and develop best practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this section, the Director shall specifically investigate existing and potential methods or devices that will assist such individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper ballots and in reading or transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back to such individuals and voters.

`(b) Deadline- The Director shall complete the requirements of subsection (a) not later than January 1, 2010.

`(c) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $1,000,000, to remain available until expended.'.

(B) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of contents of such Act is amended--

(i) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as relating to section 248; and

(ii) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the following new item:

`Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible voter verification mechanisms.'.

(3) CLARIFICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS UNDER VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDANCE- In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the ballot verification requirements for individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such subtitle.

(c) Additional Voting System Requirements-

(1) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED- Section 301(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

`(7) INSTRUCTION OF ELECTION OFFICIALS- Each State shall ensure that all election officials are instructed on the right of any individual who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, other disability, or inability to read or write to be given assistance by a person chosen by that individual under section 208 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

`(8) INSTRUCTION REMINDING VOTERS OF IMPORTANCE OF VERIFYING PAPER BALLOT-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The appropriate election official at each polling place shall cause to be placed in a prominent location in the polling place a notice containing the following statement, in boldface type, large font, and using only upper-case letters: `THE PAPER BALLOT REPRESENTING YOUR VOTE SHALL SERVE AS THE VOTE OF RECORD IN ALL RECOUNTS AND AUDITS. DO NOT LEAVE THE VOTING BOOTH UNTIL YOU HAVE CONFIRMED THAT IT ACCURATELY RECORDS YOUR VOTE'.

`(B) SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES- All voting systems equipped for individuals with disabilities shall transmit by accessible media the statement referred to in subparagraph (A), as well as an explanation of the verification process described in paragraph (3)(B)(ii).

`(9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system used in an election for Federal office shall at any time contain or use any software not certified by the State for use in the election or any software undisclosed to the State in the certification process. The appropriate election official shall disclose, in electronic form, the source code, object code, and executable representation of the voting system software and firmware to the Commission, including ballot programming files, and the Commission shall make that source code, object code, executable representation, and ballot programming files available for inspection promptly upon request to any person.

`(10) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, remote, wide area, or concealed communication device at all.

`(11) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM OR TRANSMISSION OF SYSTEM INFORMATION OVER THE INTERNET- No component of any voting device upon which votes are cast shall be connected to the Internet at any time.

`(12) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS USED IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- No voting system may be used in an election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of such system and the election officials using such system meet the applicable requirements described in subparagraph (B).

`(B) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED- The requirements described in this subparagraph are as follows:

`(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall document the secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote storage media, and ballots used in connection with voting systems, and shall make the information available upon request to the Commission.

`(ii) The manufacturer of the software used in the operation of the system shall provide the appropriate election official with updated information regarding the identification of each individual who participated in the writing of the software, including specific information regarding whether the individual has ever been convicted of a crime involving election, accounting, or computer security fraud.

`(iii) The manufacturer shall provide the appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official to provide information to the Commission under paragraph (9).

`(iv) After the appropriate election official has certified the source code, object code, and executable representation of the voting system software for use in an election, the manufacturer may not--

`(I) alter such codes and representation; or

`(II) insert or use in the voting system any software not certified by the State for use in the election.

`(v) The appropriate election official shall ensure that all voting machines and related supplies to be used in the election shall remain secured within storage facilities arranged for by the election official, and shall not be removed from such facilities until such time as they are to be delivered to the relevant polling place and secured at the polling place until used in the election.

`(vi) The manufacturer shall meet standards established by the Commission to prevent the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest with respect to candidates for public office and political parties, including standards to ensure that the manufacturer's officers and directors do not hold positions of authority in any political party or in any partisan political campaign, and shall certify to the Commission not later than January 31 of each even-numbered year that it meets the standards established under this clause.

`(vii) At the request of the Commission, the appropriate election official shall submit information to the Commission regarding the State's compliance with this subparagraph.

`(13) DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS-

`(A) DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER BALLOTS- All voter-verified paper ballots required to be used under this Act (including the emergency paper ballots used under paragraph (14)) shall be marked, printed, or recorded on durable paper of archival quality capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts without compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots, and capable of retaining the information marked, printed, or recorded on them for the full duration of the retention and preservation period called for by title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974 et seq.) or under applicable State law, whichever is longer.

`(B) READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE-MARKED OR PRINTED PAPER BALLOTS- All voter-verified paper ballots marked or printed through the use of a marking or printing device shall be clearly readable by the naked eye and by a scanner or other device equipped for voters with disabilities.

`(14) PROHIBITING TURNING INDIVIDUALS AWAY FROM POLLING PLACES BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH OR SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT, BALLOTS, OR SUPPLIES-

`(A) ENSURING ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES- Each State shall ensure that the voting systems it uses to conduct elections for Federal office are designed in a manner that ensures that no voter will be unable to cast a ballot at a polling place due to a shortage or failure of voting equipment, ballots, or necessary supplies.

`(B) USE OF EMERGENCY PAPER BALLOTS IN CASE OF SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE- In the event of the failure of voting equipment or other circumstance at a polling place that causes a delay, any individual who is waiting at the polling place to cast a ballot in an election for Federal office and who would be delayed due to such failure or other circumstance shall be advised immediately of the individual's right to use an emergency paper ballot, and upon request shall be provided with an emergency paper ballot for the election and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot. Any emergency paper ballot which is cast by an individual under this subparagraph shall be counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot and not as a provisional ballot, unless the individual casting the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot if the voting equipment at the polling place had not failed.'.

(2) REQUIRING LABORATORIES TO MEET STANDARDS PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS CONDITION OF ACCREDITATION FOR TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEM HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE-

(A) IN GENERAL- Section 231(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15371(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

`(3) PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS-

`(A) IN GENERAL- A laboratory may not be accredited by the Commission for purposes of this section unless--

`(i) the laboratory certifies that the only compensation it receives for the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of the manufacturer's voting system hardware and software is the payment made from the Testing Escrow Account under paragraph (4);

`(ii) the laboratory meets the standards applicable to the manufacturers of voting systems under section 301(a)(11)(B)(vi), together with such standards as the Commission shall establish (after notice and opportunity for public comment) to prevent the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest in the testing carried out by the laboratory under this section, including standards to ensure that the laboratory does not have a financial interest in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of voting system hardware and software, and is sufficiently independent from other persons with such an interest;

`(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will permit an expert designated by the Commission to observe any testing the laboratory carries out under this section; and

`(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any testing carried out under this section, discloses the test protocols, results, and all communication between the laboratory and the manufacturer to the Commission.

`(B) AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS- Upon receipt of information under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall make the information available promptly to election officials and the public.

`(4) PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING TESTING; PAYMENT OF USER FEES FOR COMPENSATION OF ACCREDITED LABORATORIES-

`(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW ACCOUNT- The Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be known as the `Testing Escrow Account') for making payments to accredited laboratories for the costs of the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software.

`(B) SCHEDULE OF FEES- In consultation with the accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish and regularly update a schedule of fees for the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software, based on the reasonable costs expected to be incurred by the accredited laboratories in carrying out the testing for various types of hardware and software.

`(C) REQUESTS AND PAYMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS- A manufacturer of voting system hardware and software may not have the hardware or software tested by an accredited laboratory under this section unless--

`(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed request for the testing to the Commission; and

`(ii) the manufacturer pays to the Commission, for deposit into the Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A), the applicable fee under the schedule established and in effect under subparagraph (B).

`(D) SELECTION OF LABORATORY- Upon receiving a request for testing and the payment from a manufacturer required under subparagraph (C), the Commission shall select at random, from all laboratories which are accredited under this section to carry out the specific testing requested by the manufacturer, an accredited laboratory to carry out the testing.

`(E) PAYMENTS TO LABORATORIES- Upon receiving a certification from a laboratory selected to carry out testing pursuant to subparagraph (D) that the testing is completed, along with a copy of the results of the test as required under paragraph (3)(A)(iii), the Commission shall make a payment to the laboratory from the Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to the applicable fee paid by the manufacturer under subparagraph (C)(ii).

`(5) DISSEMINATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ACCREDITED LABORATORIES-

`(A) INFORMATION ON TESTING- Upon completion of the testing of a voting system under this section, the Commission shall promptly disseminate to the public the identification of the laboratory which carried out the testing.

`(B) LABORATORIES WITH ACCREDITATION REVOKED OR SUSPENDED- If the Commission revokes, terminates, or suspends the accreditation of a laboratory under this section, the Commission shall promptly notify Congress, the chief State election official of each State, and the public.'.

[FogerRox]

5. thru section 328

SEC. 3. ENHANCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.

Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511) is amended--

(1) by striking `The Attorney General' and inserting `(a) In General- The Attorney General'; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:

`(b) Filing of Complaints by Aggrieved Persons-

`(1) IN GENERAL- A person who is aggrieved by a violation of section 301, 302, or 303 which has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a written, signed, notarized complaint with the Attorney General describing the violation and requesting the Attorney General to take appropriate action under this section.

`(2) RESPONSE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL- The Attorney General shall respond to each complaint filed under paragraph (1), in accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General that require responses and determinations to be made within the same (or shorter) deadlines which apply to a State under the State-based administrative complaint procedures described in section 402(a)(2).

`(c) Clarification of Availability of Private Right of Action- Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any person from bringing an action under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) (including any individual who seeks to enforce the individual's right to a voter-verified paper ballot, the right to have the voter-verified paper ballot counted in an election, or any other right under subtitle A of title III) to enforce the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements under sections 301, 302, and 303.

`(d) No Effect on State Procedures- Nothing in this section may be construed to affect the availability of the State-based administrative complaint procedures required under section 402 to any person filing a complaint under this subsection.'.

SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION.

(a) In General- Section 210 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15330) is amended by striking `each of the fiscal years 2003 through 2005' and inserting `each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2003'.

(b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT.

(a) Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards- Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subtitle:

`Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards

`SEC. 321. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION AUDIT BOARDS.

`(a) Establishment- Not later than 60 days before the date of each election for Federal office held in the State, the chief auditor of each State shall appoint an Election Audit Board to administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, random hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots required to be produced and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2) for each such election held in the State (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at the same time as such election).

`(b) Composition-

`(1) IN GENERAL- Each political party in the State with a candidate in any of the regularly scheduled elections for Federal office held in the State whose candidates in the most recent regularly scheduled general elections in the State received at least 5% of the aggregate number of all votes cast in such elections, together with any independent candidate who received at least 5% of the aggregate number of all votes cast in the most recent regularly scheduled general elections in the State, shall select a qualified individual for appointment to the Election Audit Board of the State.

`(2) UNAFFILIATED MEMBERS- In addition to the individuals serving on the Board pursuant to paragraph (1), the chief auditor of the State shall appoint qualified individuals who are not nominated by any political party or candidate and who are not employees or agents of any political party or candidate to serve on the Board. The number of individuals appointed pursuant to this paragraph shall be sufficient to ensure that the total number of individuals serving on the Board is an odd number not less than 7.

`(3) QUALIFICATIONS- An individual is qualified to be appointed to the Board if the individual has professional experience in carrying out audits on an impartial basis, and does not have any conflict of interest with the manufacturer or vendor of any voting system which was used in any of the elections that will be audited by the Board.

`(4) DIVERSITY IN APPOINTMENTS- In making appointments to the Board, the chief auditor of the State shall (to the greatest extent practicable) ensure that the members of the Board reflect the demographic composition of the voting age population of the State.

`(c) Special Rule For Runoff and Special Elections-

`(1) RUNOFF ELECTIONS- If a runoff election for Federal office is held in the State, the Election Audit Board which was appointed for the initial election which resulted in the runoff election shall serve as the Election Audit Board with respect to the runoff election.

`(2) SPECIAL ELECTIONS- If a special election for Federal office is held in the State (other than a special election held on the same date as the date of a regularly scheduled election for Federal office), the Election Audit Board which was appointed for the most recent regularly scheduled election for Federal office in the State shall serve as the Election Audit Board with respect to the special election.

`(d) Chief Auditor Defined- In this subsection, the `chief auditor' of a State is an official of the State government, who, as designated by the Attorney General of the State and certified by the Attorney General of the State to the Commission, is responsible for conducting annual audits of the operations of the government of the State under the laws or constitution of the State, except that in no case may an individual serve as the chief auditor of a State under this subsection if the individual is the chief State election official.

`SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

`(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (b), the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand count administered by the Election Audit Board of a State under this subtitle with respect to an election shall be determined as follows:

`(1) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 10 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).

`(2) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is greater than or equal to 1 percent but less than 2 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 5 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).

`(3) In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is equal to or greater than 2 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 3 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election for Federal office).

`(b) Use of Alternative Mechanism- Notwithstanding subsection (a), a State may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism to determine the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to the hand counts required under this subtitle with respect to an election, so long as the National Institute of Standards and Technology determines that the alternative mechanism will be at least as effective in ensuring the accuracy of the election results and as transparent as the procedure under subsection (a).

`SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

`(a) In General- The Election Audit Board of a State shall administer an audit under this section of the results of an election in accordance with the following procedures:

`(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count in each precinct in the State, the Board shall determine and then announce the precincts in the State in which it will administer the audits.

`(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election (other than provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), the Board shall administer the hand count of the votes on the paper voter-verified ballots required to be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State.

`(3) With respect to votes cast other than at the precinct on the date of the election (other than votes cast before the date of the election described in paragraph (2)) or votes cast by provisional ballot on the date of the election which are certified and counted by the State on or after the date of the election, including votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the Board shall administer the hand count of the applicable voter-verified ballots required to be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and section 301(a)(2)(B) and compare the count it administers with the count of such votes as announced by the State.

`(b) Special Rule in Case of Delay in Reporting Absentee Vote Count- In the case of a State in which, under State law, the final count of absentee and provisional votes is not announced until after the expiration of the 7-day period which begins on the date of the election, the Election Audit Board shall initiate the process described in subsection (a) for administering the audit not later than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count for the votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election, and shall initiate the administration of the audit of the absentee and provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial count of such votes.

`(c) Additional Audits if Cause Shown-

`(1) IN GENERAL- If the Election Audit Board finds that any of the hand counts administered under this section do not match the final unofficial tally of the results of an election, the Board shall administer hand counts under this section of such additional precincts (or equivalent jurisdictions) as the Board considers appropriate to resolve any concerns resulting from the audit and ensure the accuracy of the results.

`(2) ESTABLISHMENT AND PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES GOVERNING ADDITIONAL AUDITS- Not later than January 1, 2008, each State shall establish and publish procedures for carrying out the additional audits under this subsection, including the means by which the State shall resolve any concerns resulting from the audit with finality and ensure the accuracy of the results.

`(d) Public Observation of Audits- Each audit conducted under this section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire process.

`SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

`(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (c), the selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Audit Board of the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle shall be made by the Board on an entirely random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in a State have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with such procedures as the Commission determines appropriate, except that--

`(1) at least one precinct shall be selected at random in each county; and

`(2) the Commission shall publish the procedures in the Federal Register prior to the selection of the precincts.

`(b) Public Selection- The random selection of precincts under subsection (a) shall be conducted in public, at a time and place announced in advance.

`(c) Mandatory Selection of Precincts Established Specifically For Absentee Ballots- If a State establishes a separate precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in an election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable by precinct, the State shall include that precinct among the precincts in the State in which the Election Audit Board shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle.

`SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

`(a) Submission to Commission- As soon as practicable after the completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election Audit Board of a State shall submit to the Commission the results of the audit, and shall include in the submission a comparison of the results of the election in the precinct as determined by the Board under the audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as announced by the State, as well as a list of any discrepancies discovered between the initial, subsequent, and final hand counts administered by the Board and such final unofficial vote count and any explanation for such discrepancies, broken down by the categories of votes described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 323(a).

`(b) Publication by Commission- Immediately after receiving the submission of the results of an audit from the Election Audit Board of a State under subsection (a), the Commission shall publicly announce and publish the information contained in the submission.

`(c) Delay in Certification of Results by State-

`(1) PROHIBITING CERTIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF AUDITS- No State may certify the results of any election which is subject to an audit under this subtitle prior to the completion of the audit and the announcement and submission of the results of the audit to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section.

`(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AUDITS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS- In the case of an election for electors for President and Vice President which is subject to an audit under this subtitle, the State shall complete the audits and announce and submit the results to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section in time for the State to certify the results of the election and provide for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline described in section 6 of title 3, United States Code.

`SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

`(a) Payments For Costs of Conducting Audits- In accordance with the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission shall make a payment to a State to cover the costs incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections that are the subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle.

`(b) Certification of Compliance and Anticipated Costs-

`(1) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED- In order to receive a payment under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in such form as the Commission may require, a statement containing--

`(A) a certification that the State will conduct the audits required under this subtitle in accordance with all of the requirements of this subtitle;

`(B) a notice of the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved; and

`(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require.

`(2) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT- The amount of a payment made to a State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections involved, as set forth in the statement submitted under paragraph (1) a notice submitted by the State to the Commission (in such form and containing such information as the Commission may require).

`(3) TIMING OF NOTICE- The State may not submit a notice under paragraph (1) until candidates have been selected to appear on the ballot for all of the elections for Federal office which will be the subject of the audits involved.

`(c) Timing of Payments- The Commission shall make the payment required under this section to a State not later than 30 days after receiving the notice submitted by the State under subsection (b).

`(d) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each succeeding fiscal year such sums as may be necessary for payments under this section.

`SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW.

`This subtitle does not apply to any election for which a recount is required automatically under State law because of the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election. Nothing in the previous sentence may be construed to waive the application of any other provision of this Act to any election (including the ballot verification and audit capacity requirements of section 301(a)(2)).

`SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

`This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office beginning with the regularly scheduled general elections held in November 2008.'.

(b) Availability of Enforcement Under Help America Vote Act of 2002- Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511), as amended by section 3, is amended--

(1) in subsection (a), by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.';

(2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking `section 303' and inserting `section 303, or subtitle C of title III,'; and

(3) in subsection (c)--

(A) by striking `subtitle A' and inserting `subtitles A or C', and

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.'.

(c) Clerical Amendment- The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the item relating to title III the following:

[FogerRox]

6. Seems to say no VVPB printers on opscans.

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

(a)(1)(2)(A)(i)

Edit:

(10) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, remote, wide area, or concealed communication device at all.

Ok the 1st thing I'm thinking is what is the definition od voting system, does that include the tabulator?

`(11) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM OR TRANSMISSION OF SYSTEM INFORMATION OVER THE INTERNET- No component of any voting device upon which votes are cast shall be connected to the Internet at any time.

Seems to allow tabulators to be connected to the net. NO?

[FogerRox]

7. I clicked on properties and it was created today.

[Land Shark]

10. Also says that in close races in battle ground states like OH and FL=NO HOLT AUDITS

(because of the automatic machine recounts in those states

per
`SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW.

`This subtitle does not apply to any election for which a recount is required automatically under State law because of the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election. Nothing in the previous sentence may be construed to waive the application of any other provision of this Act to any election (including the ballot verification and audit capacity requirements of section 301(a)(2)).

[FogerRox]

13. I understand the logic of that, but it seems like a cheap way out

I would set a Fed standard for implimenting of recounts, if the state standard is lower the fed law prevails.

SO HOlt says that the automatic recount done by states may be done under state law, including whatever differences there are bewteen state laws. SO in a presidential election ... lets say 10 states decide they are doing recounts.... there could 10 methodologies employed. Because there is no federal standard?

Didn't Ohio do a recount in '04, and folks got convicted for it right? SO HOlts bill will not prevent a similar scenario?

[Wilms]

17. What a mess. Huh? n/t

[FogerRox]

18. might be, I am trying to be kind, but hr811 does not look to be a

marked improvment over hr550.

[Land Shark]

9. DOA with We the People; check the morgue; Congress a different matter

[Melissa G]

11. Hey Roj, thanks for the PM..

My office thinks I need to work instead of combing through this bill right now so detailed analysis will have to wait until evening....
However my email box had this little gem from Ron Baiman on another site that I read where he is dialogging with Josh Mittledorf...here is an excerpt from his highlights of what he has heard is important BUT he also has not dived into the bill... He has some bolded text that i don't have the savvy to reproduce but here is an excerpt from the email from Ron B...

snip


A) I'm not sure if you're aware of the fact that much of the clearly documented large scale corruption in 2004 in Ohio occurred on optical-scan paper ballot systems. This is not to say that this did not occur on ETS or "punch card" systems (still in use then), but the point is that optical scan machine miscounts and rigged or biased "recount" corruption are an evident and real danger to a trustworthy voting system - see: http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2006/2209 .

B) The corrupted precents were targeted for detailed on-the-ground poll book, absentee, early, and provisional, vote investigation, by analyzing statistical anomalies in vote returns, not because races were close in these counties. Exit poll evidence (Ohio was the only state where precinct level exit poll data and matching election results were released, after this data was used to ostensibly rule out fraud!) was also key to alerting analysts to potential vote corruption in 2004. ( see
video of We Count Presentation at: http://www.wecount2006.org/ and http://www.freepress.org/images/departments/2196.pdf )

C) These facts point to a need for regular uncorrupted and objective recounts and audits of sufficient quality and power to ensure corruption detection (even with op-scan machines and paper ballots) and for public (or at least publicly transparent and available) exit polling data and detailed precinct-level analysis of election return data (that needs to be available to the candidates and to the public before results are certified) regardless of the closeness of the election.

D) They also raise concern about the following reported provision in HOLT 2 (discovered by election integrity attorney Paul Lehto):

" In states with automatic machine recount provisions based on winning percentage, no paper "ballots" will EVER be counted if the race is CLOSE. (boldface and caps added)."
This provision (if it is in the bill), which seems to suggest that "automatic machine recounts" can replace paper ballot counts (even when the race is close) defies logic and common sense, and appears to vitiate the entire intent of the bill!


Sincerely,

Ron Baiman, Ph. D.
Center for Urban Research and Learning
Loyola University Chicago

Note from Melissa..
I am very concerned about recounts. Trusting in recounts as a first line of defense for insuring the integrity of elections in a state the size of Texas is prohibitively expensive.

I want transparent precinct counts. Where neighbors with a history of each other are checking a historical vote of their neighbors and these numbers are posted where all of use activists with spreadsheets can check them. Consolidating precincts and the use of mega precincts are obstacles to this.

[FogerRox]

14. Right, I noted this earlier, opscans are vulnerable

A VVPB printer on an opscan would raise an immediate red flag as to one single problem in real time. ANd the opportunity to redress the problem, take the opscanner out of use, or FIX IT.

The same cannot be said of a DRE with a VVPB printer on it. Maybe Rush Holt needs to understand opscans are potential victims to attack vectors just like DRE's. But the problem is different and needs a different solution.

[Land Shark]

12. Open Voting Consortium quote: "There are no open source provisions in Holt."

By not meeting the real definitions of real open source, Open Voting Consortium opposes the Holt bill (also for its federalization of elections)

My take is that the attempt even to escrow the source code will also fail. Analysis on that below (that's separate from open source development)

The Holt bill, while seeming to have a very broad duty on the part of state and local government officials to "disclose" source code and object code (etc) to the federal government, has very weak langage on how the local or state government officials are going to get their paws on all this source code in all jurisdictions in the first place. The relevant text simply states that manufacturers shall provide the appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official to provide information to the Commission . It does not say "all" information, and it does not specify source code, just the amount of "information" necessary for the official to provide some "information" to the Commission.

If the source code is to be disclosed then that trade secret "property" is being lost because it will be disclosed (these trade secrets) to all the world via public request and therefore no longer a secret. So the claim will be made by the manufacturers that (A) because the law abhors a forfeiture, the language should not be interpreted to require them to "forfeit" millions in investment in their view via losing their source code in the first place, and alternatively (B) if the language IS sufficient to command a forefeiture of their trade secret property, then their trade secret "property" worth millions has been subject to a "regulatory taking" such that they should be compensated. Their investment, they will argue, has been nationalized in effect, and they should be compensated handsomely for that.

I will be very surprised if the states and locals get their hands on all source codes for free. Instead, it appears that the local officials obligations to disclose are so broad (they arguably even include the source code on firmware embedded on hardware that the vendors literally don't control) that the state and local officials will be making at least a partial defense of impossibility, and they will probably also add that it was impossible for them to get a hold of the source code from the vendor like Diebold or Sequoia, in addition to the firmware or what have you on all the other hardware parts.

Here again, you'd think Holt II was providing us with source code that would be open, but it is unlikely to happen that way. Sequoia filed a declaration in my case claiming their trade secret investment was around $6M without considering lost profits from their purported 'investment."

Note also that in section 12, the state and local officials are required to document the secure chain of custody of the trade secret software, among other things. While chain of custody is a good thing for the election, this also has the effect of forcing the local government to document that secrecy has been preserved as to the trade secret software, which is the primary argument to destroy a trade secret once it is admitted to exist. This helps make the trade secrecy claims of the vendor stronger as well when they sue for damages or an injunction to stop the disclosure of their trade secrets to anyone not under a confidentiality agreement with them.

------------------------------------------

Compare Section (9)'s broad language for local officials:

9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS.—No voting system used in an election for Federal office shall at any time contain or use any software not certified by the State for use in the election or any software undisclosed to the State in the certification process. The appropriate election official shall disclose, in electronic form, the source code, object code, and executable representation of the voting system software and firmware to the Commission, including ballot programming files, and the Commission shall make that source code, object code, executable representation, and ballot programming files available for inspection promptly upon request to any person.


with section 12's weak language for vendors:

(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall document the secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote storage media, and ballots used in connection with voting systems, and shall make the information available upon request to the Commission.

(ii) (ed. note: Only criminals not allowed in elections per this section are election, accounting, or computer security fraud criminals, but con men, national security felons, embezzlers and many others are very welcome).

(iii) The manufacturer shall provide the appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official to provide information to the Commission under paragraph (9).

[FogerRox]

15. They will let ya look at the code if sign ZEE PAPERS first....old MAN

non disclosure....


TO me thats not the point.

It may be that what Holt does try to do (edit: and apparently fails), is deal with the issue of ES&S owning our votes on their software, kinda like thats our oil under Iraqs sand....

Lets say FL-13 happens again...I wanna complete post mortem, forget about the fucking open/closedsource code. If your equipment does a FL_13, I use any tool at my disposal to open those suckers up. At that point the vendor has like......... NO FUCKING Proprietary RIGHTS, as to their source code. Thats the law I want.

TO me one issue is... code inspection or audit of moderate integrety or higher, on a scale as large as a national voting system, can become unteniable. Which leads me to say that by the time we have a moderatly secure E-voting system the thing is so big & expensive, that HCPB become a way to be fiscally responsible.

LS said:

"Their investment, they will argue, has been nationalized in effect,"

Nationalize the Voting machine vendors, hmmmmmm dude, you got a germ of an idea.... LOL.

[Ellipsis]

16. Thanks for posting the info on HR 811

Great pic of * with bong by the way... a dorm-mate in college had one of those... He called it "wellenough" cuz he could never leave "wellenough" alone.

[Febble]

19. Kick