Got an Issue with my posts on skin oils cause problems with DREs?

[FogerRox]

Bring it in here. Show your face, and disprove the science behind Touchscreens using galvonic response. Got some cajones? Bring it on. Thanks in advance.

My name is Roger Fox, and I approve this message.

On edit:

Kips post:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x455194#455427

2nd edit

This thread here:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=455194&mesg_id=455194

3rd edit:

In 2004, during early voting Broward got 6 DREs per early vote location. Miami Dade got 30. So the Static buildup and skin oil problems would show up in Broward, not Dade. Touchscreen DREs such as the ES&S used in Broward rely on galvonic response to register voter selection, the small amount of electricity generated by the human body, skin oils or oils in general are electrically insulating. Oil buildup over the John Kerry and Betty Castor buttons (registration areas)insulate those areas from selection.

[MrModerate]

1. Hate to appear ignorant, but WTF are you talking about? n/t

[Nolo_Contendre]

2. DRE = Direct Record Electronic system (touchscreen voting machines)

Other than that, I can't really help out...

[FogerRox]

4. I wenr back to get the link, I edited into the OP

[bullimiami]

3. touchscreen technology isnt new anymore. there is no reason for them

to be inconsistant or sensitive.

i believe they work just as they were designed to.

[FogerRox]

5. correct, & when you allocate more to Repub districts than

DEM disticts you have more people per DRE, concentrating skin oil & Static problems in DEM districts.

[bullimiami]

11. sounds like a computer age version of the old punch card machines

they would put the ancient worn-out rubber, chock full of years of chads, falling apart, never maintained crap in dem districts and not enough of them.

[FogerRox]

12. Yup, that might make a fair analogy.

[w4rma]

6. Every single one of these DREs should just flat out right be destroyed. (nt)

[FogerRox]

7. They dont work properly they are never tested to see if they work in an election

Though Wiley Labs shakes them, heats them up, voltage variances, preporgrammed mock elections called pre election logic and accuracy tests. But Wily labs never sets one up and has 100 people vote on one.

[w4rma]

8. And it is expensive to do all that, also. Most likely more expensive than

just running a full election with optical scan, human readable, paper ballots.

[FogerRox]

9. yup, Newer full featured large screen DREs are $7,000

Diebolds are cheap crap for about $3,500, even cheaper on a per vote basis is paper ballots scanned by an opscan. Plus opscans can process up to 250-300 ballots per hour, DRE's..... 6 to 12 per hour.

[w4rma]

10. Agreed. (nt)

[seriousstan]

13. B.S. what about ATMs? That is a fair comparison.

[kster]

14. ATMs are built to work, thats not the case with secret vote count machines..nt

[FogerRox]

16. Couldn't have said it better kster.

[kster]

19. ATM'S are constantly audited by EVERYONE that uses it, if

you use the ATM and your taking out $100 and the machine only gives you $20, it wouldn't be called a
"GLITCH" it would be called "give me my 80 bucks" and same goes for the bank, if the machine starts spitting out $100 dollar bills to everyone, the machine gets put out of order until diebold gets called out to fix it.

ATM'S can't be used to describe voting machines, because voting machines don't have the checks and balances or oversight that an ATM machine gets.

[FogerRox]

15. I dont know what an ATM costs, but they don't go for no $3500

that Diebold charges for a TSX. I'll bet that ATM's are 10k plus.

[eomer]

17. The specifics of the reports in 2004 don't fit with your theory.

The voters reported that the vote registered correctly on the voting screen but then flipped when they got to the review screen. If your theory were correct then the vote would have shown up as incorrect in the first place, on the voting screen.

[eomer]

18. For example, here is testimony from a voter who describes how it happened for her:

Witness Suzanne Goldstein: I’d like to read this affidavit that was prepared on October 27th.

<Reading> I’m a registered voter in the state of Florida, precinct 4176 in the southeast <inaudible> Palm Beach County. On October 27th, 2004, I went to cast my vote early at the Supervisor of Elections office in West Palm Beach, Florida. I stood in line starting at about 2 pm. At around 3:30 pm I was standing in front of a touchscreen voting machine and started to vote. When the screen came up it showed my choices for U.S. President. I touched the circle for John Kerry and I saw the checkmark appear in the circle for John Kerry… and I touched the screen to bring up my next set of choices. I continued in this manner. After placing each vote I looked to see that the checkmark appeared in the correct circle before moving on to the next voting screen. In this manner I voted a straight Democratic ticket. I looked at the last screen – the review screen that is supposed to show all the voting choices I made. I was surprised to see the screen indicated my voting preferences as a straight Republican ticket. George W. Bush for U.S. President, Mel Martinez and on down the line. After a moment of looking at the screen I called my husband and the clerk. A woman came over to me. I showed her the screen and told her that everything that I see is opposite and wrong and that these are not the candidates I checked. She said, “Well let’s just go back and look at your ballot because you could’ve made some mistakes”. I told her I would not touch anything. My thinking was that I wanted others to see this screen. At that point another woman came over and said basically the same thing. After a few minutes, Tony Enos, E N O S, I think is the spelling of the last name, came over. I told him that I would not touch anything and that I wanted an attorney from outside to come in. After a few minutes an attorney did come in. He introduced himself to me as Jeffrey Stein. I asked for and received his card. I explained the problem to him. Tony Enos and the two women confirmed to Mr. Stein that the final review screen showed Republican choices. Mr. Enos said, “Well let’s review your ballot and your choices”. When we did that, we saw my checkmarks in the circles for John Kerry and the Democratic slate. At this point Mr. Enos told me I could go ahead and cast my ballot and not pay any attention to the review screen because my actual choices would override the review screen. I was told, go ahead and vote with confidence. I did not do that. I asked, how could this have happened? Mr. Enos said that the review screen I saw was probably the previous voter’s and somehow it didn’t clear. I told him I didn’t understand that explanation because when you start to vote you put a card into the machine and the machine holds it until you cast your ballot. When that card comes out the machine is supposed to be cleared. I requested that this machine be removed because it was not working properly. One of the clerks left and came back and made preparations to shut down the machine and remove it. They cleared my screen and gave me back the card I was using and showed me the tape that comes out of the ballot machine. At that point I noted the number of the machine – 21660. I was directed to the voting machine on my right where I began the voting process again. I looked at the review screen at the end and this time all the voting preferences were correct. I touched the screen to submit the ballot and left.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=319233

I added emphasis that I didn't have in the original transcript (I was the one who attended this hearing, recorded it, and then posted the transcript on DU).

[FogerRox]

20. yes, that is the problem of voting the straight ticket., a separate issue

A far more serious issue.

[eomer]

21. No, it is not an issue of voting a straight ticket.

In Florida we do not have a straight ticket choice (not permitted by law).

This voter selected her choice for each race separately and each one registered for the Dem on the voting screen but then showed for the Repub when she got to the review screen.

[FogerRox]

23. I stand corrected on FL law.

Next.

[Wilms]

24. No Straight Ticket by law.

But are the machines capable of supporting Straight Ticket?

From what I understand, it's a check box in GEMS.

[eomer]

25. I'm sure the machines are capable of supporting it

but I've never seen a straight ticket choice when I voted or heard of anyone else seeing it here in Florida (family, friends or incident data).

[Wilms]

26. Exactly.

If I got it right, a given race on the ticket could be used to trigger the SP option.

So a down ticket race could be used not making the flip apparent until the summary screen.

Problems along this line (w/OpScan) are part of the ES&S problems VotersUnite outlined.

[eomer]

27. Sounds possible but would depend on how the software is written.

You're saying that somewhere down the ticket the ballot definition is set up with a straight party option but in the place where the party names would appear instead the names of some actual candidates are inserted? Then that choice on the screen would look like some down ticket race but would actually function like a straight party choice and set all the other races to a certain party.

This may or may not be possible depending on how the software is written. For all we know it is.

[OnTheOtherHand]

28. I bet something like that is possible

The ability to introduce dependencies between races could be legitimately useful, and I think I've read about it (yeah, I know, that's useful...). I don't know if it could explain the particular reports we have heard. The trigger would probably have to be a fairly obscure candidate, because if this happens with a large proportion of votes, I don't like the chances of the machine staying in service. But "large" is really hard to judge here. What percentage of voters notice switches, what percentage of those report the switches, and how many reports does it take before the average poll worker takes a machine out of service?

Somewhere out there, I think, is a study where the researcher actually induced errors to see whether voters noticed -- but that's all I remember about it. There's an external validity problem with many such studies, because the 'voters' are told whom to vote for and really couldn't care less.

This still doesn't strike me as a promising avenue for stealing a whole lot of votes, but it could deliver some. In some circumstances it could be 'win-win': the attacker could anticipate snagging some votes if the machine is left in service, and suppressing some votes if it is taken out of service. So, I'm keeping an open mind about this hypothesis. DRE threat analysis is never, ever going to be my forte.

[Wilms]

29. Something like that...

...and what OTOH said.

[FogerRox]

22. Excellent logic