Democratic Underground Latest Greatest Lobby Journals Search Options Help Login
Google

CA: McPherson reply on Emergency Paper Ballots

Printer-friendly format Printer-friendly format
Printer-friendly format Email this thread to a friend
Printer-friendly format Bookmark this thread
This topic is archived.
Home » Discuss » Topic Forums » Election Reform Donate to DU
 
rumpel Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Tue Oct-24-06 04:58 PM
Original message
CA: McPherson reply on Emergency Paper Ballots
Edited on Tue Oct-24-06 05:15 PM by rumpel
Thank you for your recent email regarding the use of paper ballots in
the upcoming November 7, 2006 election.

As Secretary of State, I believe that there is no right more fundamental
and vital than the right to vote. Democracy depends on it.

I would like to clarify a few points so you can have confidence in how
elections are conducted in California.

First, all electronic voting machines used in California elections have
a paper trail that is used for the voter to verify the vote cast and as
the official ballot record. In fact, a 2006 California law, which I
sponsored in the Legislature, permanently requires that all electronic
voting machines used in California elections, must have a voter-verified
paper audit trail of each ballot cast. Further I have implemented the
most rigorous voting systems testing standards and security precautions
in the nation to insure the accuracy and integrity of the each vote
cast. These include:

1. The toughest voting systems testing standards in the nation
(10-step process).
2. Three-tiered testing -- federal, state and local -- with
thorough checks and balances.
3. Each machine has a strict set of use procedures to ensure proper
implementation including custody logs, proper storing, and serialized
security seals.
4. 1% manual recount tally to audit the results to make sure they
are accurate.
5. New paper trail requirement that allows a voter to see how they
voted and to correct any errors prior to casting their ballot.
6. Systems that allow disabled voters to vote independently and
privately statewide for the first time.

In addition, I have directed all county election officials to have an
adequate supply of paper ballots, as determined by the election
official, available at the voting locations on election day for use in
the event of a power failure, temporary loss of the ability to use
electronic equipment, or if a voter chooses not to vote on electronic
equipment. These ballots may be cast on sample or provisional ballots or
other reasonable, available supplies of ballots. If a voter who is
otherwise entitled to cast a regular ballot does so on a paper
provisional ballot, that ballot shall be handled as a regular ballot -
not as a provisional ballot. This directive has been in effect for each
election I have overseen - the 2005 Special Election and for both the
2006 Primary and the upcoming General Election.

Please be assured that I am dedicated to ensuring that all Californians
are able to vote and have their vote counted accurately. No voter
should ever be turned away or told to come back later because a voting
system is not available when the voter appears.

For additional information on voting systems, please visit my web site
at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm

Sincerely,

BRUCE McPHERSON
Secretary of State


I disagree with No 2 - there are no federal testing standads to date

Excerpts from
Commentary on the EAC's New Testing and Certification Program
By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA
October 23, 2006
The following testimony will be presented at the EAC public hearing on the proposed Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual on October 26, 2006.1

Among Dr. Shamos’ first recommendations was that the manufacturers should not pay the laboratories that test their equipment, a situation that makes the manufacturers, in effect, the laboratories’ clients and subject to conflicts of interest that raise questions about their ability to effectively safeguard the public interest. The credibility of the current process has been further damaged by the severe reliability, security, and accuracy problems revealed in a steady stream of academic and governmental studies and in hundreds of cases of malfunctions in fielded machinery.6

While we recognize some significant movement toward effectiveness and transparency, it is with considerable disappointment that we see the proposed testing and certification program as substantially a perpetuation of the same unacceptable system with new acronyms. The philosophy expressed in the proposed testing and certification program is too deferential to the interests of voting equipment manufacturers while inadequately reflecting the interests of the primary stakeholders in the election process – the voters.
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1916&Itemid=26


I disagree with No 3 - so, why then did they certify CA-50 (chain of custody, proper storing = in peoples homes?)

so-our emergency ballots are PROVISIONAL ballots! Who marks or identifies those ballots to be different from actual provisional ballots?

What nonsense!

on edit: the 10 Step Certification Process:

Ten Steps to Voting Systems Certification
Note: This process historically takes 50-55 days to complete, assuming that no problems arise during the certification process and that a completed application is received from the vendor.
Steps
Activity
Step 1
Receive application from vendor, review application and develop testing plan.
Step 2
Make logistical arrangements and preparation for certification testing.
Step 3
State certification testing commences
• Note: State certification testing does not begin until the federal qualification testing is successfully completed.
Step 4
Complete State certification testing.
Upon completion, the following will be scheduled:
• Volume testing
• Demonstration of system for elections officials and VSTAAB*
• Public hearing
Step 5
Publish 30-day notice of public hearing
Step 6
• Conduct Volume test
• Conduct demonstration for elections officials and VSTAAB*
• Draft and finalize staff report
• Consultant writes and submits report
Step 7
Publish staff report, independent consultant report and other material regarding system in advance of public hearing
Step 8
Conduct public hearing
Step 9
Close public comment period
Step 10
Final review of system and decision by Secretary of State
*VSTAAB = Voting System Technology Assessment Advisory Board
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
rumpel Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Tue Oct-24-06 05:22 PM
Response to Original message
1. Just In: Response On CA-50
Thank you for your email expressing your concerns regarding voting
machines in San Diego, California. I apologize for the delay in
responding.

Let me assure you that my top priority is ensuring the integrity and
security of every vote cast. I am confident that the system in place
will protect the integrity of the vote and will prevent or detect any
potential or actual tampering with voting systems. Let me share with
you some of what is involved before a voter will ever see a voting
system on Election Day.

Prior to any voting system being used in California, the machines must
undergo the most rigorous testing in the nation. California state
certification requires a three tiered testing process that occurs on the
federal, state and local levels. Voting systems must first be tested to
meet the requirements of the federal Independent Testing Authority (ITA)
and the federal 2002 Voting System Standards. Upon successful
completion of federal testing the voting system undergoes the state
certification process. This includes a review of the system's firmware,
hardware, and software. In addition, all systems must meet strict
standards including the nation's first volume test requirement. The
third and final tier is testing of the voting systems at the county
level. The county conducts acceptance testing, again testing the
system's hardware and software, in addition to logic and accuracy
testing.

Once a system is certified, I require strict pre-Election Day security
measures and use procedures. Prior to a county deploying a system to
the polling places, counties conduct logic and accuracy testing to
ensure that the systems are operating accurately and reliably, and are
correctly programmed for the election. The serialized memory cards are
then immediately inserted into the systems in the presence of two
election officials and a tamper evident seal with a serial number on it
is applied to the protective case covering the serialized memory card.
The tamper evident seals with serial numbers will indicate if the
system's internal mechanisms have been exposed. Only after these steps
have been completed and recorded will the system be placed under the
control of the poll inspector, who is instructed to keep machines in
secure and locked locations until needed on Election Day. Poll
inspectors go through specialized training and certification, sign
oaths, and are paid workers.

I have also implemented strict Election Day security measures to ensure
reliability and accuracy of systems. Prior to a system being used on
Election Day, a review of the system and the serialized tamper evident
seals is conducted by at least two election officials. Upon inspection,
if any of the serialized seals have been tampered with, the system must
be removed and a complete inspection of the system must be conducted.
Additionally, a report must be done on those and submitted to the
Secretary of State's office. Prior to the system being used on Election
Day, a report (commonly referred to as a "zero tape") must be run on
each voting machine to ensure that no activity had been recorded on the
system. The "zero tape" must be established prior to use. The
safeguards of the serialized tamper evident seals, the inspection, and
the zero tape would detect if tampering had occurred.

Then finally, I have established a rigorous set of post election checks
and balances. All electronic voting systems in California are required
to have a voter verified paper audit trail, by which the voter can
confirm their selections prior to finalizing their vote at the polling
place. California is among the first states to require this and many
other states are following suit. These paper records are used for the
mandatory 1% manual recount that occurs in every county and for every
election. This recount will ensure that the votes recorded on the
systems match with what is displayed on the paper trail record. In
addition, after each election, the county elections officials conduct
post election logic and accuracy testing to ensure once again that the
systems have operated accurately and reliably.

Tampering with a voting system is a felony. If and when we receive
credible evidence of tampering, we would immediately open an
investigation and work with law enforcement to gather facts and
prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. Currently, there have been
no credible reports of anyone tampering with a voting system. The
voting systems are trusted in the custody of poll inspectors who are
charged with running the election in the polling place. These are the
same people who oversee the elections, open and close the polling places
and certify the accuracy of the results of that polling place.
Additionally, they go through specialized training and certification,
sign oaths, and are paid workers. The strict security measures that we
have in place are designed to prevent or detect any tampering that could
possibly occur in advance of the voting systems being used on Election
Day.

In accordance with California Elections Code Section 15620, which
states, "ollowing completion of the official canvass, any voter may,
within five days thereafter, file with the elections official
responsible for conducting an election in the county wherein the recount
is sought a written request for a recount of the votes cast for
candidates for any office." For further information regarding
requesting a recount please refer to California Elections Code Section
15620 to Section 15634. You may access the California Elections Code in
its entirety at

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/calawquery?codesection=elec&codebody=&
hits=20.

California has nearly 25,000 functioning polling places on Election Day
and each polling place requires multiple machines. The logistics of
getting the machines to each site (some schools, churches, gyms, private
homes, etc.) can be complicated and each county election official is
charged with determining the best course of action to complete this
task, while holding true to the strict security measures and use
procedures prescribed by the Secretary of State.

The continued reliability and trustworthiness of California elections
will always be one of my greatest priorities as Secretary of State.
California is a leader in this regard as we have a Voting Systems
Technical Advisory Board, conducted a national Voting Systems Summit,
and required additional security reviews on systems above and beyond
what was outlined above. Voting is the foundation of our democracy, and
that is why my staff and I, together with the dedicated election staff
of each county, will continue to explore all measures and technologies
that can make our election systems even more secure.

Sincerely,

BRUCE McPHERSON
Secretary of State


So, it is up to the County Registrar to decide? - Sleepovers are OK?
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Land Shark Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Tue Oct-24-06 06:15 PM
Response to Reply #1
3. each county gets to sell the elections in that particular county
well, they could. Except that it's just that they NEVER NEVER do, despite the secret vote counting. Who wants to be a conspiracy theorist with regard to crimes almost impossible to catch, eh? :sarcasm:
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Peace Patriot Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Tue Oct-24-06 05:54 PM
Response to Original message
2. It's not just the testing that is a fraud, they've made a fraud out Shelley's
provision of the paper ballot option to voters, by allowing corrupt county election officials to substitute in "provisional" ballots. And if you believe Diebold shill Bruce McPherson's assurance that these will be counted, then you have not been paying attention.


"These ballots may be cast on sample or provisional ballots or other reasonable, available supplies of ballots. If a voter who is otherwise entitled to cast a regular ballot does so on a paper provisional ballot, that ballot shall be handled as a regular ballot - not as a provisional ballot." -Bruce McDiebold

--------

These snakes in the grass are really beyond belief.

-------

Your ONLY guarantee that you will be able to cast a vote in this election is to vote by ABSENTEE BALLOT. There is still time. The Calif deadline for requesting an Absentee Ballot is OCTOBER 31. A whole week left to do it. (The deadline to register to vote was Oct. 23, yesterday. But if you're already registered, you can still vote by AB.). When the machines "break down"--by accident or design--YOU will not be stuck with a "provisional" ballot, or no ballot.

You can mail your Absentee Ballot in by 1st class mail, or better, certified/return receipt requested (to insure that it got there), or you can deliver it to your polling place on election day.

And, in addition to insuring that you WILL be able to vote, you will be participating in a huge nationwide PROTEST against the machines. Bust the Machines--Vote by Absentee Ballot!

-------

All this stuff about "testing" the machines is so off-point. The machines are "tested" in SECRET by the election theft industry itself. And the voting machines, AND the central tabulators, are run on TRADE SECRET, PROPRIETARY programming code--code so secret that not even our Secretaries of State are permitted to review it--owned and controlled by Bushite corporations.

There is nothing else to know. And he's one of their bought and paid for operatives.

-------

Vote for the Democratic candidate DEBRA BOWEN who is opposing Schwarzenegger appointee McPherson for Calif Sec of State. She is a lifelong advocate of open government and a great candidate, and she will clean this filthy house up.


Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Wilms Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Wed Oct-25-06 12:49 AM
Response to Reply #2
4. Care to back any of that up with some links? Like...
"Your ONLY guarantee that you will be able to cast a vote in this election is to vote by ABSENTEE BALLOT."

Really? A guarantee? Sounds too good to pass up. Now, where's the link?

And about that "huge nationwide PROTEST"! Sounds great! I'll go light my torch and sharpen my pitchfork while you get a url for that.

Meet back here.

Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
rumpel Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Wed Oct-25-06 01:51 AM
Response to Reply #2
7. as for Los Angeles
Edited on Wed Oct-25-06 01:59 AM by rumpel
Inkavote is paper ballot, and I do get my little stub, and they are implementing this new machine (Plus) which seem to come in 2 versions.

One is only to verify whether the ballot is readable by the machine and whether you missed to mark a race or overvoted. (PBR) Precinct Ballot Reader.

The other machine, which is NOT in use this November is the (PBC) Precinct Ballot Counter.

I think Connie is prepping that one for 2008, otherwise, why spend so much money on the PBR's - just to verify what you marked? I have eyes-still, to check, granted many voters don't. However, I am puzzled to read the manual which requires the machine to be zeroed etc. when it is just a PBR.

In any event, the precinct has not changed procedure since I last worked as a pollworker (some years ago) we count the total ballots and verify the numbers of the signature at poll closing. So no machines here.

The only concern I have for LA is the Diebold Gems - but that's where things can really get bad, and no one can really verify the algorithms there. Remember, she did not allow anyone even look at the machine or open the room, which was in a separate closed off room?

Also as much as I have considered absentee, Connie clearly said absentee and early votes will not be included in the random 1% audit. They will scan and/or create a data entry of the absentee votes - which procedure again is unclear and muddy here. She testified before that there are usually around 700,000 absentee votes in LA - this time obviously it's going to be more...

So I am not too convinced, for LA, at least, to switch to absentee. Other counties, especially those with DRE's, by all means -

btw, according to the LA manual there is no difference stated in the manual for provisional ballots they go into the pink envelope and that's that- however there are the regular ballots. So, McPherson is not speaking for LA - or LA is defying his orders, but again- Inkavote is based on paper ballots.

Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Wilms Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Wed Oct-25-06 12:59 AM
Response to Original message
5. Great post, Rumpel.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
rumpel Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Wed Oct-25-06 01:26 AM
Response to Reply #5
6. only my 2 cents...
:)
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
kster Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Wed Oct-25-06 12:02 PM
Response to Original message
8. K N R ...nt
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
DU AdBot (1000+ posts) Click to send private message to this author Click to view 
this author's profile Click to add 
this author to your buddy list Click to add 
this author to your Ignore list Mon May 06th 2024, 04:52 AM
Response to Original message
Advertisements [?]
 Top

Home » Discuss » Topic Forums » Election Reform Donate to DU

Powered by DCForum+ Version 1.1 Copyright 1997-2002 DCScripts.com
Software has been extensively modified by the DU administrators


Important Notices: By participating on this discussion board, visitors agree to abide by the rules outlined on our Rules page. Messages posted on the Democratic Underground Discussion Forums are the opinions of the individuals who post them, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Democratic Underground, LLC.

Home  |  Discussion Forums  |  Journals |  Store  |  Donate

About DU  |  Contact Us  |  Privacy Policy

Got a message for Democratic Underground? Click here to send us a message.

© 2001 - 2011 Democratic Underground, LLC