Oregon Vote By Mail

[GentryLange]

Everyone says Oregon's system is having none of the traditional problems usually seen with Vote By Mail systems. Is this true? Or is lack of evidence the real problem with VBM?

Who knows Oregon's system? The VBM cure all for voting is poised to be pushed nationally... Anyone concerned about this want to help me understand Oregon's problems? Or successes?

Help please?

Gentry Lange

[Viva_La_Revolution]

1. ooohhh oohhh! I know!

over 70% voter rate, highest in the nation!

I love it. I fill out my ballot at home, after much research, and drop it off at the local library or collection box.

The only thing I am worried about is the scanners used to count the votes. Opti-scans can be calibrated to reject overvotes, or to flip the vote totals completely. We also have a paper trail, the votes can be re-counted by had if necessary.

I'm about 80% sure my votes are counted correctly. That's more than anyone who votes on those damn machines can say.

[nosmokes]

3. Ditto.

it's simple, easy, very secure if you use the ballot collection boxes, maybe a bit less so if you use the US mail. it's cheap and it does make for a better turn out than conventional going to a polling place, though i do sorta miss that at times.

[Tiggeroshii]

2. here's some articles on it

a series of articles by the american prospect. A good read.

http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=New+Ballot+Box

[sandnsea]

4. Working on mandated audits

And open code for the tabulation machines. I'd like to see us add numbered receipts for registration too.

Another good thing is that if there's a registration problem, you know ahead of time so you have more time to correct it. I'm pretty sure you can correct signature problems and that sort of thing as well.

I think it's pretty good. But we also don't have the history of corruption that some areas do, so I'm not sure the drop-box method would work every place. They aren't all that secure and anybody could steal them. I really don't know the answer to that in a big city like New York or something.

[Selatius]

5. Are these ballots optically scanned ballots?

We buy these scantron forms for our classes at university, and often because classes can be as much as 200 students large, it becomes more efficient to simply scan the forms and have the computer grade them. We just bubble in our choices with a #2 pencil.

Is that how the ballot is filled out in Oregon?

[Amaryllis]

10. Yes, opscans.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

6. transparency

It has even less transparency than precinct voting on electronic voting machines.

It solves a "convenience" problem, but not security or transparency.
It further adds to the "chain of custody" for the ballot.

The more complicated the "chain of custody", the more risks to your ballot.

The argument for voter turnout may or may not be a winner,
I would like to see the data compiled in one place that compares
like elections to like.

Oregon didn't implement this VBM all at once, they did it in a graduated
period of time.

If you trust your mailmen,strangers going by your mail box, your secretary of state, your BOE and anyone who will be touching your ballot - implicitly, then Vote By Mail.

If you can trust all of these people with your mail in ballot, as well as the persons
programming the machines that count your mail in ballot,
then
why not trust the poll workers, the election officials, and the programmers for the
precinct voting?

[GentryLange]

7. Well that's my problem with the idea...

It has less transparency, a whole lot of traditional vote fraud concerns, but... everyone in ORegon claims to LOVE it. In the most recent election they only had 20% turnout. But they'll still claim 70%.

The problem is everyone is drinking the koolaid.

The system, by rational logical analysis appears to be just as insecure as touch screen voting machines, there's no chain of custody, and yet, and yet...

To me it's a case of "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence". People love vote by mail, because it suits the Americans lifestyle, watching TV and mailing it in!

But I think that as they pair this system with touchscreens, or Diebold OpScans, that they are obviously unconcerned about the risks.

So those who love the system, ignore the secrecy and security issue, and always point to increased voter turnout. But nobody points to any evidence of accuracy.

Other thoughts?

[nosmokes]

8. i don't know where you get your data...

seeing as how the last election was a primary election i doubt seriously that anyone is claiming 70% turn out. and for someone like me, registered 3rd party and living in an unincorporated area the only votes i had were for a couple of judges and one county commissioner.

no doubt, if someone wanted to mess with the scanning machines, i suppose that's possible. but then there are paper ballots for a recount. and yeah i suppose it's possible to hijack a ballot drop box, but they are in rather public areas. yeah, if you actually mail ballot in then*gasp* a letter carrier handles the ballot. do you realise how many ballots would have to be adulterated or go missing to influence an election? how heavy that load would be? and it would have to be spread out over many precincts and areas. no, i'm not 100% assured that my vote gets counted, but i'm comfortable enough i can live with it.not every damn thing in the world is a conspiracy andby far most poll workers are good honest people. the beauty of the VBM is the paper ballot, and the end result is way out of kilter with the polls then a hand count can be done and that can lay to rest most any questions. one thing's for sure, i'll take VBM over a black box w/o a paper receipt any day.

[Amaryllis]

11. Why do you assume there is no chain of custody? OR has very good

chain of custody.

It constanly amazes me how ready people are to say things like "there's no chain of custody" without even checking out how the OR system WORKS!

How can you say it's no more secure than touch screen voting? We have PAPER BALLOTS. They can be recounted.


HOw can you conclude we are "obviously unconcerned about the risks?" Obviously, you say? On what basis to you make that determination?

We certainly DO NOT ignore the security issues. We have spent hours at our BOE in a number of counties getting to know our county election officials and exactly how our system works.

[Amaryllis]

12. We had close to 80% turnout in 2004. the last election was just a primary.

There is always lower turnout for primaries.

[Amaryllis]

13. We dont trust the opscans that count the ballots which is why we are

working on a mandatory verification process. But this has nothing to do with VBM; all states have this issue.

[Amaryllis]

9. Some things you need to know about the OR system:

Oregon's system is a statewide SYSTEM with rigorous checks and balances. It is NOT just an absentee balloting system. So if by "none of the traditional problems associated with VBM" you mean the problems associated with absentee balloting, that is true. Oregonians become quite indignant when the OR system is likened to other state's absentee balloting systems.

We have an SOS who understands the perils of e-voting (and yes, opscans and tabulators are a problem and this is our main focus for the work we are doing here; however, this has nothing to do with vote by mail and is a problem that ALL systems currently have in ALL states.)Our SOS also understands the many voter suppression tactics used in other states through centralized voter reg databases and voter ID and makes sure that doesn't happen in OR.

ANY system can be corrupted and is only as good as the checks and balances in the system and the integrity of those administering the system.

One of the critical things that separates Oregon's VBM system from other mail-in systems is our forensic checking of the voters' signatures. Our elections workers are trained in forensic handwriting analysis, and the signature on each ballot envelope that comes in is checked, by hand, by comparing the ballot signature with the signature on the voter's voter registration card (scanned and put on the computer). If the signature doesn't match, the voter is contacted immediately and given 10 days to prove that the ballot is indeed theirs. (For example, perhaps someone has had a stroke and their signature has changed, or a spouse will sign their spouse's name on the spouse's ballot.)

We also want to caution activists in other states and emphasize that VBM will not work in all states at this point in time. I know some activist groups are pushing VBM for other states, but this caution comes from our elections officials. Essentially this is because not all states have adequate checks and balances in place in their overall system to ensure that it would be a sound and secure election system.

http://www.oregonvrc.org/2006/01/flow_charts_of_oregons_vote_by_mail_election_system
Below is the text you will find at the above link.
Note the text contains a number of links which you need to access from the above link.

What all is involved in
Oregon's Vote-by-Mail election system?

How is it different than other
mail-in ballot systems?

First, Oregon's statewide Vote-by-Mail election is NOT a typical mail-in ballot system. Any election system and process is complex and involves a number of variables. Oregon's VBM system works very well in Oregon because of a number of strict policies, procedures, and security measures in our overall election process.

Attached is a 3-page flow chart (PDF) showing Oregon's current election system infrastructure, the pre-election day VBM process, and the election day process.

Additional information, including the official Oregon VBM Manual, can be found at the Oregon Secretary of State's website at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/vbm/vbm.htm.

BE ADVISED: VBM will not work in all other states at this point in time, until a number of the process variables are also securely in place. For additional information, see the Oregon VRC's Election Standards Checklist, which can be found here. (again, go to link provided above to access the links in this text.)

[Amaryllis]

14. GO here for a lot more on VBM so I dont have to retype a lot of stuff:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x429265

[GentryLange]

15. A long paper against Oregon's system

Here's a piece I found that is against the VBM system. And let's just be clear here, I am for a good voting system. If someone could prove to me that VBM is a good system, that it maintains the secret ballot, that vote buying is not a problem, and could explain the checks and balances, I might be convinced, but for now I'm not...

Here's the link:
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/research/csae_09132004.pdf

[Senator]

16. No defense against "Ghost Voting" (no, not dead people)

This is the real problem I think many are missing in the reforms and VBM does nothing to stop it.

What the election thieves do is inflate Rep registration levels, by switching Dems and registering people without their knowledge. They were just caught doing this in Calif.

This allows them to produce "results" that don't seem inconsistent with anything but exits polls, which they then just pooh, pooh -- or float some nonsense about "nonresponders."

It allows them to use the variety of methods that they employ; including machine fraud where they can, but also "voting" inactive voters and "new" voters (who never knew they were registered), and just plain dumping and spoiling (overvoting) Dem ballots.

Remember they have the people in place, like Blackwell and Harris, to "rule" that if 2 ballots are mailed in theirs is counted. No investigation is done because they just say "oh, they forgot and voted twice -- no harm."

That's why I'm concerned about this Calif. idea I heard about, regarding awarding electoral votes to the national popular vote winner. This would allow them to do all the stealing in areas where they have total control.

Which is what they did to boost the phony national margin in '04. The purpose was to suppress interest in fraud investigation in any state where they had to steal so much they got caught -- like Ohio. That was their lesson from Florida.

Oregon has avoided machines and polling place suppression. Not these other dangers.

--

[GentryLange]

17. Voter Apathy? And other reasons for low turnout in Oregon

"Vote by mail takes away focus from election day. I forgot."
http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2006/05/22/daily38.html

Which is what the longer term studies out of England show, that over the long run VBM actually decreases turnout. While the paper I posted a link to argues that it has already been hurting turnout nation-wide, and in Oregon.

The chain of custody issue, is that too many transfers are taking place. I will happily explain that in detail when I have more time. But the same argument can be made with Touch Screens, which is essentially, "trust us". With VBM you have to trust lots of hand offs, and ballot transfers. With precinct level hand counts you only have to trust the "many eyes" system of everyone voting in the same place, same day, and then counting the votes without any transfers.

You know, I'm not a huge fan of the secret ballot, but we should at least discuss the issue before we go to VBM nationwide and eliminate it.

There's numerous cases of vote-buying with absentees as well. All you need is for someone to sign their ballot and then sell it blank. It's very traditional to buy votes, when you can be sure of what you are buying. And with even 20% that don't vote, and probably don't care that much, they might part with a signed ballot for very little money.

[Amaryllis]

19. Read my other posts in this thread. VBM is ONLY as good as the

checks and balances in the system. ANY system can be corrupted in a corrupt environment.
go here and read the VBM handbook
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/vbm/vbm.htm
and then you will have the knowledge base to have this discussion. You don't now.
And where are you getting this idea that it decreases voter turnout? It has only increased it in the time we've had it here. We have one of the highest in the nation.

[GentryLange]

20. Please don't tell me what I know or do not know

Amaryllis,

I have been working on voting reform for 5 years. I ran Andy Stephenson's campaign for secretary of state of Washington. I ran myself for King County Executive last year opposing Diebold's control of our election system. I read constantly, everything I can get my hands on. I helped break the story on Jeff Dean and John Elders by sending 6000 emails to the press regarding PSI Group, etc.

I have posted link after link as to where I get my information, which you apparently haven't read. I read your links as you post them. But don't start insulting me in the middle of a debate. It will get you nowhere.

I have, up until this point respected your point of view. As I said before, I am for clean elections. But I have no patience for insults or flame wars. And, if I don't take Oregon's Secretary of State's biased view of VBM very seriously, it's only because the NASS is, well, fairly corrupt.

[GentryLange]

22. Where'd that info come from?

Amaryllis,

I posted this before, but apparently you only read stuff from Oregon's SOS... so I'll quote some of it for you.

http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/research/csae_09132004.pdf

4. Mail Voting In Oregon:

In one sense, Oregon’s unique all-mail elections, implemented for the first time in the
Gordon SmithlRon Wyden special election of 1998, is no excuse absentee carried to its extreme.
In Oregon every registered citizen is an absentee voter whose ballots are mailed to them between
14 and 18 days before election day and have to be returned by election day.

The evidence is that all-mail balloting in Oregon has not helped and probably hurt
turnout and for perhaps the same reason — diffusion of mobilization.

Beyond the SmithlWyden special election whose turnout cannot be really compared with
anything other than a similar statewide special election which are few and far between, there
have been five major statewide elections since mail voting was instituted, none of which speak
to a positive turnout effect ofmail voting:

In the 2000 Presidential and statewide primary, Oregon’s turnout (29.2 percent of
eligibles) was the lowest turnout ofany Presidential primary in the state’s history.

In the 2000 general election, Oregon’s turnout did increase by 2.8 percentage points
which was barely higher than the national increase of2.7 percentage points but substantially
below the average increase in turnout (3.5 percentage points) ofbattleground states ofwhich it
was one, Eighteen states had greater increases in turnout than Oregon. None ofthese had all-mail
voting.

In the 2002 statewide primary, Oregon’s turnout (27.6 percent ofeligibles) was higher
than the 22.5 percent which turned out in 1998, but it was also the second lowest turnout for a
statewide primary in Oregon’s history.

In the 2002 general election, turnout also increased to 50.5 percent from 47.3 in 1998, but
the 2002 turnout was the third lowest in Oregon history.

This year’s primary turnout at 26.5 percent of the electorate was the lowest turnout in the
state’s history.

Oregon’s turnout ranked sixth highest in the nation in Presidential elections before mail
voting and it ranks sixth highest in the nation (at a lower turnout rate) after. Oregon’s mid-term
turnout rate was fourth highest in 1994. It ranked fifth in 2002.

[GentryLange]

23. Here's a report out of Reed College with Baker and Jimmy Carter...

http://www.reed.edu/~gronkep/docs/Carter%20Baker%20Report-publicrelease.pdf

The rapid expansion of early voting and no excuse absentee balloting, combined with a number of
high profile cases of voter fraud involving absentee voters, have raised questions about ballot
integrity when voters may never personally encounter an elections official or poll worker. Critics of
VBM and no-excuse absentee balloting raise a number of security issues. First, ballots sent through
the mail might be obtained and filled out by someone other than the legal voter. Second, without
the necessity of appearing in person, it is easier to falsely register and vote. Third, without the
privacy of the ballot booth, a vote could be coerced or unduly influenced. The Florida Department
of Law Enforcement has even referred to absentee ballots as “the tool of choice for those inclined
to commit voter fraud.”

These concerns have been heightened by a number of disputed elections and documented cases of
absentee ballot fraud. The November 2004 Washington gubernatorial election was the closest
governor’s race in this nation’s history and was only resolved in the courts on June 6, 2005. Those
contesting the results pointed to absentee ballots as a source of some of the problems. In January
2005, King county election officials announced plans to pursue the prosecution of three people
suspected of casting absentee ballots for their dead relatives.4 And on May 13, 2005, King County’s
absentee ballot supervisor testified that, due to ongoing computer problems, absentee ballots were
misplaced and not tabulated during the November ballot count.

Absentee ballots played a key role in the 1998 Miami mayoral election fraud case. The courts
overturned the original election results and installed Joe Carollo as mayor after throwing out all
4,740 absentee ballots that had been cast in the previous November’s election.6 During the
investigation, police discovered more than 100 absentee ballots in the home of local political boss
Alberto Rossi. Other recent allegations of election fraud involving absentee ballots have occurred
in Denver, Colorado; Benton Harbor, Michigan; Albany, New York; and Tallahatchie County,
Mississippi.

{Then Later in the Same Report}

The Commission expressed concern, however, over the potential for fraud and coercion under systems
which lack the “fundamental privacy of the voting booth.” In many respects, these conclusions
remain valid, at least when examined in the context of Oregon’s all-mail balloting system.

[Amaryllis]

18. THere is no way people can vote twice in OR. Read my other posts.

It's because of the signature verification process. IN fact the OR system prevents ALL of the abuses you mention above.

Go here and read the VBM handbook, and then if you want to have this discussion you will have a knowledge base to have it.
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/vbm/vbm.htm

[Senator]

21. Certainly far better than "absentee" -- but a question

The info you've provided is not specific to the registration process.

I'm wondering if there is a defense (beyond a cross-check of the provided DMV or SocSec number) against registering non-voting people without their knowledge, or registering ghosts voters (w/ real SocSec numbers).

---

[GentryLange]

24. Really, no way?

How about I pay someone $20 to sign their ballot and hand it to me blank?

Or...

I could forge my mom's signature and vote her ballot (I am quite good at forging her sig from highschool).

Just two ways I can think of to vote twice in Oregon.

In fact, maybe I should come down and buy some votes in Oregon just to prove that a guy from Washington can vote in Oregon two or more times.