Voter Verified Paper Ballots Verify NOTHING Unless...

[kster]

http://www.wheresthepaper.org/PaperBallotConcepts.htm

Snip....3. The proposed law requires voters to have an opportunity to verify and change their votes before the ballot is cast. Regrettably this only refers to the screen display and the paper printout of the voter’s choices (the voter-verifiable paper ballot, or VVPB). The proposed law assumes that the invisible, electronic ballot in the computer is the same as what is displayed on the screen and what is printed on the VVPB. If you voted on a simple paper ballot with a pencil (or a ballot-marking machine for voters with special needs), you wouldn’t have three potentially-different versions of your ballot. If the VVPB were the ballot of record, it wouldn’t matter if the screen and the electronic ballot were wrong, or if the electronic ballot was falsified just after you press the “OK” button. This is because what you verify on paper is what would be counted, and the paper can’t change itself and observers can prevent a wrongdoer from tampering with it. But our proposed new law makes the electronic ballot the ballot of record, even though no one can verify or observe it, but a wrongdoer in some remote place can modify it at his leisure after it is cast.

Snip....The proposed law requires vendors to submit a copy of their software for escrow, to be examined under court supervision in case of litigation. But since no one can control what software is in the machine during elections, escrow software may be of little use in an investigation of irregularities.



Electronic voting surely brings us into a topsy-turvy world, and our law and our Boards of Elections aren’t ready for it. Citizen activists are pushing for adoption of an alternative technology that our proposed new law allows, paper ballots with optical scanners and ballot-marking devices for voters with special needs. The advantage of paper ballots is that everyone understands how they work. Observers can observe. The ballots won’t change while they sit in a ballot box. Wrongdoers would need to show up personally to get their hands on the ballots, and we could catch them at it. No one could falsify an entire state election in a few nanoseconds. We should go with the paper ballots.

http://www.wheresthepaper.org/PaperBallotConcepts.htm

[Neil B Forzod]

1. there's a flaw in that logic

But since no one can control what software is in the machine during elections, escrow software may be of little use in an investigation of irregularities.

That part's actually a false premise. Any election supervisor/administrator can 100% control and verify what software is installed in the machine if they expend a bit of effort. What on earth would prevent them from being able to do that, except for disinterest and/or laziness?

Neil

[eomer]

2. No, it is not that simple.

To start with, most election supervisors around the country have no clue about software. They are not remotely qualified or capable of determining whether one or more parts of a software application installed on a computer have been tampered with.

The supervisor would have to delegate this task to someone else. The someone else they delegate to nowadays often seems to be someone with ties to a software vendor. Even if they started choosing delegates with no known conflict of interest there is no way to be sure a person doesn't have an undisclosed conflict. There's also the possibility of someone who makes untrue claims of technical proficiency.

Even if we could be sure that the job is being done by a qualified and honest technician, it would be extremely difficult to prove that there is not a compromised component somewhere in the machine. It is hard enough to find a needle in a haystack but it is many magnitudes harder to prove there isn't one. Take a quick look at your own computer and tell me with 100% confidence that there is not a virus in there. You can't do it.

And finally, even if a supervisor were able to pull off this feat, next let's have the supervisor write up an explanation for any interested citizen to review and form an opinion on whether the system is trustworthy. This explanation will have to be detailed and technical if it is to provide any assurance. A computer scientist will be able to follow it but even a rocket scientist will probably have trouble. How well do you think a lawyer or a doctor (both obviously well educated) will do with it. How about someone with less education. Even if you could pull off the technical side of it you cannot possibly make it transparent to the ordinary citizen.

No, the idea of a truly transparent and trustworthy e-voting system is impossible -- it cannot be done.

I have been developing software for a living for over 25 years. (I am also an actuary, which is not relevant here but just to not give an inaccurate impression.) I am totally in favor of software for almost every job you can imagine but not for elections.


edit: typo

[nicknameless]

3. K&R for paper ballots and clean elections.

:kick:

[liam_laddie]

4. K & R...n/t