How is the voting count removed from the electronic voting machine?

[wadestock]

I've been on a few threads talking about the voting machine code. I just talked to someone today who said they had actually examined the Diebold code (most of it) on the internet and it is crap, etc....

But then he said....why are you concerned about that....when the memory stick that is used to download the vote tally off these electronic voting can be easily pocketed and replaced with memory sticks that have the desired vote count? Don't you think that's the real issue?

In other words....aweful hard to walk off with boxes of punch cards....but a little switcheroo....and here you have a memory stick with a bunch of interesting numbers on it.

Whether or not any fraud can be proven, the system is completely hopelessly vunerable at this point.

I've done some web searching...can't verify the memory stick thing....found possibly the use of a PCMCIA card?

Regardless...this is an outrage...if the media can be that easily messed with.

[flyingfysh]

1. vote editing can be done long before that

Votes are maintained in Excel, which is a standard spreadsheet program, and grossly insecure.

There is an even worse problem: what if a hard disk blows up? (this can (and does) happen, and financial institutions guard against it by using RAID arrays and transactions; but voting machines don't). There go several thousand votes, at least, with NO way of finding out what they were.

Paper ballots can be recounted, and old-fashioned mechanical voting machines can't fail in such a way as to lose all the votes. But if a hard disk goes, you've had it.

[crispini]

2. Yep, exactly.

In my precinct we voted via optiscan machine using paper ballots. At the end of the day we opened up the machine, pulled out the card, put it in its static safe envelope, boxed up the ballots, put on the numbered seals, tossed it all in the car and away we went.

During training my county's elections administrator said to us, "If the card goes bad or there's another problem it's easy... we just recount the paper ballots."

And I thought to myself, What about the places where there are no paper ballots to recount?

[Boredtodeath]

5. Not EXCEL! Microsoft Access

Also, there is no hard disk. Voting machines have PCMCIA cards (equivalent to a large capacity floppy disk) and flash memory (for redundant, backup storage).

[Eloriel]

8. Access, not Excel

at least I've never seen ANY references to Excel, just Access (a database program that makes REAL db programmers wince, laugh or puke at the mention of its use "protecting" our vote).

[jsamuel]

3. Forget memory cards (too hard), VOTE TABULATORS UNSECURE!

This is what I have gathered so far:

People voted on voting machines.

Votes were stored on memory cards.

Memory cards were taken out of the machines when they were full.

They then hooked the memory cards up to the internet and transmitted the data to tabulating computers (one per state).

These tabulating computers absolutely needed to be on the internet in order to download this information.

(Here is where it gets messy)

These computers were windows computers with at best, poor security. All you had to do was hack into them (if even that), then open a file and change the vote totals. THATS IT!

[wadestock]

4. Let me see if I get this ....

You do agree that you have to physically remove a memory card (of whatever type) from the electronic voting machines.

Then...the vote tally on the card(s) have to be put into a "host" computer. (still not sure about this part, such as whether that computer is really compiling what is actually on each card. For instance, that methdology would then seem to have the ability to actually verify that X number of cards were input, their possible card identity, etc)

Problem #1 - the issue of accountability of the memory cards and the process of getting them read into a host machine is extremely flaky.

Then....exactly what and why is this then transmitted over the internet?@#$#@!

Yes this is a huge problem #2.

[Boredtodeath]

6. Misinformation abounds

Far be it from me to defend these machines (I'm not) but, folks, let's please get the story straight.......

Vote tally cards are NOT put into a "host" computer. The cards are accumulated into a single vote total database on one (of the existing) card(s), at the precinct, a report printed, then the totals database is sent to a host computer via modem (INsecure modem, BTW).

The PCMCIA cards are then taken to the central location and turned into the elections director to be read and used in a recount if one is so ordered.

Modem connections, yes. Internet connections, no.

[wadestock]

7. ok....please comment on the issue of accountability of the cards...

Do you think there is any real accountability of the cards which prevents this "switcharoo" I was referring to or anything else which accomplishes an easy way to fudge the tallies coming off the cards?

[Boredtodeath]

10. Sure there are issues about that

and here's a great article detailing every one of them:

Polls closed/Precincts begin reporting in
Modem communications are not monitored by anyone at any time. No one is assuring what is being moved between the computers, nor that someone might be connecting to the GEMS server inappropriately. One can hear the modem connections being made, see the screen on the GEMS server moving lines of text, but no one is monitoring it.

As poll workers bring the reports and PCMCIA cards back to election center:

1. HQ Poll workers receive the envelopes, checking the seal
2. HQ Poll worker registers the number of PCMCIA cards indicated in handwriting on the envelope.
3. HQ Poll worker breaks the seal, counts the PCMCIA cards, checks off task on list. The HQ poll worker passes the PCMCIA cards to the next station where the cards are counted again.
4. At no time during this process does any HQ poll worker check, monitor or verify the serial numbers or any other identifying information on the PCMCIA cards.
5. HQ Poll workers return to the envelopes and check off that it contains "tapes." The tapes are not removed from the envelope, they are not read, they are not documented and the envelope is dumped into a bin with other envelopes. These "tapes" contain the Zero Total Report and the End of Day Precinct Totals.
6. he 3rd station HQ Poll worker searches for the marked accumulator card and pulls it from the stack of cards because it has the accumulated total database file on it and that database is prepared for upload to the GEMS computer. In this district, the VIBS machines and associated card are designated the accumulator unit. We did not observe them actually uploading these files.
7. If there is no "accumulated database" on the designated card, the PCMCIA cards are located, taken to a touchscreen machine and the accumulation process begun. Once again, separating the accumulator card from the remaining cards which are returned to the stack.

Notes and scattered observations: At the entrance to the election center, tables are set up for poll workers to return voter access cards, and miscellaneous materials from the precincts. Because this is at the door, there is a large bottleneck created where poll workers carrying the election results are effectively barricaded from delivering them. There is no security and there is mingling and socializing going on as well. A switch of envelopes or cards would go virtually undetected.

There was a security guard outside watching the parking lot, but when I asked what she was looking for, she replied "oh, nothing. I just stepped outside to get some air." There is no procedure in place to secure against a switch of precinct data and cards.
http://www.countthevote.org/gems_watch.htm

You should also read the front page article on that site, it's a treasure trove of information.

[wadestock]

12. THANK YOU....THAT'S THE ANSWER

Probably someone has already sent this over to the Olbermann site...but I'll do it as well and my favorite list of congressmen.

[Eloriel]

9. Sorry, if there's a modem connection, it's an internet connection

Travels over the public telphone infrastructure.

MY concern is that they can be manipulated realtime from a central location -- one (or 2 or 3) people sitting at their computer far, far away can switch and manipulate the votes real time.

IMO, that's why some of the CA Recount votes on the fancy new machines took so long to get the final results. Also late-day swings in tallies (when not thoroughly and irrefutably accounted for by traditional Dem or Repug counties and precincts coming in -- but even then, it's been astutely pointed out that strongholds are a great place to shave votes -- nobody questions it as long as the stronghold's favorite candidate actually wins for that area).

[Boredtodeath]

11. Your concerns are valid

But your terminology is incorrect. A modem connection does NOT equal an internet connection. They are not the same.

Besides, you should try connecting to the internet using a 9600 baud modem (yes, they use 9600 baud modems). Doesn't work. What does work at that speed, however, is time to intercept, alter and store the altered data back onto the source. The data is moving so slow, no one would notice the delay.