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You don't have to have a "smoking gun" to have an investigation. Was there ever a "smoking gun" in Whitewater? Absolutely not. There wasn't even one after the investigation, let alone before it began, and it was about some paltry land deal gone bad that occurred before Clinton became president, not possible treason.
Be that as it may, there is plenty to investigate with respect to the 2004 presidential election. Hopefuly, an investigation by the Justice Dept. and FBI would turn up multiple additional "smoking guns."
But let's look at some of the things we do know that justify an investigation. Just for starters, what about the 5 percent difference between the exit polls and the reported results? Multiple reputable statisticians have now said that this is a virtual statistical impossibility. This would be enough to cast very heavy doubt on an election occurring anywhere else in the world. Why not here? If anything, we have the most sophisticated exit polling in the world. Exit polling was practically invented in this country, and it has been continuously perfected in election cycle after election cycle for at least fifty or sixty years. Why is it suddenly invalid only in the U.S.?
What about the RABA Technologies report on the Diebold AccuVote TS DRE Voting System dated January 20, 2004, which was commissioned by the Dept. of Legislative Services of the Maryland General Assembly? It reviewed, and extensively commented on, the previously issued report by Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins University, et al. (commonly known as the “Rubin report” or “Johns Hopkins report”) and the paper by Science Applications International Corporation (generally known as the “SAIC report”), both of which had previously identified extremely serious security flaws in the Diebold AccuVote TS DRE voting machines and the GEMS central vote-tabulator program.
The Director of RABA, computer security expert Dr. Michael A. Wertheimer, put together a "Red Team" of computer security experts, who were directed to attack the software and hardware in the Diebold voting system and report their results to the state. Among the RABA findings were seven vulnerabilities of the GEMS database, which begin at the bottom of page 20. Note in particular vulnerabilities 2 and 5:
"2. Modify GEMS software and/or election database on LBE server. Given physical access to the server, one can insert a CD that will automatically upload malicious software, modify or delete elections, or reorder ballot definitions. The problem is that the server enables the 'autorun' feature."
"5. Modify election database. Given either physical or remote access (see below) it is possible to modify the GEMS database. Because both the database password and audit logs are stored within the database itself it is possible to modify the contents without detection. Furthermore, system auditing is not configured to detect access to the database."
These are only two of seven serious vulnerabilities identified by the RABA team in the GEMS software. They also found a number of serious security flaws in the software that runs the Diebold AccuVote TS DRE voting machines. These vulnerabilities were not fixed before the 2004 presidential election and are reason enough for an investigation. But there is much more.
In view of these vulnerabilities, what about having a felon who was convicted of computer embezzlement in charge of software development at Diebold (Jeffrey Dean)? Dean pleaded guilty to 23 counts of embezzlement that court records say involved "sophisticated" manipulation of computer accounting records, including the planting of “back doors” in his software, which enabled him to access the accounting records and siphon off funds without being detected. According to the findings of fact in case no. 89-1-04034-1 (King County, Washington):
“Defendant’s thefts occurred over a 2 1/2 year period of time, there were multiple incidents, more than the standard range can account for, the actual monetary loss was substantially greater than typical for the offense, the crimes and their cover-up involved a high degree of sophistication and planning in the use and alteration of records in the computerized accounting system that defendant maintained for the victim, and the defendant used his position of trust and fiduciary responsibility as a computer systems and accounting consultant for the victim to facilitate the commission of the offenses. "
What about the secret two-character switch that Bev Harris has identified in Diebold's GEMS central tabulator software. According to Harris, GEMS has two vote-tabulating tables that are normally linked and contain the same data. However, a secret two-character switch turns this connection on and off. When off, the two tables are completely decoupled. Interim reports during the election draw data from the first table to permit spot checks of real election results. However, the final election summary report is drawn from the second table (a second set of "books," if you will), which can be altered manually or by malicious software. There is no reason for this second table to be in the software, except to permit tampering.
What about the audit log entries that disappeared from the central tabulator software in King County, Washington on the night of a primary last fall? Bev Harris has documented an erasure that occurred in the office of King County, Washington Elections Supervisor Dean Logan of at least three hours of the audit log on September 14, 2004, the night of a primary held in King County. Harris obtained printouts of summary reports that were run at 10:34 p.m., 11:38 p.m., 12:11 a.m., 12:46 a.m., and 1:33 p.m. (there are actually no entries from 9:52 p.m. until 1:31 a.m.). The reason it is possible to say with complete certainty that they were run at those times is that each of the reports was signed by Elections Supervisor Dean Logan and bears the original date and time stamp showing that it was run then.
What about the posting of an internal Diebold memo on its own FTP site that says they had a routine practice of not securing the audit logs and of changing the software after it was checked and certified? Diebold will tell you that it is impossible to alter the audit log. But Harris has posted a memo by Diebold chief engineer Ken Clark dated October 18, 2001, in which he (i) admits that it can be done, (ii) discusses how Diebold employees might get around questions put to them about the problem by the Independent Testing Authority, Metamor (now Ciber), and (iii) says that “King County is “famous” for it.”
Diebold representatives will blithely state that their software is secure because it employs password protection. However, Harris found that the user name was often simply the default user ID, "Admin," and that the standard password was "1111." In other cases, passwords were frequently something obvious, such as the name of the county using a particular software build. Diebold also made user ID and password information readily available in downloadable manuals and other documents that it posted on its FTP site. In some cases this information was also available in the developer's comments within the downloadable source code on the FTP site.
Although I am an attorney, I do not claim to be an expert in election law. Nevertheless, I feel certain that the King County erasure is a violation of state and federal law. It may be possible to break this wide open if Supervisor Logan can be given limited or full immunity in a congressional or criminal proceeding in exchange for (i) admitting that he either personally made the changes or knowingly permitted them to be made, (ii) providing details about the changes that were made, (iii) telling why he did it, (iv) revealing who told him about the two-character switch and other security holes in the GEMS software and (v) identifying the person or persons who induced him to make the changes or to look the other way while someone else was making them.
I could continue, and I am sure that others have many other similar incidents or circumstances that are deserving of investigation.
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