DREs: Bugs vs. Features

[Bill Bored]

In the world of hi tech, especially where programming is concerned, vendors try to convince their customers that undesirable "bugs" in their products are really just desirable "features." Let's say for example that you have an operating system that in its factory default configuration, allows anyone on the Internet to gain full administrative rights to your PC as long as they know your IP address. No passwords, encryption or firewalls are enabled unless you explicitly enable them.

Some would say this default behavior is a bug, but others might argue that it's a feature because it makes it so easy to access the PC from anywhere in the world. Just take it out of the box and connect it to the Internet and voila!

Knowledgeable users would of course disable this particular "feature", by applying a strong password, maybe a firewall (to keep anyone out who might be able to crack the password), and maybe some encryption (so that desired users of the PC could conduct their business in private). But the factory defaults were to leave the machine wide open to attack and manipulation. Later versions of the operating system might have some "patches" applied to fix this bug, but the feature would still be available; it just wouldn't be the factory default behavior anymore.

Now in the case of e-voting machines, we hear about the touch screens "defaulting" to Bush, not allowing straight-party tickets, etc. But are these bugs or are they features? Are they factory defaults, or are they programmed this way? And if programmed, by whom? Boards of Election? Vendor techs? Hackers? Who? It's important for us to know.

Are they documented bugs, like the ones that appear in user manuals? E.g., "To allow straight party voting, see Section 3.1. Otherwise forget about it!" Or, "Unless otherwise specified, to avoid undervotes, the default candidate will always be at Ballot position #1." The vendors might say these are features. After all, DREs are supposed to result in fewer undervotes, right? I'm still not sure why anyone would want to disable straight ticket voting though. I guess it could be a feature for Dixiecrats or something. I'd like to know if this sort of thing actually exists, or does it only seem to occur more or less at random (i.e., as "glitches")?

Does anyone have a configuration manual for one of these machines, or are they as proprietary as the source code?

Then there are the undocumented bugs. Such bugs might occur more infrequently and there should eventually be fixes for them. There would be bug reporting procedures too. Do they exist for these machines? I don't mean the hotlines for voter complaints; I mean procedures for bugs to be reported to the vendors. That way a replacement machine could be brought in as soon as the bug is detected to ensure that the rest of the election runs smoothly while the guys and gals in the white lab coats can simulate the bugs in their labs and fix them in future versions of the product, right?

But if the incidents we've been hearing about are "features", or documented bugs, it's a completely different matter. Features would be something that Boards of Election should be aware of and could enable or disable. If you had a bi-partisan BOE, why would they willingly accept any machine that could ever be programmed to favor one candidate over another, even in the event of an undervote where no candidate is selected? And why wouldn't they want to facilitate voting for straight-party tickets to speed up the process and keep the lines moving on election day? Why would they accept a system that could even be configured with "features" that might confuse voters or result in unintended choices? What benefit could these features possibly provide, except to those who would want to inaccurately record voter intent?

So I ask you, are these actually configurable options on any of these DREs? And if so, are any of them enabled by default when the machine is taken out of the box, or does one have to configure them explicitly?

I've voted on lever machines all my life, so I don't know WTF is going on with these DREs, but if they are actually intentionally programmed to work this way, not by sloppy programmers, engineers or hackers, but by BOEs and vendor techs, I don't understand why the citizens in the states that use them, and the affected candidates themselves aren't more outraged.

If anyone has some answers, please post them here. Thanks.

[AndyTiedye]

1. DRE = Diebold Republican Electing Machinez

 "committed to helping to deliver the electoral votes of Ohio to the President"
  Walden O'Dell, CEO

[shraby]

2. They all have proprietary code.

Secret and no one can see it. Unbelievable, huh?

[Bill Bored]

3. I'm not just talking about code.

I'm talking about user manuals. I can program a Cisco router without seeing the actual code. You can go to their website and see all the options. You can get them on CD. It's called a Configuration Guide. Lots of other products have PDF manuals like this. So what's with these DREs? That's what I'm interested in. Not just the code, although the code would of course be helpful, but the user-level interface that lets BOEs, or whoever, set up elections. If that's got inherent problems, you don't need the code to take some sort of action, and it would be a lot more understandable to the average voter, attorney or judge than a bunch of 1s and 0s!

[k8conant]

7. Are any copies of the "user" guides available?

I'd certainly like to read through them.

On edit: just saw the scoop address from icehenge. What about tabulators and the like from Triad?

[Bill Bored]

4. kick nt

[icehenge]

5. googled

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00157.htm

[icehenge]

6. 3.2. Communication

"You will generally be considered to be a high-ranking election specialist and a paragon of knowledge and solutions, which may be disconcerting when things go wrong. Do not promote your ignorance - in case of doubt, call a designated contact who may be more knowledgeable than you."


"Do not to offer damaging opinions of our systems, even when their failings become obvious."

[icehenge]

8. Kick - VISIT the link

[Bill Bored]

9. I'm there. So far it looks like an Al Qaeda training manual! nt

[BeFree]

10. Designed to lose votes?

From Diebold:
If a straight party race has been defined, all candidate selections made prior to straight party selection will be lost on the ballot, unless the Pennsylvania Straight Party Voting option was selected in GEMS.


So, if I voted for someone at the top of ballot, and down ballot cast a straight party vote, the top of ballot is lost? Yep.

I wonder if that is why so many people who re-examined their votes found that a top ballot vote was lost?

[BeFree]

11. Yer catching on, eh?

"I don't understand why the citizens in the states that use them, and the affected candidates themselves aren't more outraged."

It is a wonder that everyone is not more outraged. These machines are programmed to count votes a certain way. It was not sloppy programming it is intentional. That's why the code is being kept a secret.

[Bill Bored]

12. Comments on the Election Manual

This is a start, but I'd like to see an actual configuration guide too. The following is most illuminating however and should be sent to Conyers, et al:

From:

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00157.htm

Comments added without quotes:

This is version 1.0. It's old (Oct. 2002), but it probably was valid for the 2002 election.

Sect. 5. Election day:

"Remember that 'undervoting' in industry is generally considered to be no candidate selection or less candidates selected than the number to vote for, while we consider undervoting to be the latter only."

Does this mean they don't consider no vote for President an undervote? It's not clear but the word "only" might imply this. Of course if the number to vote for is "1", then "0" could be considered an undervote. It's poorly written and ambiguous. It could affect how undervotes are recorded and reported to the media, etc.

Sect. 5.1. AccuVote-TS (DRE):

"If a straight party race has been defined, all candidate selections made prior to straight party selection will be lost on the ballot, unless the Pennsylvania Straight Party Voting option was selected in GEMS."

This is HUGE! Could this be why Kerry was able to win PA? They have their own straight ticket option, actually named after the state! I'd imagine there are some Diebold DREs there. There were many complaints about not being able to vote for President on straight party tickets.

"In order to change the candidate selection on the ballot, the voter must first touch the candidate again on the AccuVote-TS ballot before making another selection, unless the One Click Vote option was selected in GEMS."

While this is shown on the demo on their website with clear instructions, some may have trouble with it and since there is more than one option, it may not be programmed the same way on every machine. Poll workers trained on this method may screw up votes if some machines are set up with the other option, esp. if they are not computer savvy.

5.1.1. Recuperation:

Suffice it say that when these machines fail, there is ample room for human error in the repair process. And now WARNING! about the possible loss of votes, democracy, etc!

7. Early voting closing:

Here's why I'm against this scam!

"Early voting will have been completed by election day. At election close, the election must be ended on early voting memory cards, be they AccuVote-TS or AccuVote-OS, prior to uploading. The reason for this is that ending the election will also automatically tally results, which is illegal prior to election close."

In other words, you shouldn't tally the early votes until Nov 2 after the polls close. But in order to actually do this, and have the early votes count, you have to END the Early Voting election on their separate memory cards. Another opportunity to screw up the process! The cards sit around for days or weeks, subject to whatever tampering may occur, theft, static discharge, corruption, erasure, etc. And if someone neglects to add those votes on Nov. 2, they are gone forever.

And there's more:

"Early voting memory cards may be uploaded prior to polling vote centers. In order for this to occur, enough time must be available to end the election, print the Election Totals tape, then upload. The early voting Election Totals report may include every precinct in the election, and therefore be both extremely lengthy and time-consuming to print. In this case, numerous voting devices may be set aside to end the election and print paper tapes, while one unit only may be used to upload early voting results to the GEMS host computer, either directly or over a LAN connection."

So you have to CLOSE the election on each card, and then upload the results to the tabulator. Piece of cake right? NOT!

The rest of the manual refers to the Optical Scan machines, but since these have voter-verified paper ballots, while problematic, they are much less likely to be fraudulent.

I have to go now, but keep this kicked for Teddy from Conyers' staff.

I'll send it to him later if he's around.

Let's keep researching this stuff!

[Bill Bored]

13. kick nt

[feelthebreeze]

14. Read the link and kick

The winds of change are blowing...do you feel the breeze?

[feelthebreeze]

15. Sent the link to ...

House Committee on the Judiciary, Democratic Memebers.
http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/contact.html

The winds of change are blowing... do you feel the breeze?

[ivorysteve]

16. Kick! Facinating stuff n/t