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Last year I managed to work my way through Tolstoy's _War And Peace._ It was not easy, but I'm glad I did it--if only because it gives me a new perspective on what's going on right now.
One of the things I appreciated about which I would have been unable to enjoy even 5-10 years ago is Tolstoy's depiction of the behind-the-scenes infighting going on within the Russian army during the war against Napoleon. I am fond of a lot of that stuff, but what I've been thinking of most lately is his treatment of Kutuzov and the other Russian generals during Napoleon's victorious advance, and, later, disastrous retreat.
Kutuzov had a simple theory about how Russia was going to defeat an army that was undeniably better equipped, more organized, and more heavily armed: patience and time. Instead of putting everything you have into big decisive dramatic battles which, even if you win them, will use up tremendous resources, do as little as you have to do in order to keep the conflict going as long as possible until the enemy army exhausts itself and collapses.
That is what wound up happening. What's interesting to me as I think about all this DU angst is Tolstoy's obvious contempt for all the generals underneath Kutuzov who thought he'd lost his mind and who, because they were thinking based on their training and their officers' culture, refused to grasp the fact that Kutuzov had the right idea for this time and this situation. They kept demanding big costly battles, even after Napoleon's army had already essentially given up and started their retreat. Kutuzov's approach was, hey, the enemy army wants out of our country, why should we get in their way? He did order some battles, but only because he knew it was the only way to keep the other generals happy enough to prevent some form of organized mutiny.
I'm not suggesting that Kutuzov's "patience and time" strategy would actually work in this situation. We don't have much time and obviously we are all short on patience. My point is this: what we can see from where we are does not tell you very much about what the Obama campaign's overall strategy is. Just as it looked to all of Kutuzov's generals as if he were just sitting there doing nothing, when in fact he was winning the war, there's a lot of shit that may look incompetent to us but may actually be part of a larger strategy that--precisely because it is nothing like the strategies that were used and failed in the last two elections--we cannot recognize, but which for the same reason might actually work.
Consider that Obama cannot inform us, the rank and file Democrats, of his campaign strategy without also informing the opposition. That alone suggests that we don't really know what they've got planned. As for the demands for new negative ads RIGHT HERE RIGHT NOW, well, obviously the Obama campaign has decided to honor them; but I think this is probably the equivalent of Kutuzov organizing battles to get the generals off his case. Cause there are a lot of fuckin' generals--on this board and elsewhere--aren't there?
What we want, what satisfies our desires to see someone just knock these lying bastards down and step on them once and for all, is not necessarily what is smart or likely to work. I accept that beacuse the last 2 elections have shown me that I do not have any idea what goes on in the heart or mind of the 'mainstream' American.
cliffordu has a good post the other day about why Obama cannot personally go on the attack against McCain--because, basically, it will make him the Angry Black Man. And I think that's absolutely right. Let us remember that a white man who thinks with his fists, talks violence all the time, threatens to kick everyone's ass, and owns a number of firearms is a cowboy, whereas a Black man with the same attributes is, as far as most of America's middle class white voters are concerned, is either in a gang or in the Nation of Islam. Obama can't do certain things that Kerry *could* have done, but didn't. But I believe, and I think I'm right in this, that his people get this and that they have long ago worked out compensatory strategies which we will find out about only when they are unleashed upon his hapless opponents.
Let's hope, anyway,
The Plaid Adder
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