A theory of presidential campaign dynamics. (Hope and Fear in decision-making)

[Kurt_and_Hunter]

I have a theory about presidential politics that Democrats tend to fade late due to an aspect of human nature.

Our approach to making any decision tends to be more hopeful and imaginative the further away the decision is. As the decision approaches we become more cautious, giving greater weight to familiarity, reassurance and aprehensions of what could go wrong.

The styles of the Parties are hope versus fear; change versus stasis. Hope does well in the summer, fear does well in the fall. (Fear can include the basic anxiety of change and unfamiliarity.) Thus even our winning candidates tend to hang on for dear life to win after racking up big polling advantages during the summer. (Would Dems do better if election day was in April or May when the days are getting longer rather than shorter? Maybe so.)

If valid, the theory offers a basis for action, not merely pessimism. (I happen to believe that the electorate must be made to fear McCain, not merely love Obama.)

1968 was a notable exception. Humphrey closed hard late and almost overtook Nixon, but Nixon was, believe it or not, the hope and change candidate. (That's why the '68 election is recalled as the ultimate bummer.) Dems had been in power for eight years. Nixon offered a pie-in-the-sky solution to Vietnam but Humphrey was the devil we knew and closed hard late. (Was it Gore Vidal who said, “I haven’t voted since 1968 when I voted for the peace candidate: Richard Nixon.”)

And Hope and Fear were definitely reversed in 1964, the year of the infamous though only aired once "daisy ad." Goldwater’s slogan was “In your heart you know he’s right,” and the Dem counters were, “In your guts you know he’s nuts,” and "In your heart you know he might." (Referring to nuclear war.)

Some would cite 1980 as a year when hope closed late, but that presumes Reagan ever represented anything that could reasonably be called hope. That’s a stretch for me. He represented white tribalism which is an anxiety reducing comfort to those in the tribe. Carter was the incumbent, but arguably also the alien. The theme is reduction of anxiety... Reagan offered the imaginary past and Carter offered the uncertain present.

In 1976 Carter lost giant summer leads and barely hung on to win. Clinton won 1996 easily, but Dole closed late making it closer than summer polling suggested.

1960 and 2000 are the two close and static elections. Gore’s last minute close in 2000 was due to the DWI story, so that’s news driven rather than just a psychological gestalt. (And 2000 was the least fearful election since the 1920s. But did we all have it good!) Nobody closed in 1960. It was razor thin for the whole campaign.

I recall 1992 as fairly static through the fall, though complicated by the polling wrinkle of Perot. Did GHWB pick up a few points in the last week?

Our losers have usually enjoyed summer leads: Kerry, Dukakis, and even Carter-1980 while having GWB-type approval ratings. Walter Mondale never led. He was tied for a few days coming out of the convention and Reagan had the worst debate performance in presidential history in the first 1984 debate, but still closed like crazy. Our only guy who was never in it for a day was McGovern, and boy was that election hope versus fear. The pugs claimed that McGovern’s slogan was “Acid, amnesty and abortion.” Hope never got off the ground.

So what do you think?

[Kurt_and_Hunter]

1. .

[Kurt_and_Hunter]

2. ignored

[ContinentalOp]

3. Wow, your theory about the seasons is really interesting.

I have never thought of that but I think you're on to something. It's intriguing to ponder what different results we might see if election day were moved.

[CK_John]

4. I have always felt that last day of Sept should be New Years Eve. I agree that

early Nov weather has a great effect on turnout and ability to get to the polls. Also presents a great excuse for those who don't want to go to the polls.

[grantcart]

5. It parrallels another group dynamic that can be seen in any group that is stalemated

between reasonable rational people on the one side and obstinate unreasonble ideological people on the other.

In the end reasonable people agree to compromise and conciliation while the unreasonable obstinate people stand their ground until they end up getting more and more of the 'pie'.

In world history this was most clearly seen with Lenin. He started with the smallest but the most determined and most unreasonable group. They battled and out negotiated the Mensheviks (which means minority, but was in reality a much larger group), the social democrats, the nationalists and then went to war and fought the White Russians.

In American society you see it in Church settings all of the time. The liberal church has been outmanouvered and hemmed in after congregation after congregation stalemated on social issues until the liberals finally agree to compromise but then become disenchanted and leave.

In the year 2000 the country was perfectly stalemated and there should have been massive public outcry and demonstrations but the reasonable people compromised while the ideological zealots on the Republican side just stood their ground. The neocons then held their minority position and stalemated the moderates in their own party and took over every key position in the administration. Is there any clearer example of this than Colin Powell? Engage, negotiate, stalement, compromise becomes capitulation and finally you leave.

Something similar happens towards the end of the general election campaign reasonable people will try and find a reasonable way to come together. Unreasonable folks of the far right don't care. They would rather hold on to their point and if it blows up the entire system then fine - they are unreasonable - they don't care.

This time the reasonable people have, I believe, understood that, not this time. This time we are going to be unreasonable we are not going to compromise. They are going to have to compromise with us.

[Kurt_and_Hunter]

6. The 'mad bomber' of games theory

Being unreasonable in a world of rational actors has distinct advantages.

In 1968 Nixon and Kissinger embraced the early 1960s Rand Corporation games theory in nuclear war stuff and tried to create an impression through back channels that Nixon was indeed the 'mad bomber.'

Though games theory gets the credit/blame, I believe that Nixon was really just imitating Ike. In 1952 Ike let it be known (quietly) that he planned to nuke China when he got in office.

If that hastened the end of the Korean war the Chinese were poor judges of character. Throughout his eight years Eisenhower proved himself to be the post-war century president most reluctant to use force in a major international confrontation. (Though hs didn't mind gunboat diplomacy with largely unarmed Latin American countries.)

[grantcart]

7. I think that China's self awareness that it is a government holding itself a seething

mass of contradictions that constantly threaten its unity is the most pressing question that governs most of its big decisions.