Letter To President George W. Bush From Senator Hillary Clinton

[wyldwolf]

September 5, 2007 -- The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In the wake of your recent trip to Iraq and as your Administration prepares to submit its Congressionally-mandated report on progress in Iraq by September 15, it is important that the American people have an accurate perception of the situation in Iraq. In order to provide a complete picture to the American people of current conditions in Iraq, I write to request that the Administration’s report address the issues listed below and that General Petraeus, the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, be prepared to discuss these issues when they appear before Congress prior to the delivery of the September 15 report.

1) When you announced the escalation of U.S. forces in Iraq, you said that the increase would provide the Iraqis with the “space” necessary for political reconciliation. Why has the increase in U.S. forces in Iraq not translated to the desired reconciliation effect that would facilitate the passage of meaningful legislation including equitable distribution of oil resources and revenues, constitutional reform, militia disarmament programs, and scheduling of local and provincial elections?

2) The declassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability” states that in the next six to 12 months, “the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance”. If the escalation was supposed to lead to political reconciliation, do you agree with the NIE key judgments that reflect that this goal is unlikely to be attained in the next six to 12 months?

3) The declassified key judgments of the NIE assess that the level of overall violence in Iraq remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks. What factors are preventing U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from maintaining the initiative at the local level and defeating insurgents and extremist networks that still retain operational and strategic capabilities?

4) The declassified key judgments of the NIE state that the Iraqi Army is still not capable of conducting independent major operations. Indeed, the newly released Government Accountability Office (GAO) report “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks” concludes that benchmarks on Iraqi Army capabilities have not been met. In fact, the ISF is not improving and the number of Iraqi army units capable of operating independently declined from ten this past March to six this past July. Why is the overall unit capability trend-line declining? Will Iraqi Army assessments provided in the NIE and the GAO report be reconciled in the September 15th report in order to fully understand the scope of Iraqi Army capabilities and combat proficiencies?

5) Press reports indicate that the Congressionally-mandated commission to examine the Iraqi Security Forces led by General James Jones (Retired) will recommend remaking the 26,000-member Iraqi National Police (INP) force to purge it of corrupt officers and Shiite militants suspected of complicity in sectarian killings. Why has there been little success thus far in reforming the INP? Why hasn’t the Iraqi government made reforming the police a top priority? If endemic corruption and the inability of the INP to support the rule of law were known in 2002 and 2003, and as press reports describing the Jones Report suggest continues, why have wholesale INP reforms taken this long to implement?

6) The GAO report “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks” concludes that the benchmark of ensuring that the ISF are providing even-handed enforcement of the law has not been met. In fact the report assesses that the ISF engages in sectarian-based abuses. Have ISF sectarian loyalties hampered operational success? Will these conclusions be reflected in the September 15th report?

7) Recent press reports suggest that Iraqi intelligence operations are fueling sectarian violence and promoting sectarian agendas. What is the assessment of the Iraqi intelligence services and their ability to provide objective intelligence support to ISF operations?

8) What is the strategy for addressing the influence of Muqtada al Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to the security and political situation in Iraq? Were JAM’s recent activities fueling sectarian violence and what were their roles in attacks of U.S. and Iraqi forces?

9) What are the nationalities of suicide bombers and foreign fighters conducting attacks in Iraq? What efforts are being made by the U.S. and Iraq to stem the flow of suicide bombers and foreign fighters from these countries?

10) On August 10, 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution to expand the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in Iraq’s reconstruction process. What will be the future role of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in coordinating reconstruction and aid distribution, regional dialogue, refugee and humanitarian assistance, and reconciliation efforts? Will UNAMI personnel and mission support specialists be able to operate independently given the current security situation in Iraq? What security arrangements and support will MNF-I and the ISF provide to the UNAMI mission?

11) What steps, if any, are being taken to address the under-representation of Sunnis in provincial councils?

12) Since the beginning of the escalation, has the number of internally displaced persons and refugees in Iraq increased or decreased? If it has not decreased, what does that mean for the effectiveness of the increase in troops which was supposed to provide the space for political reconciliation? How many segregated enclaves have been established in Iraqi neighborhoods and cities as a result of sectarian cleansing? Who provides local security in these segregated enclaves? Have any of these enclaves become de facto sanctuaries for outlaws and extremist groups or networks?

13) Why has intra-sectarian violence continued to worsen in the southern provinces of Iraq and in Basra specifically despite the increase of U.S forces in Iraq since January 2007? What is the assessment of the provincial governments in southern Iraq and their capabilities to address intra-sectarian violence?

14) Will the strategic capabilities and ability to respond to other contingencies outside of Iraq by the U.S. military be reduced if current troop levels in Iraq are sustained throughout 2008?

15) General Petraeus recently said that “There are limits to what our military can provide, so, my recommendations have to be informed by — not driven by — but they have to be informed by the strain we have put on our military services.” How much longer can the U.S. sustain the current troop levels in Iraq given deployment policies and the shrinking pool of ready-to-deploy units available past April 2008? How many troops are scheduled to redeploy from Iraq in 2008 based on plans to sustain current troop levels? If no action is taken to reduce current troop levels and they are sustained beyond April 2008, what will be the impact on the 15 months deployed/12 month dwell policy? Would this policy still remain in effect? If the current troop levels in Iraq are sustained past April 2008 how many units and personnel serving in Iraq will have their 15 month deployment tours extended? If tours are not extended, how many additional National Guard units and Reserve personnel will be activated for deployment to fill the shortage of unavailable Active ready-to-deploy units? Of these personnel required to fill gaps how many will violate stated dwell time policies?

16) How much will readiness in the Army and Marines suffer if the current troop levels are sustained beyond April 2008? What impact will sustaining the current troop levels past April 2008 have on operational readiness rates for Army and Marine equipment? What is the projected cost to repair and re-set equipment? What is the length of time required to restore equipment to fully viable operational readiness rates?

17) On May 31, 2007, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker sent Secretary of State Rice a diplomatic cable detailing diplomatic staff shortages in the U.S. Embassy of Iraq. What is the current state of Department of Defense/Department of State coordination in Iraq? Has Ambassador Crocker’s May request for more diplomatic officers and specialists to be deployed to Iraq been filled?

18) On the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom March 19, 2003, you stated that American and Coalition forces would disarm Iraq, free its people, defend the world from grave danger, and undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war. On January 23, 2007, during the State of the Union Address, you admitted that “This is not the fight we entered in Iraq”. Does the Administration agree that the nature and mission of the fight that our forces are engaged in now in Iraq in 2007 is fundamentally different than the conflict that our armed forces entered in 2003?

19) The importance of Congressional oversight on Iraq policy formulations was recently highlighted in an exchange of letters I had with Secretary of Defense Gates and the Department of Defense. In fact, Secretary Gates affirmed his belief that congressional oversight is a “fundamental element of our system of government”. In regards to the Iraq debate, I should further note to you that Secretary Gates expressed his views that this debate has been constructive, appropriate, and necessary. Does the Administration agree that Congressional oversight plays an important role in developing policy towards Iraq? Can you clarify the importance of Congress in overseeing Iraq policy?

20) Will you provide assurances to Congress and the American people that the Administration is currently planning for contingencies regarding the redeployment of U.S. forces out of Iraq?

I trust that these issues will be addressed in the September 15 report on Iraq being prepared by the White House as well as the testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Hillary Rodham Clinton

CC: The Honorable Robert Gates
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable Stephen Hadley
Lt. General Douglas Lute
General David Petraeus
Ambassador Ryan Crocker
General Peter Pace

Source: Senator Hillary Clinton

http://www.allamericanpatriots.com/48731519_congress_letter_senator_hillary_rodham_clinton_president_bush_regarding_iraq_fiasco

[lojasmo]

1. That's a lot of words to say nothing. EOM.

[wyldwolf]

2. that's an odd reply to a post (and letter) that says plenty.

Is it getting lonely at Deanunderground?

[liberal N proud]

4. That is why she is the Senator and running for President

The ability to speak volumes yet say nothing.

[wyldwolf]

5. as opposed to a former senator who can do neither?

[Adelante]

10. These are questions that have to be asked

If only Edwards had been so thorough when he sat on the Intelligence Committee and co-sponsored the IWR, back when he was the ONLY senator on that committee to NOT read the NIE. He did have a lot to say, of course, none of it to the good of the nation he now presumes he can lead.

[Alamom]

3. Thanks for posting.

[zulchzulu]

6. So the Senator is reading NIEs these days... that's...um...an "improvement"

She didn't read the October 2, 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) when she voted for the Iraq War Resolution in 2002, thus allowing the war she has the infinite wisdom to condemn now. Even her staff that had security clearances to read the very important NIE didn't read it. She even voted against the Levin amendment that called for using diplomacy before attacking Iraq.

Nicely played...nicely played...

:crazy:

[wyldwolf]

8. of course, Obama doesn't know HOW he would have voted if he'd been a Senator then.

[Colobo]

9. He opposed the war from the start. That can't be denied, wyld.

[wyldwolf]

11. yet he said he didn't know how he would have voted in the Senate. That raises a red flag...

He was opposed from the start, but if he'd been in the Senate, he might have voted for it. Trust issues there! Can he stick to his convictions? Doesn't seem like it.

[Colobo]

13. Wyld, focus on what's important.

[wyldwolf]

14. Katz, I am.

[zulchzulu]

15. Yeah, it's only on video a couple times that he would have voted against it

Heck, what's video as proof... yunno...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sXzmXy226po

:crazy:

[wyldwolf]

17. Except when he said he didn't know how he would have voted

:shrug:

[zulchzulu]

19. I guess your gullability is shining through again

He's only on video a couple times saying he would not have voted for the Iraq War Resolution and that he was against the war six months before Clinton and Edwards signed away to give Bush a free pass to invade Iraq.

You can't come to terms with that. It's that simple.

Whatever...

[wyldwolf]

28. Except when he said he didn't know how he would have voted

[Maribelle]

12. Do you mean the redacted one?

Former Senator Bob Graham was beyond clear about this - - the NIE available to Congress in the 11th hour blacked out the most important information. Did you listen to what he had to say?

[zulchzulu]

16. Bob Graham read the NIE and knew the only choice was...

...to vote NO on the Iraq War Resolution.

Let's drag Graham through the mud now to hide the fact that Clinton voted incorrectly and voted against using diplomatic strategy via the Levin Amendment.

Give me a friggin' break. I'm not gullible.

[Maribelle]

18. Through the mud? You're totally wrong. I have the utmost respect for Graham.

He is one of the most honest men you'll ever meet. And I stand by my post.



http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802397.html



What I Knew Before the Invasion

By Bob Graham

...

...

As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during the tragedy of Sept. 11, 2001, and the run-up to the Iraq war, I probably had as much access to the intelligence on which the war was predicated as any other member of Congress.

I, too, presumed the president was being truthful -- until a series of events undercut that confidence.

In February 2002, after a briefing on the status of the war in Afghanistan, the commanding officer, Gen. Tommy Franks, told me the war was being compromised as specialized personnel and equipment were being shifted from Afghanistan to prepare for the war in Iraq -- a war more than a year away. Even at this early date, the White House was signaling that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was of such urgency that it had priority over the crushing of al Qaeda.

In the early fall of 2002, a joint House-Senate intelligence inquiry committee, which I co-chaired, was in the final stages of its investigation of what happened before Sept. 11. As the unclassified final report of the inquiry documented, several failures of intelligence contributed to the tragedy. But as of October 2002, 13 months later, the administration was resisting initiating any substantial action to understand, much less fix, those problems.

At a meeting of the Senate intelligence committee on Sept. 5, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet was asked what the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided as the rationale for a preemptive war in Iraq. An NIE is the product of the entire intelligence community, and its most comprehensive assessment. I was stunned when Tenet said that no NIE had been requested by the White House and none had been prepared. Invoking our rarely used senatorial authority, I directed the completion of an NIE.

Tenet objected, saying that his people were too committed to other assignments to analyze Saddam Hussein's capabilities and will to use chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons. We insisted, and three weeks later the community produced a classified NIE.

There were troubling aspects to this 90-page document. While slanted toward the conclusion that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stored or produced at 550 sites, it contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the information, especially by the departments of State and Energy. Particular skepticism was raised about aluminum tubes that were offered as evidence Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. As to Hussein's will to use whatever weapons he might have, the estimate indicated he would not do so unless he was first attacked.

Under questioning, Tenet added that the information in the NIE had not been independently verified by an operative responsible to the United States. In fact, no such person was inside Iraq. Most of the alleged intelligence came from Iraqi exiles or third countries, all of which had an interest in the United States' removing Hussein, by force if necessary.

The American people needed to know these reservations, and I requested that an unclassified, public version of the NIE be prepared. On Oct. 4, Tenet presented a 25-page document titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." It represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them, avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version. Its conclusions, such as "If Baghdad acquired sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year," underscored the White House's claim that exactly such material was being provided from Africa to Iraq.

From my advantaged position, I had earlier concluded that a war with Iraq would be a distraction from the successful and expeditious completion of our aims in Afghanistan. Now I had come to question whether the White House was telling the truth -- or even had an interest in knowing the truth.

On Oct. 11, I voted no on the resolution to give the president authority to go to war against Iraq. I was able to apply caveat emptor. Most of my colleagues could not.

[zulchzulu]

20. So, what's your point? Graham saw through the BS and voted no

Clinton didn't read the NIE then... and voted for the war...and against the Levin Amendment for diplomatic strategies.

Are we through? Do you get it?

[Maribelle]

21. Putting your arrogant sarcasm aside, I ask you to please reread the post you attempted to flame.

Dragging through the mud - - which you attempted to accuse me of - - appears to be your widdle trick, not mine.




On Oct. 4, Tenet presented a 25-page document titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." It was fake - - a terrible redacted version of the NIE.

[zulchzulu]

24. So what's the conclusion...

Does Senator Clinton get a free pass to send our troops to war because of a...um...technicality? She didn't read the NIE because _________? She voted for the war because_________? She voted against the Levin Amendment because _________?

Please explain.

On my "arrogant sarcasm", I'm not either. Flabbergasted perhaps.

I just find it ludicrous that someone would send the letter to the President all while knowing she is complicit in the same crime. Meanwhile, more troops die, more terrorists are being spawned, more Iraqis die and billions of dollars are pissed away... I guess that's the "Change" we want. Is it with a Trademark symbol?

Don't run and hide. Tell me why you believe Clinton and think she has any credibility on giving instructions to the President on the war based on her past unapologetic mistake...

:popcorn:

[Maribelle]

29. I believe you are confused. Which document do you think Hillary did not read : 90-page or 25-page

You need to clarify this, because I already told you the Oct2/4 (pick a date crybaby) distributed document was a 25-PAGE redacted report which fooled many. Did Hillary say she didn't read this one? Or did Hillary say she didn't read the top secret one that Graham first requested which was the full NIE report?

We could be here for days unless you tell me which document you are talking about.

[lojasmo]

27. Does redaction excuse not reading the damn thing? I don't think so.

[Maribelle]

30. Which document did Hillary say she did not read? redacted or not redacted? 90 pages or 25 pages?

I have yet to see a Hillary basher answer this very simple question. And I would imagine that if anyone thinks they are smart enough about this to bash Hillary over it THEY WOULD KNOW THE ANSWER BEFORE BASHING.

[lojasmo]

39. Clinton did not read the NIE report on Iraq.

Frankly, I don't care how many pages she failed to read.

[Maribelle]

23. There was nothing to read on October 2.

If your going to accuse others of dragging someone's name through the mud, you should try a little harder to get the facts of your sarcasm a little more correct first, sweetie.

The severely redacted document posing as an NIE was presented to congress on October 4th.

[zulchzulu]

25. This kind of "argument" reminds me of another Clinton

The NIE in question was printed and sent to the Senate on October 2nd. The Iraq War Resolution was introduced on that day as well. We can hem and haw about whether is was October 2nd or 4th if you want. I guess that's the whole point, right?

A couple day difference to argue about vs. whether someone who now have the magical powers to tell the President what to do about a war she is complicit in based on NIEs she now reads that she didn't read before the goddamn war started and she voted for.

Was it 8:30 or 9:30? What was the second hand on? Was the clock synced to atomic time servers? Which ones?

:crazy:

http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7758

[Maribelle]

31. You mean it's neocon deception. That document you're crying about was not the NIE

The NIE was not sent to the Senate.

[zulchzulu]

36. I've always loved women named Maribelle

Let's call it a truce.

I'm sure we agree on 97% of all the issues we care about.

Best,
ZZ

[SaveElmer]

7. Bush will probably have to have someone read this to him...

And tell him what it means...

[Clintonista2]

22. I love her letters

Let's see if she gets the same nasty response as her pentagon letter.

[ShortnFiery]

26. IMO, you are one of very few. Clinton *burn-out* is a truism. nt.

[wyldwolf]

32. actually, it's a myth

Clinton is viewed favorably by 81% of Democrats and unfavorably by 17%. Obama is viewed favorably by 66% of those in his party, unfavorably by 28%. Forty-four percent (44%) have a Very Favorable opinion of Clinton while 31% say the same about Obama.

Clinton leads Obama by 29 points among women and six points among men.

http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/daily_presidential_tracking_poll__1

[BeyondGeography]

34. Uh, are those the pre-Oprah numbers?

:scared:

[wyldwolf]

35. uh, do have any stats saying Oprah has reversed them?

:scared:

[Tellurian]

38. Hillary polls 65% support at DU...looks like detractor *burn-out!*

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=132x3499694

[Imagevision]

33. This letter to Bush penned by Hillary help never read by Bush so who the hell is talking to who???

[wyldwolf]

37. wtf?