War hawks, war doves, war spin

[ProSense]

This was posted on CNN's website:

CAMPAIGN LAUNCHES "FIRST DIRECT ASSAULT" ON FELLOW '08 DEM: Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton last night ripped into 2008 White House contender John Edwards - her first direct assault on any of her potential Democratic presidential rivals. Clinton's surprising broadside came just hours after Edwards, in Harlem, delivered a sharp condemnation - clearly aimed at Clinton, although he didn't mention her by name - against those who fail to "speak out" against the war in Iraq. "Silence is betrayal, and I believe it is a betrayal not to speak out against the escalation of the war in Iraq," Edwards told a crowd at Manhattan's Riverside Church, where Martin Luther King had declared his opposition to the Vietnam War... "In 2004, John Edwards used to constantly brag about running a positive campaign. Today, he has unfortunately chosen to open his campaign with political attacks on Democrats who are fighting the Bush administration's Iraq policy," said Clinton adviser Howard Wolfson. New York Post: Hill Jabs at John

Of course this is from the NY Post, but I thought Clinton and Murdoch were buddies.

Sunday, January 14, 2007
never mind what you said, it's what you're buying:
Jon argues that we shouldn't ignore Iraq hawks because Iraq doves have been less than wise themselves. I agree.

The trouble is that Jon's focus is misconstrued. Using Jonathan Schell as his foil, he writes, "it's worth recalling that his own record of prognostication is not exactly perfect," and proceeds to list some bungled predictions. But predictions are not the issue: the thought process that goes into someone's positions is. It's certainly the case that the ability of that process to explain events on the ground is a crucial consideration, and predictions made reveal this to a great extent. However, a focus on specific predictions that don't come true can obscure the general picture. In 2003, recall, Bush and his supporters attempted to discredit their critics by noting that a predicted humanitarian calamity hadn't materialized. If Jon buys his own argument, he has to nod in agreement with this dubious point.

He doesn't need to. There were a whole host of antiwar arguments that functioned as Gettier cases. For instance, the idea that the war was reducible to oil -- oil is, of course, what makes anyone care about the Persian Gulf region, but to essentialize every impulse for war to a rapacious desire to seize oil will misexplain much about the war's architects. That's a more important consideration than someone's record of predictions: the rationale that leads them to such predictions. Remember Al Gore's September 2002 Commonwealth Club speech against the war. Gore was certainly right to oppose the war, but his premises included the desirability of deposing Saddam Hussein -- only this was to occur short of war somehow -- which introduced an element of incoherence to what was, in top-line form, a correct case. By contrast, Richard Clarke had the right argument against the war: it would, even in the best case, deal a huge setback to the broader strategic need to fuck al-Qaeda up.

What would make Jon's case a lot clearer would be if he specified what he thinks the lessons of the Iraq war actually are. He says there are several. Sure. But if he says we should learn only some things and avoid learning others, it would be nice to know which is which. Otherwise, one fears that the thinking that led Jon into his support for the war is still alive and enslaving the mind of a really great guy.
--spencerackerman

more...

What Edwards said:

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I firmly believe that the issue of Iraq is not about politics. It's about national security. We know that for at least 20 years, Saddam Hussein has aggressively and obsessively sought weapons of mass destruction through every means available. We know that he has chemical and biological weapons today. He has used them in the past, and he is doing everything he can to build more. Each day he inches closer to his longtime goal of nuclear capability--a capability that could be less than a year away.

I believe that Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime represents a clear threat to the United States, to our allies, to our interests around the world, and to the values of freedom and democracy we hold dear.

Saddam has proven his willingness to act irrationally and brutally against his neighbors and against his own people. Iraqi's destructive capacity has the potential to throw the entire Middle East into chaos, and poses a mortal threat to our vital ally, Israel.

What's more, the terrorist threat against America is all too clear. Thousands of terrorist operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on Saddam's arsenal, and there is every possibility that he could turn his weapons over to these terrorists. No one can doubt that if the terrorists of September 11 had had weapons of mass destruction, they would have used them. On September 12, 2002, we can hardly ignore the terrorist threat, and the serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be used in aid of terror.

Iraq has continued to develop its arsenal in definance of the collective will of the international community, as expressed through the United Nations Security Council. It is violating the terms of the cease-fire that ended the Gulf War and ignoring as many as 16 U.N. Security Council resolutions--including 11 resolutions concerning Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.

These U.N. resolutions are not unilateral American demands. They involve obligations Iraq has undertaken to the international community. By ignoring them. Saddam Hussein is undermining the credibility of the United Nations, openly violating international law, and making a mockery of the very idea of international collective action which is so important to the United States and our allies.

The time has come for decisive action. With our allies, we must do whatever is necessary to guard against the threat posed by an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction, and under the thumb of Saddam Hussein . The United States must lead an international effort to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and to assure that Iraq fulfills its obligations to the international community.

This is not an easy decision, and its carries many risks. It will also carry costs, certainly in resources, and possibly in lives. After careful consideration, I believe that the risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of action.

As we set out on this course, we must be as conscious of our special responsibility as we are confident in the rightness of our cause.

The United States has a special role of leadership in the international community. As America and its allies move down this path, we must do so in a way that preserves the legitimacy of our actions, enhances international consensus, and strengthens our global leadership.

First, this means making the strongest possible case to the American people about the danger Saddam poses. Months of mixed messages, high-level speculation and news-leaks about possible military plans have caused widespread concern among many Americans and around the world.

I am encouraged that the President has overruled some of his advisors and decided to ask for the support of Congress. From the support of Congress, this effort will derive even greater and more enduring strength.

Second, the Administration must do as much as possible to rally the support of the international community under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. We should tap into the strengths of existing alliances like NATO to enforce such a mandate. And let me be clear: America's allies deserve more than just token consultation. The Bush administration must make a full-court press to rally global support, much like the impressive effort President Bush's father made to rally the first international coalition against Saddam in the fall of 1990. If they do, I believe they will succeed.

If, however, the United Nations Security Council is prevented from supporting this effort, then we must act with as many allies as possible to ensure that Iraq meets its obligations to existing Security Council resolutions. After all, that's what the U.S. and its NATO allies did during the 1999 war in Kosovo, when a U.N. Security Council resolution was impossible.

Third, we must be honest with the American people about the extraordinary commitment this task entails. It is likely to cost us much in the short-term, and it is certain to demand our attention and commitment for the long-haul. We have to show the world that we are prepared to do what it takes to help rebuild a post-Saddam Iraq and give the long-suffering Iraqi people the chance to live under freedom.

Working with our allies, we have to be prepared to deal with the consequences of success--helping to provide security inside Iraq after Saddam is gone, working with the various Iraqi opposition groups in shaping a new government, reassuring Iraq's neighbors about its future stability, and supporting the Iraqi people as they rebuild their lives. This is a massive undertaking, and we must pursue it with no illusions.

Ensuring that Iraq complies with its commitments to the international community is the mission of the moment. Rebuilding Iraq and helping it evolve into a democracy at peace with itself and its neighbors will be the mission of many years.

Unfortunately, the administration's record to date gives me cause for concern. They must not make the same mistakes in post-Saddam Iraq that they are making in post-Taliban Afghanistan, where they have been dangerously slow in making the real commitment necessary to help democracy take root and flourish.

Finally, the administration must show that its actions against Iraq are part of a broader strategy to strengthen American security around the world.

We must address the most insidious threat posed by weapons of mass destruction--the threat that comes from the ability of terrorists to obtain them. We must do much more to support the many disarmament programs already in place to dismantle weapons and prevent access to weapons-grade materials in Russia and the former Soviet states; we must fully fund Nunn-Lugar; and we should work hard to forge international coalition to prevent proliferation.

We must be fully and continuously engaged to help resolve the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians. Disengagement was a mistake. The United States cannot deliver peace to the parties, but no agreement is possible without our active involvement.

We also must have a national strategy for energy security, working to strengthen relationships with new suppliers and doing more to develop alternative sources of power.

And we must do far more to promote democracy throughout the Arab world. We should examine our overall engagement in the entire region, and employ the same kinds of tools that we used to win the battle of ideas fought during the Cold War, from vigorous public diplomacy to assistance for democratic reform at the grassroots.

The path of confronting Saddam is full of hazards. But the path of inaction is far more dangerous. This week, a week where we remember the sacrifice of thousands of innocent Americans made on 9/11, the choice could not be starker. Had we known that such attacks were imminent, we surely would have used every means at our disposal to prevent them and take out the plotters. We cannot wait for such a terrible event--or, if weapons of mass destruction are used, one far worse--to address the clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

John Edwards (D-NC) Sept 12, 2002

What Kerry said:

We Still Have a Choice on Iraq
by Sen. John F. Kerry
Sept 6, 2002

It may well be that the United States will go to war with Iraq. But if so, it should be because we have to — not because we want to. For the American people to accept the legitimacy of this conflict and give their consent to it, the Bush administration must first present detailed evidence of the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and then prove that all other avenues of protecting our nation's security interests have been exhausted. Exhaustion of remedies is critical to winning the consent of a civilized people in the decision to go to war. And consent, as we have learned before, is essential to carrying out the mission. President Bush's overdue statement this week that he would consult Congress is a beginning, but the administration's strategy remains adrift.

Regime change in Iraq is a worthy goal. But regime change by itself is not a justification for going to war. Absent a Qaeda connection, overthrowing Saddam Hussein — the ultimate weapons-inspection enforcement mechanism — should be the last step, not the first. Those who think that the inspection process is merely a waste of time should be reminded that legitimacy in the conduct of war, among our people and our allies, is not a waste, but an essential foundation of success.

If we are to put American lives at risk in a foreign war, President Bush must be able to say to this nation that we had no choice, that this was the only way we could eliminate a threat we could not afford to tolerate.

In the end there may be no choice. But so far, rather than making the case for the legitimacy of an Iraq war, the administration has complicated its own case and compromised America's credibility by casting about in an unfocused, overly public internal debate in the search for a rationale for war. By beginning its public discourse with talk of invasion and regime change, the administration has diminished its most legitimate justification of war — that in the post-Sept. 11 world, the unrestrained threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein is unacceptable and that his refusal to allow in inspectors is in blatant violation of the United Nations 1991 cease-fire agreement that left him in power.

The administration's hasty war talk makes it much more difficult to manage our relations with other Arab governments, let alone the Arab street. It has made it possible for other Arab regimes to shift their focus to the implications of war for themselves rather than keep the focus where it belongs — on the danger posed by Saddam Hussein and his deadly arsenal. Indeed, the administration seems to have elevated Saddam Hussein in the eyes of his neighbors to a level he would never have achieved on his own.

There is, of course, no question about our capacity to win militarily, and perhaps to win easily. There is also no question that Saddam Hussein continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction, and his success can threaten both our interests in the region and our security at home. But knowing ahead of time that our military intervention will remove him from power, and that we will then inherit all or much of the burden for building a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, is all the more reason to insist on a process that invites support from the region and from our allies. We will need that support for the far tougher mission of ensuring a future democratic government after the war.

The question is not whether we should care if Saddam Hussein remains openly scornful of international standards of behavior that he agreed to live up to. The question is how we secure our rights with respect to that agreement and the legitimacy it establishes for the actions we may have to take. We are at a strange moment in history when an American administration has to be persuaded of the virtue of utilizing the procedures of international law and community — institutions American presidents from across the ideological spectrum have insisted on as essential to global security.

For the sake of our country, the legitimacy of our cause and our ultimate success in Iraq, the administration must seek advice and approval from Congress, laying out the evidence and making the case. Then, in concert with our allies, it must seek full enforcement of the existing cease-fire agreement from the United Nations Security Council. We should at the same time offer a clear ultimatum to Iraq before the world: Accept rigorous inspections without negotiation or compromise. Some in the administration actually seem to fear that such an ultimatum might frighten Saddam Hussein into cooperating. If Saddam Hussein is unwilling to bend to the international community's already existing order, then he will have invited enforcement, even if that enforcement is mostly at the hands of the United States, a right we retain even if the Security Council fails to act. But until we have properly laid the groundwork and proved to our fellow citizens and our allies that we really have no other choice, we are not yet at the moment of unilateral decision-making in going to war against Iraq.

John F. Kerry, a Democrat, is a senator from Massachusetts.

H/t to DUer TayTay for the articles.