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The hate on the ground is too intense, and was too intense before Hezbollah made its raid. If the occupation didn't produce enough hate, the pan-Arab humiliation over many lost wars, and having Palestinians ejected from the land Allah gave the Muslims, would do it--it wasn't completely revenged by Hezbollah's studly forcing of Israel to withdraw. But having many of the mosques controlled by imams that routinely fan the simultaneous feelings of victimization and superiority certainly helped.
When Nasrallah can go and say, with a straight face, that having Hezbollah bombed is all about winning Lebanese independence, one wonders exactly what he's been doped with.
When the Shi'ite members of the cabinet could stage a walkout when Siniora gave a speech saying that Hezbollah was a militia that needed to be disarmed, it was a sign that things were going to end badly. They returned only when Siniora said Lebanon was proud of Hezbollah, the resistance.
Your solution is the common sense one, one that could have been achieved in other ways. Lebanon could have asked for non-Israeli help in disarming Hezbollah; it could have even *prevented* Hezbollah's continued arming. But the Lebanese that didn't want an armed militia around preferred to pretend there wasn't a problem, as long as only Israel was attacked; and the Lebanese that liked Hezbollah around made it clear they really liked having it around, and it wasn't only Israel that could be attacked.
La Signora de Beirut had no other politically viable option but to play kick the can. He knew it looked like a grenade; he just hoped it wouldn't explode during his tenure.
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