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Edited on Thu Oct-20-05 07:51 AM by MaineDem
For Immediate Release
October 19, 2005
Contact: Karen Finney - 202-863-8148
CONDOLEEZZA RICE AND THE WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was a member of the White House
Iraq Group. This group, which was formed in August of 2002, was
developed in order to sell the Iraq war to Congress and the American
people. However, in addition to actively promoting the President's
agenda, the group also worked to discredit anyone who openly disagreed
with the President's plan, including Valerie Plame's husband, former
Ambassador Joseph Wilson. To date, at least seven of the nine members of
WHIG have been questioned by Fitzgerald or called to testify in front of
the grand jury. It is becoming increasingly clear that members of the
White House Iraq Group are intimately involved in the Plame leak
scandal. Today, Rice appears before the Senate Foreign Relations
committee to talk about Iraq and U.S. foreign policy. While she's there,
she should answer a few questions about her involvement in the use of
intelligence in the events leading to the war in Iraq and her role in
the White House Iraq Group.
WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP (WHIG)
Who had the ultimate authority over the White House Iraq Group? What
was Rice's role?
Fitzgerald Considering Conspiracy Charges for Group of Senior
Administration Officials - WHIG? "(A) new theory about Fitzgerald's aim
has emerged in recent weeks from two lawyers who have had extensive
conversations with the prosecutor while representing witnesses in the
case. They surmise that Fitzgerald is considering whether he can bring
charges of a criminal conspiracy perpetrated by a group of senior Bush
administration officials. Under this legal tactic, Fitzgerald would
attempt to establish that at least two or more officials agreed to take
affirmative steps to discredit and retaliate against Wilson and leak
sensitive government information about his wife. To prove a criminal
conspiracy, the actions need not have been criminal, but conspirators
must have had a criminal purpose." (Washington Post, 10/2/05)
CIA LEAK: WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP
Was Rice or Hadley involved in the effort to discredit Ambassador
Wilson? What were Rice's and Hadley's involvement in the WHIG?
White House Iraq Group Formed To Formulate Strategy To Sell Iraq War to
American People. "Systematic coordination began in August, when Chief of
Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. formed the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, to
set strategy for each stage of the confrontation with Baghdad. A senior
official who participated in its work called it "an internal working
group, like many formed for priority issues, to make sure each part of
the White House was fulfilling its responsibilities." The group met
weekly in the Situation Room. Among the regular participants were Karl
Rove, the president's senior political adviser; communications
strategists Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin and James R. Wilkinson;
legislative liaison Nicholas E. Calio; and policy advisers led by Rice
and her deputy, Stephen J. Hadley, along with I. Lewis Libby, Cheney's
chief of staff." (Washington Post, 8/10/03)
WHIG Members Reunite To Back Up Their Faulty Intelligence. During the
summer of 2003, Hughes and Mary Matalin joined Dan Bartlett in
formulating a strategy to push back on general questions about the White
House's credibility over its handling of the Iraq war. "The plan:
Release all relevant information. Try to shift attention back to Bush's
leadership in the war on terrorism. Diminish the significance of that
single piece of iffy intelligence by making the case that Saddam was a
threat for many other reasons. Put Republican lawmakers and other Bush
allies on TV to defend him. Most important: Question the motives of
Democrats who supported the war but now are criticizing the president."
(New York Times, 10/21/02; USA Today, 7/24/03)
CIA LEAK: STATE DEPARTMENT MEMO
When did Rice see the State Department memo that included Valerie
Plame's name? Did Rice receive the memo? Did Rice read the memo on Air
Force One?
The State Department Compiled a Memo on Joe Wilson in June of 2003. On
June 10, 2003 the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research
compiled a memo for Marc Grossman, then the Under Secretary of State for
political affairs, on Joe Wilson's mission to Niger. The memo included
the fact that Wilson's wife was a CIA operative working on WMD issues.
At the time, Wilson was criticizing the Administration's justification
for the war, specifically discrediting the charge that Iraq was
attempting to purchase yellow cake uranium. (Newsweek, 7/25/05; New York
Times, 7/16/05)
State Department Memo Was Marked as Containing Sensitive Information.
According to officials familiar with the case, the memo compiled by the
State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research, was marked as
sensitive information. The section of the document pertaining to Plame's
role in the trip to Niger was marked as especially sensitive. According
to the Wall Street Journal, "the paragraph in the memo discussing Ms.
Wilson's involvement in her husband's trip is marked at the beginning
with a letter designation in brackets to indicate the information
shouldn't be shared, according to the person familiar with the memo.
Such a designation would indicate to a reader that the information was
sensitive." (Bloomberg, 7/18/05; Wall Street Journal, 7/19/05)
Powell Admitted to Circulating State Department Memo That Identified
Plame To White House Officials on Air Force One. "After a June 12
Washington Post story made reference to the Niger uranium inquiry,
Armitage asked intelligence officers in the State Department for more
information. He was forwarded a copy of a memo classified "Secret" that
included a description of Wilson's trip for the CIA, his findings, a
brief description of the origin of the trip and a reference to 'Wilson's
wife.'... July 7, this memo and the notes were removed from the safe and
forwarded to Powell via a secure fax line to Air Force One. Powell was
on the way to Africa with the president, and his aides knew the
secretary would be getting questions. Fitzgerald has become interested
in this memo, the earliest known document seen by administration
officials revealing that Wilson's wife worked for the CIA. Powell told
prosecutors that he circulated the memo among those traveling with him
in the front section of Air Force One. It is believed that all officials
in that part of the aircraft had high-level security clearance." (Los
Angeles Times, 8/25/05)
Top Bush Administration Officials Were Seen Reading State Department
Memo. During the July 2003 trip to Africa by Bush and his staff, high
ranking Administration officials were seen with the State Department
memo. According to a person involved in the case, then-Secretary of
State Colin Powell was seen walking around Air Force One with the memo
as was former White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. According to
individuals connected to the case, the Special Prosecutor Peter
Fitzgerald believed "that a printout of memo was in the front of Air
Force One" during the trip, making it available to various members of
the Bush staff. (Washington Post, 7/17/05; Bloomberg, 7/18/05)
State Department Memo May Have Been Used to Brief Bush Administration
Officials for Sunday Shows. "Meanwhile, in transatlantic secure phone
calls, the message machinery focused on a crucial topic: who should
carry the freight on the following Sunday's talk shows? The message:
protect Cheney by explaining that he had had nothing to do with sending
Wilson to Niger, and dismiss the yellowcake issue. ...She (Rice) was on
the Africa trip with the president, though, and wouldn't be getting back
until Saturday night. To allow her to prepare on the long flight home to
D.C., White House officials assembled a briefing book, which they faxed
to the Bush entourage in Africa. The book was primarily prepared by her
National Security Council staff. It contained classified information -
perhaps including all or part of the memo from State. The entire binder
was labeled TOP SECRET." (Newsweek, 7/25/05)
WHIG AND THE CIA: RICE USING HER INFLUENCE?
Did Rice or anyone else in the Administration lobby the committee on
this vote?
Rice Part Of Group Described As Having A Disdain for CIA Views On
Intelligence Matters. "When the disclosure of Wilson's CIA mission to
Niger put the White House on the defensive, one administration official
said it reminded a tight knit group of Bush neoconservatives of their
longtime battles with the agency and underlined their determination to
fight. Many of those officials also were members of the White House Iraq
Group, established to coordinate and promote administration policy. It
included the most influential players who would represent two elements
of the current scandal: a hardball approach to political critics and
long-standing disdain for CIA views on intelligence matters. The group
consisted of Rove, Libby, White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr.,
then-national security advisor Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Stephen
Hadley, and Mary Matalin, Cheney's media advisor... Before the war, this
Iraq group promoted the view that Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction and was seeking more." (Los Angeles Times, 8/25/05)
House International Relations Committee Republicans Voted Against
Resolution That Would Have Required State Department to Release CIA Leak
Case Records. On September 14, 2005, the House International Relations
Committee considered H. Res 419 that would have required Condoleezza
Rice and the State Department to release all information and documents
pertaining to the leaking of Valerie Plame's status as a CIA operative.
In a party line vote, the Republicans on the committee voted against the
resolution. (H.Res. 419, 2005; AP, 9/14/05)
INTELLIGENCE MEDDLING: WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP
Did Rice favor intelligence that supported the Administration's plans?
Rice's Deputy Was Warned To Drop Niger Uranium Reference From Bush's
October Address To The Nation. In October 2002, CIA Director George
Tenet personally and repeatedly warned Stephen Hadley, a deputy of
Condoleezza Rice, as well as other White House officials that references
to Niger be dropped from Bush's October 7 speech to the nation. The
Niger allegation was omitted from that speech. (Washington Post,
7/25/01; New York Times, 7/16/03; 7/13/03)
But The Previously Omitted Information Showed Up In Bush's January 2003
State Of The Union. "The British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
(Bush, State of The Union, 1/28/03)
Bush Claims Proved False Before Wilson Arrived In Niger; Three Separate
Reports Debunked Niger Transaction Prior to State of the Union. In
addition to Ambassador Wilson's conclusion debunking the Niger arms
uranium sale, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to Niger, and her
staff had already concluded the intelligence was false by the time
Wilson arrived in the country. The U.S. embassy had alerted Washington
of those conclusions. Separately, 4-Star Marine Gen. Carlton W. Fulford
Jr. had met with the Niger president in February 2002 to check the
security of the country's uranium. Fulford reported that he was
"convinced it was not an issue," and passed his findings to Gen. Richard
B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. When asked about Bush's claim in
the State of the Union, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who
investigated the possibility of the Niger transaction, said, "I
believed, at the time (I) effectively debunked the Niger arms uranium
sale." (Washington Post, 7/15/03; Joseph Wilson Op-Ed, New York Times,
7/6/03; The New Republic, 6/30/03; Nicholas Kristoff Op-Ed, New York
Times, 6/13/03; The New Yorker, 3/31/03; NBC "Meet the Press," 7/6/03)
Rice Was Repeatedly Warned Not To Cite Niger Report. In March 2002,
both the CIA and State Department learned that evidence linking Iraq to
Niger was unfounded. In October 2002, CIA Director Tenet personally
intervened with Condoleezza Rice's deputy National Security Advisor to
have the charge removed from Bush's speech to the nation. Rice herself
was sent a memo debunking the claim. In January 2003, just days before
Bush uttered the false charge, CIA officials tried again to remove the
language, but the White House insisted it remain - with the added caveat
that they had received the information from British sources. (Bush State
of the Union, 1/28/03; Time, 7/21/03 Issue; Hadley/Bartlett Gaggle,
7/22/03; New York Times, 7/13/03; Washington Post, 7/20/03; NPR,
6/19/03)
Hussein Did Not Have Chief Requirements For Nuclear Weapons. Hussein
turned out not to have the principal requirement for a nuclear weapon, a
sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And the
U.S. government, authoritative intelligence officials said, had only
circumstantial evidence that Iraq was trying to obtain those materials.
Inspectors in postwar Iraq "found the former nuclear weapons program,
described as a 'grave and gathering danger' by President Bush and a
'mortal threat' by Vice President Cheney, in much the same shattered
state left by U.N. inspectors in the 1990s." (Washington Post, 8/10/03,
1/7/04)
INTELLIGENCE MEDDLING: WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP
Who wrote the "script" provided for Powell's speech to the UN on WMDs?
WHIG Members Attempted To Reinsert Intelligence Backed By Hearsay Into
Powell's UN Presentation. "Rice, Tenet and Hadley were trying to
reinsert bits of intelligence they personally favored but that could not
be corroborated. Hadley offered an unsubstantiated report of alleged
meetings between Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi
intelligence officer in Prague shortly before the attacks. 'The whole
time, people were trying to reinsert their favorite ...pet rocks back
into the presentation, when their pet rocks weren't backed up by
anything but hearsay, or Chalabi or the INC or both," (Powell advisor
Larry) Wilkerson said. In the end, Powell agreed with Tenet to rely
mainly on the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which had been
vetted by the CIA. Wilkerson came to believe that the Pentagon
officials, and their allies in the White House, doubted what the
intelligence community said because 'it didn't fit their script' for
going to war." (Los Angeles Times, 8/25/05)
WHIG Provided Powell With "Script" For Speech to United Nations on
Iraq's WMD Threat. The final step was to get Powell to make the case to
the United Nations. This was handled by the White House Iraq Group,
which, Bamford says, provided Powell with a script for his speech. Much
of it was unsourced material fed to newspapers by the OSP. Realizing
this, Powell's team turned to the now-discredited National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq. But some of Feith's handiwork ended up in Powell's
mouth anyway. (UPI, 7/19/04)
INTELLIGENCE MEDDLING: WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP
Was Rice's use of the term "mushroom cloud" a decision made by the
WHIG?
WHIG Pushed Iraq Nuclear Threat In Papers and Planned Speeches. Under a
special "strategic communications" group associated with WHIG, White
House staff planned speeches and wrote papers which emphasized Iraq's
supposed nuclear threat. According to the Washington Post, "The
escalation of nuclear rhetoric a year ago, including the introduction of
the term 'mushroom cloud' into the debate, coincided with the formation
of a White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, a task force assigned to 'educate
the public' about the threat from Hussein, as a participant put it."
(Washington Post, 8/10/03)
Rice Warned of Smoking Gun as "Mushroom Cloud." "'The problem here is
that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can
acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a
mushroom cloud.' National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told CNN's
'Late Edition.'" (AP, 9/8/02)
Paid for and authorized by the Democratic National Committee,
www.democrats.org. This communication is not authorized by any
candidate or candidate's committee.
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