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(Moderators: Permission to post long excerpt granted by author. -r.)“Is this real-world or exercise?”: Cyber-PsyOps Warfare & 9/11 by Mssr. Jouet Part I (of 7): 9/11, Simulation and “Red Teaming” What was the time span between the awareness of the US military of the second hijacking (a clear indication of an aberrant event, confirmed in a short time by the first and second WTC impacts) and the impact on the Pentagon? It is tempting to see the totality of 9/11 as a single event, but in reality those events played out over hours -- yet were sometimes measured in minutes, or seconds (or even milliseconds) over multiple locations from Boston to Washington to Florida and beyond. 9/11 was a series of inter-connected events. Furthermore, we know that there were extensive warnings in advance by sources both inside and outside the US. Indeed, there was a palpable prodrome (a period of time during which early warning signs can be observed or experienced) that was acknowledged and noted at that time by many. (The 9/11 prodrome was so palpable that the US military community drilled for it for years in advance.) We also know -- despite the fact that we think that 9/11 came to a close as the dust settled and the President returned to Washington to address the nation -- that the events of 9/11 continued on beyond that day, as evidenced by the anthrax events, the clean-up, and the discussions about investigations that dragged on for years, as well as the war, infringement of liberties, torture, governmental abuses and cover-ups done in its wake. But even when thinking only about that “severe clear” September morning, it must be acknowledged that any encounter of a modern-day military nature must necessarily be a dynamic event… in other words, it can change nature, tempo and focus as it evolves through multiple bifurcations, Moebian twists and the forced false perceptions of mind war. The Battle of the Bulge, for example, can be seen as a single event, but it had a prodrome period that extended for months, and Patton’s G-2 smelled out the attack before it occurred; the event had several phases, critical moments, and critical locations, each with their distinct nature and characteristics; the whole event lasted for ten days, two weeks, or a month, depending on how you want to see the event in retrospect. War-gaming since its inception was developed to explore this dynamism: multiple scenarios, multiple roles, simulated “injects” and “wild cards” are used to introduce such change, and numerous methods and approaches are used to mimic or simulate “the fog of war”. Note that the motto of the agency which coordinates the development of military computer simulation technologies (STRICOM) is “All But War Is Simulation”. In recent history, war-gaming and simulation have been used extensively inside and outside the military as a means of creating indirect experience with these dynamics. The value of such indirect experience is discussed on the first page of the first chapter of the seminal 1954 book Strategy by Sir. B. H. Liddell Hart, published in 1954. See also, for example, the various publications and books by James Dunnigan ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Dunnigan ), especially http://www.hyw.com/Books/WargamesHandbook/Contents.htm .)
http://911conspiracysmasher.blogspot.com/2006_09_01_archive.html .]
Note as well:
Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis: Naval Inst. Press, 1990).
Thomas B. Allen, War Games: The Secret World of the Creators, Players, and Policy Makers Rehearsing World War III Today (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987).
“Wargaming: The Key To Planning Success” (in the Bosnian conflict)
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec99/MS467.htm
See also “THEATERS OF WAR”
http://www.stanford.edu/class/sts145/Library/Lenoir-Lowood_TheatersOfWar.pdf
and note the relevance of simulation to Desert Storm and the battle of 73 Easting. Captain Joe Sartiano, commander of Troop G at the battle of 73 Easting during Desert Storm, was asked how his troop had been able to do so well their first time in combat. He answered that it wasn’t their first time: the troop had been exposed to combat repeatedly through the National Training Center and an array of simulations. .
The Clancy/Franks book also has an excellent description of a synchronization matrix and its use during Desert Storm. Synchronization is "the ability to focus resources and activities in time and space to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point."
“This paper* proposes an automated technique (labeled the "Dynamic Synchronization Matrix") for synchronizing forces at the operational level. The Dynamic Synchronization Matrix is a simple adaptation of a commercial project management program, run on a personal computer, which improves upon existing capabilities because it combines the two distinct major improvements of PERT methodology and automation. This decision support tool improves upon the two-dimensional synchronization matrices that enable modern tactical planning, command and control by making connections between time, space, forces, functions, actions, and effects which the average human would have difficulty making and storing…. The net gains in employing the DSM include more disciplined planning, greater flexibility in subsequent planning and execution, multiple display options, greater speed, agility, and accuracy, enhanced situational awareness and information management, insights into one's own plans, and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities, and linkage and applicability to subordinate echelons and other levels of war.”
* From “The Dynamic Synchronization Matrix: An Automated Decision Support Tool for the Campaign Planning Staff”, Kevin S Donohue, Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth School of Advanced Military Studies, http://www.stormingmedia.us/03/0329/A032982.html
Descriptors : *AUTOMATION, *ARMY PLANNING, *DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, TIME INTERVALS, METHODOLOGY, WARFARE, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, DECISION MAKING, DATA MANAGEMENT, MILITARY DOCTRINE, DISPLAY SYSTEMS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, STRENGTH(GENERAL), ENEMY, MICROCOMPUTERS, ARMY, ARMY OPERATIONS, MILITARY COMMANDERS, COMBAT FORCES, PERT, AIR LAND BATTLES.
Subject Categories : OPERATIONS RESEARCH, MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, MILITARY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING & MAN MACHINE SYSTEM
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Published in 1994, it can also be found here:
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA289230
One of the key elements in military-caliber simulation gaming is the use of “Red Teaming”. This is in close parallel to the use of “Team B” as developed during the Reagan administration under the tutelage of his DCI, George Herbert Walker Bush. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Team_B .
“The “Red Team”: Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency Plan”, by Col. Timothy Malone and Major Reagan Schaupp (both USAF), describes the use of “red-teaming, synchronization matrices and simulation for improved mission planning and mission rehearsal. The use of “a group of subject-matter experts (SME), with various, appropriate … disciplinary backgrounds, that provides an independent peer review of products and processes, acts as a devil’s advocate, and knowledgeably role-plays the enemy and outside agencies, using an iterative, interactive process during operations planning.”
“An effective Red Team can pinpoint key Blue decision points, identify planning shortfalls, show deviations from doctrine, reveal overlooked opportunities, and extrapolate unanticipated strategic implications.”
“Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke’s adage ‘no plan survives contact with the enemy’ is true. But through Red Teaming, a plan can be refined after each contact with a Red Team. This process is valuable because it brings a contingency plan, together with the reasoning and information behind it, under the scrutiny of a well-simulated enemy. Better still, the Red Team can imitate outside agencies, higher headquarters, and even “Murphy’s Law.” A plan that survives this kind of treatment should be healthy indeed. To modify Gen George S. Patton’s famous quotation, ‘A good plan, well rehearsed, is better than a perfect plan unrehearsed’.”
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/malone.html
The Red Team can also discover (through drills, exercises, table-tops and simulations) how protocols, communications, and command thinking function in a given scenario.
Simulation and operations are simply two sides of the same coin.
Review, at the end of this series, the range of exercises and drills that were focused on 9/11-like scenarios for years prior to 9/11.
Continued...
http://www.911blogger.com/node/7874
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