Disengagement, despite everything
The 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip was problematic, but strategically, it was and remains crucial.
By Ari ShavitAbout six months before the disengagement, a few dozen Israeli opinion makers were asked what repercussions the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip would have.
Benjamin Netanyahu said a unilateral withdrawal in return for nothing posed an existential threat. Uzi Arad was of the opinion that the disengagement would cause a security and diplomatic avalanche. Moshe Ya'alon argued that withdrawal would give terrorism a boost. Moshe Arens believed the disengagement would create a new strategic situation in which Israel's south would be under constant threat from the Palestinians. Yaakov Amidror predicted Gaza would turn into Hamastan and Palestinian missiles would fall in Ashdod and Kiryat Gat. Natan Sharansky foresaw the strengthening of Palestinian radicalism and the development of processes that could lead to war. And Eli Moyal, the mayor of Sderot at the time, suggested a wild futuristic scenario: "Thirty Qasam rockets fall on Sderot, six are killed, 10 are wounded. What does Israel do? Enter Gaza. But entering Gaza is not simple this time. Mines, bombs, south Lebanon. Soldiers are killed. Because of the killed soldiers the IDF intensifies the fire. Palestinian civilians are killed. International imbroglio."
The truth cannot be hidden. The right was right. On every point. At a time when much of Israel was experiencing euphoria over disengagement, the right saw reality as it was. At a time when the mainstream media sang the praises of the disengagement, the paralyzed right realized what was going to happen. The settlers' prophesies of doom, which were seen five year ago as hysterical and despicable, turned out to be completely accurate. Hamas' 2006 victory in the Palestinian elections and its 2007 takeover of Gaza proved how far the nationalists saw into the future.
The right was right, but the right was also wrong. It understood the latent dangers in the withdrawal, but completely failed to understand its necessity. It anticipated the near future clearly, but failed to predict the distant future. It saw the military problem in minute detail, but was blind to the strategic threat. The right failed to grasp five years ago exactly what it refuses to grasp today: The occupation virus has turned lethal.
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http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/disengagement-despite-everything-1.304713