Wanted: A new combat doctrine

[bemildred]

Does the Israel Defense Forces' combat doctrine and structure have to change following the lessons of the Lebanon war? That question should be foremost in the minds of the army's senior command, irrespective of the need to probe the senior officers' management of the war. It would be a mistake to focus only on the army's operational failures, which were indeed grave, while ignoring the basic military thinking formulated in recent years - on whose basis the IDF went to war in Lebanon.

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To a large extent, this is reminiscent of the concept the IDF developed between 1967 and 1973. The senior command believed then that the air force, which essentially defeated the Arab armies as the Six-Day War began, could answer almost single-handedly any threat from Egypt and Syria. The result was the neglect of the ground forces, along with the characteristic arrogance that disregarded the enemy's military capabilities.

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In any case, say those officers, Israel will not attack Iran with planes, so therefore the air force's investments in such long-range, manned air attacks can be reduced. The ground forces must be reorganized with an emphasis on increasing their size, quality and special operations units. Any logical scenario of future warfare shows that a large part of the war will be conducted by special operations forces and not by masses of armor. It may be time to consider creating a Special Operations Forces Command or corps. And it is time to return to a training plan that would keep the reservists at full operational capability.

The war in Lebanon was further proof that the era of mass armored battles is over. It is difficult to imagine a war in which the IDF makes use of its thousands of tanks. One need not give up armor, but the number of tanks should definitely be reduced. Instead of developing and producing the next generation of the Merkava, the current tanks should be provided with better protection. It exists, and all we need to do is to decide to equip them with it.

Haaretz

[The Magistrate]

1. From My Antiquarian's Arm-Chair, Sir

My suggestions for revision would focus on these points....

First, and by far most important, if occupation is going to continue in the Jordan valley, it needs to be conducted by a body of gendarmerie devoted particularly to the task, and not by combat units, and particularly not by first service conscripts. The force should be composed of older men, trained as much in police work as in military techniques. This would go a long way towards checking the moral rot occupation duty inflicts on the Army, and by putting the task in the hands of specialists who would develop a sort of craft knowledge about their task, as police do in their's, might well go some distance to smoothing down the edges of the administration of the place. It would be best, too, were such a force specifically charged with enforcement of occupation law against the settler's still present, and imbued with a certain hostile regard for them as troublemakers, who by their actions cause them a damned lot of work they could well do without.

Second, it is not so much "special operations" forces, in the sense of commando operations that is normally taken to mean, which must be most enhanced, but rather the basic ground force task of assault that must receive a new emphasis in organization and training. Any repetition of engagement with Hezbollah is going to be an exercise in cracking bunker complexes, which is a pretty straightforward business with little mystery about it. It does help to have small units specially trained and exercised to it, though, employing specialist tools, and imbued with a willingness to take casualties and carry on. It is generally from the combat engineer arm that such detachments are drawn, and so that would seem the branch best augmented, and raised in collective esteem to high elite status.

Third, it is not so much any flaw of design needing great correction in the vehicles employed that produced the armor casualties in this episode. The Merkaava is an old design, and doubtless could stand some up-dating and up-armoring, but it is particularly well constructed for crew protection from the front, and as it is on the slow side for a main battle tank, any augmentation of armor must be done with an eye towards the penalties of increased weight on mobility, and the penalties could well outweigh the benefits. The real problem seems to be flawed tactics in the actual situation the armored elements confronted. The cure for shoulder-fired weapons destroying tanks is not redesign of the tank, it is proper co-operation between infantry on foot and tanks operating in proximity to enemy positions. Against infantry operating from interconnected bunkers and tunnelled sally points, tanks are neither a break-through nor an exploitation element, but rather mobile direct fire artillery, that does not properly lead but rather follows the infantry, smothering fire points uncovered by the infantry's operations, and standing off at some distance behind the leading infantry elements. This is not something tankers particularly like to do, feeling it somewhat beneath their calling, just as airmen regard close-support missions, but it is what the situation encountered in south Lebanon requires.

[bemildred]

2. Yes. Particularly about the "special operations".

This is not properly "counter-insurgency" work, and guys in funny suits swooping in is not the right idea. But on all points, yes. It's not a great mystery.

[The Magistrate]

3. There Would Be Some Use, Though, Sir

To the insertion of infantry by helicopter at various points in the country-side beyond the bunker zone. It is always good to present the enemy with a novel problem suddenly created. The bunkering at the border would seem intended at least in part to shield the areas from which rockets are launched, and infantry, even if inserted almost at random, could be expected to have some disruptive effect on such operations. There is also little better by way of bait to tempt rash action by irregulars than a company-sized body in apparent isolation on a hilltop. Supported by an aerial cab-rank, it would be a situation where engaging even a sniper with a heavy guided bomb would be a paying proposition. While the bunker complexes are purportedly intended for "stay behind" operations, it would be surprising if there was not a certain "grain" to their firing and access points, that was susceptible to engagement more easily from some rearward direction. Knowledge that comrades might be in real trouble some miles ahead is also an excellent spur to efforts by the main body.

One technical point that would seem worthy of attention as well is exploring ways to quickly collapse the underground hivings on their occupants. The only pictures of one to have emerged so far do not look too prepossessing as exercises in structural engineering, and it would seem, at least, possible to do real damage by shock transmitted through the earth from a sizeable detonation, penetrated deep enough to contain the blast without much outlet through the surface. This is not quite the same thing as what they call a "bunker-buster", aimed at breaking through shielding to the hollow space within before detonation, but a harkening back to the "earthquake bomb" of Dr. Wallis, produced and employed, albeit for assault on massive concrete structures rather than for the purpose intended by its designer (the overthrow of foundations and the choking of mine-shafts), as the "Tallboy" and "Grand Slam" in the Second World War. With harder steels, and rocket assistance to add speed from height, the weights could perhaps be cut a bit from the six and ten metric tonnes of the originals. Particulars of the local surface geology, of course, might argue against the utility of such a device, but that sort of thing is quite beyond my ken.

[bemildred]

4. One of the arguments for encirclement via the Litani, IIRC

was that it would allow these emplacements to be taken in the rear. You know I take a dim view of frontal assault. We discussed the virtues of constriction and patience, and one of the purposes or effects of the rocket fire would be to make patience politically unacceptable.

My understanding is that the geology of the area is on the rocky side, but the devil is in the details with that sort of issue; and my knowledge very shallow, and it may not be rocky everywhere. As you mentioned before, there might be more ancient structures handy to use as well.

My feeling was not so much that special forces have not use at all, as that they have a role as team players in the larger tactical picture, along the lines you suggested before.

[The Magistrate]

5. That Last, Sir, Was More Blue Sky Than Usual For Me

Dr. Wallis has long interested me: he was an extraordinary engineer, and one of those dotty fellows England seems to produce in quantity. They had him in for the planning sessions on one raid, and he very carefully marked on the map little x-es where he said the bombs should land to ruin the place; the officers gently suggested that might not be quite possible and he huffed out saying "If I'd known you proposed to scatter the things about the country-side like grass seed I'd have never bothered to design them." But the basic idea seems worth exploring, as it has certain attractions of economy. Marines in the South Pacific got a lot of milage out of simply sealing the mouths of caves on Japanese garrissons, though that was mostly done by hand placed charges once the thing was fought down enough to approach.

Damned near anything is to be attempted rather than engaging in a frontal assault, certainly.

[bemildred]

6. "If I'd known you proposed to scatter the things about the country-side

like grass seed I'd have never bothered to design them."

Thank you for introducing me to Dr. Wallis, a man that should be listened to.