Israel and Hezbollah went to war - and Hamas lost

[bemildred]

Aside from being a giant advertisement for Russian weapons, one can also speculate about whether the war will serve as a recruiting tool for IJ. Meanwhile, as the finance threads indicate, the IDF thinks the proper solution is to give it yet more money to throw away on fancy weapons platforms.

GAZA CITY - Even though the fighting in Lebanon ended 10 days ago, in Gaza the Hezbollah "victory" celebrations continued this week. On Wednesday, the hottest day of the year here, a solidarity tent with the Shi'ite organization was erected on the main street, Omar al-Mukhtar.

A few representatives of the Palestinian organizations sat at the tent's entrance to greet the visitors, like a bride and groom welcoming the guests to the ceremony. Conspicuous in their absence were representatives of Hamas. Even though when the war began, it looked like Hamas would be the main Palestinian beneficiary in the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, many in the Gaza Strip - commentators, politicians, senior officials of the security units - believe its status has been diminished.

"Hamas lost in this war," said a senior Palestinian Authority official. "A few days ago, a parliament member from Fatah, Jamal Abu Rob, made a speech in which he called on Hamas to learn a thing or two from Hezbollah about organization and order. They like to call themselves the Resistance, like Hezbollah. But the only resistance that exists today is in Lebanon. They were angry and protested, but today everyone understands the difference between trained guerrilla fighters and Hamas.

"The ability of the Palestinian organization is limited to firing a few plastic missiles that make a lot of noise , and this shows how weak they are. Why do they hardly mention Hezbollah, and why don't they celebrate its victory, like the other Palestinian organizations?" he continued.

Haaretz

[The Magistrate]

1. That Is An Interesting Angle, Sir

There seems to be something to it. One of the great weaknesses of the Arab Palestinian militant organizations, Hamas included, has been the primacy of symbol over fact in their actions and orientation....

[bemildred]

2. Yes Sir, it is.

Another is whether this will lead to some sort of real reform in the IDF, and whether Hizbullah will now get fat dumb and lazy. I am beginning to believe that war is done for the moment, back to tit-for-tat-ism. Too little attention is being paid to the financial and economic effects of the war on Israel too. One sound way to predict there will be no more war for now is that there is no way to pay for it.

[pelsar]

3. there are always after affects....

dont kid yourself....we have not even begun to understand the influence the war has had on the region:

case in point: israels 67 victory has led to intifada I and II, bad news for everyone. Whereas the 73 war, led to peace with israel and egypt. What the long term outcome and who has "won" is yet to be seen.

though i believe the definition of winning and losing in asymmetrical combat is no longer definable in such clear cut immediate terms. Guerrillas/militias cant be defeated in the classic sense when there they are sponsored by a state. At best they go into hiding only to come out either in a different costume or with a different strategy. Without their sponsor "paying for it", they really dont lose.

[bemildred]

4. Aw, shit man, can't I kid myself just this one time?

The modern state is a recent invention, historically speaking, largely a product of the global success of the European colonial enterprise, and it may well prove to not be viable outside that special environment.

I would agree that much is unclear about this war and it's future effects, and bullshit abounds on the subject. Still, we all like to talk, eh?

I would agree that the idea the somebody won or lost this war is an exaggeration, this was more in the nature of political drama than a real war, and it remains so, and the definitions of won or lost one sees are all in the nature of whether this side or the other successfully dramatized the points they wanted to make, rather than being in the nature of significant military damage inflicted on either side by the other.

The tactical issues are more interesting, but that would take too long to go into, and there are too many unanswered questions.

[The Magistrate]

5. Speculation Can Be Fun, My Friend

Some reform of the Israeli Army may be needed. To my mind the Achilles heel remains occupation duty, which effectively turns the force into more of a colossal gendarmerie than a proper soldiery. The situation may have reached a pitch similiar to that several years after the declaration of the state, when the militia traditions compounded by border duties induced a dangerous laxness that required professionalization to remedy. One unfortunately likely possibility is a re-tuning of engagement practices that reduces the gingerness with which populated areas are gone into by soldiers. Though it is very much the fashion for some to fulminate over the "appalling ruthlessness" of Israeli operations, the fact is that these were conducted with kid gloves, and what was sacrificed in doing so was speed of execution on the ground. Without speed there can be neither strategic nor tactical surprise, and without surprise there can never be shock, no matter how much material damage is done.

My guess is not that Hezbollah will get fat and lazy, but that it will have some difficulty recruiting and training to the same standard as previously. The casualties among the gun-men will have been disproportionately among the most ardent and committed cadre, as those less devoted will, in an iregular force, find plenty of reasons to be elsewhere when the enemy soldiers and shells are thick and approaching. It seems likely to me, too, that the material destruction and casualties among the populace will have a straining effect on the organization. The claim it is the great defender will strike many left with only rubble as rather hollow, as defenders would have preserved the house intact, and fewer willing to play host to its fighters and installations will be available, requiring an increase in coercion to maintain miltary operations. That opens possibilities for a vigilant enemy intelligence operation.

[msmcghee]

6. The Magistrate said,

My guess is not that Hezbollah will get fat and lazy, but that it will have some difficulty recruiting and training to the same standard as previously. The casualties among the gun-men will have been disproportionately among the most ardent and committed cadre, as those less devoted will, in an irregular force, find plenty of reasons to be elsewhere when the enemy soldiers and shells are thick and approaching. It seems likely to me, too, that the material destruction and casualties among the populace will have a straining effect on the organization. The claim it is the great defender will strike many left with only rubble as rather hollow, as defenders would have preserved the house intact, and fewer willing to play host to its fighters and installations will be available, requiring an increase in coercion to maintain military operations. That opens possibilities for a vigilant enemy intelligence operation.

It has long seemed to me that that explains Israel's anti-terrorist tactics:

You go after them immediately and aggressively. You try to minimize civilian damage, but understand that the creation of moderate civilian casualties will accrue to the benefit of Israel - for the reasons cited above.

As you also said,

Though it is very much the fashion for some to fulminate over the "appalling ruthlessness" of Israeli operations, the fact is that these were conducted with kid gloves, and what was sacrificed in doing so was speed of execution on the ground.

Insofar as that is understood to be true, I can't imagine any other strategy or rules of engagement that could produce a better outcome for Israel.

[The Magistrate]

8. What You Touch On Here, Sir

Is part of the problem of being a gendarmerie as opposed to a soldiery.

"Anti-terrorist" operations are essentially police actions, conducted in these instances by a military arm functioning as a colossal S.W.A.T. team. The target is a very small number of individuals, who have no capacity to do serious harm to the force operating against them: they may escape; they will not ever prevail.

The engagement with Hezbollah was soldier's work, albeit of the non-convential guerrilla suppression variety, rather than a pure main-force action. It boiled down in the south to dealing with bunker and tunnel complexes manned by men imbued with a degree of fanaticism, who were situated to indeed have some chance of prevailing in individual engagements aimed at clearing them from particular points.

Dealing with this sort of objective requires things gendarnmerie do not employ. It requires reconnaisance by fire, and reconnaisance by exposure of your own men. It requires sudden concentration of fire-power at close range when a target is identified by these means. It requires storming with engineer's tools: flame to render the subterranean spaces toxic, and demolition charges to seal the apertures and sally points on theoir garrisons. It is a business in which appreciable casualties are going to be taken by the assaulting forces.

[bemildred]

7. Well, certainly WRT the occupation.

The IDF appears to have some rot at the top too, you are correct about the lack of decisiveness; but a better command might have viewed the matter with a decent sense of humility and better appreciation of the perils of war to start with. Instead we have these techno-junkies that think that expensive hardware is a fit substitute for brains, determination, training and preparation. They also seem to lack an appreciation of the cost of even "successful" wars; they fell for the "bully little war" idea as so many have before them. As I pointed out some time ago, they walked voluntarily into combat at a time and place of their enemies choosing, and with little better reason for doing so than a fear of looking "weak". This war was not necessary, a measured reponse to Hizbullah's provocation was possible, as was negotiation, and either would have been better.

The situation WRT Hizbullah seems less clear to me, and we shall have to wait for time to sort it out a bit more. Certainly the claims of a big win are overblown. All that can really be said is that they met the rather lowered standards they set for themselves in the beginning, that is they survived and gave a decent account of themselves in the circumstances. Certainly the Lebanese people as a whole have good reason to question what sort of defense it is that they received. This "success" has done them much harm. A Phyrric victory if you like.

The political consquences remain to be seen, the foghorns are blowing loudly on both sides now, and we will have to turn the volume way down and pay close attention to events in order to discern what real difference may have been made in the course of history.

"Nothing is more dangerous than success."

[The Magistrate]

9. We Seem To Share, Sir, A Distaste For The Acolytes Of 'High-Tech'

There is something to the view that part of the motivation here, and influential on the conduct of the enterprise, was a desire to see some of these new systems in action. A sort of 'live fire exercise', if you will. Certainly there was some over-selling by the proprietors of the new systems concerning what they sould actually do. There is a strain of military thought that seemingly needs teaching over and over again that there really is no substitute for infantry. The desire is understandable, certainly, because the business is so grim when done as it has to be, but the lesson ought to have sunk in for all time by now.

While there were certainly voluntary elements to Mr. Olmert's choice to go to war over this, my own inclination is not to judge him harshly for that. It was definitely an "if not now, surely later" sort of situation, and my own inclination is not to postpone something clearly inevitable. The place and time, in this situation, are always going to be of the guerrilla's choosing: it will be in south Lebanon, because that is where they are, and it will be on the heels of some provocation they have committed and after which they will be in some readiness, because it has just gone wholly out of fashion to wheel the troops into place and set them loose some Teusday morning out of the blue.

But Mr. Olmert certainly deserves harsh judgement for the form the action took, for seeming to have simply signed on to a wish-list of targets, in which a good deal of the destruction, while useful in theory, had no measureable effect on the miltary body of the foe. The opening action should have been soldiers moving into the south of the country, not aircraft assailing the north of it. Even were the non-combatant toll identical, the political damage in the world's eyes would have been much less, and there would have been that much more time available for doing the essential work of destruction among the cadre of gun-men.

[bemildred]

10. "there really is no substitute for infantry"

Yes. Technology is all very fine, but one explosion is much like another of similar size, and in combat most any decent size explosion will do the job if properly delivered to the right location.

We disagree as to the inevitability of this war, I see, but that looks like a long and inconclusive discussion, based in speculation about the thoughts, motives, and capabilities of the principals, so let's leave it there.

With your third paragraph I can wholly agree, that if one were going to do it, that would have been the right way to do it, and were they not ready to do that, they would have been better to do nothing. As Mr. van Creveld pointed out, it is always a mistake to put oneself in the position of being a bully.

You already know my thoughts on Olmert, Halutz and Peretz.

[pelsar]

11. perhaps some info.....

the IAF did take out the long range missles in the first day of the war...that was part of the plan. The other part, the infantry invasion was not according to plan...it took the IDF/govt to wait until the last few days of the war to put it into place..and then the IDF moved fast.

What it was more than anything was a wakeup call to the IDF....the last years of chasing palestenain children instead of training for war has had its consequences on the reserves. Its the reserves, all volunteers that are the core of not just the IDF but the society as well. Reserve units are not just army units but social units as well (we go to each others weddings, graduations, beach parties, funerals etc)... their influence is way beyond their numbers. They are, to generalize, the educated "working class", the motivators, the zionists, the ones who keep israel going and balanced...they also believe in the system and are patient with it. Which help explains why the company commanders who are protesting are doing it without signs, just sitting talking about it amongst themselves with crowds quietly listening to them....just listening.

the change?...i'm now guessing but probably a professional "police force" will deal with the westbank, leaving the army to take the lessons from this "last exercise" and plan for the "next time"....which will be if Hezballa is at the border again.

In some ways it was a cheap lesson, not just for israel but for all western countries. Hizballa is now the "leading" terrorist group in terms of organization/equipment and PR, no doubt they will be copied when possible. This is probably just the start....

[bemildred]

12. The situation with the longer range missles seems to be in dispute.

Dueling blowhards you might say. There are some other mysteries, like why SAMS were not more in evidence, no real attempts at air-defence were made that I can see.

It's nice you all are sitting around singing Kum Bah Yah together now.

A professional police force would be good, an end to collective punishment would be better, but in fairness things are so bollixed up that nothing in the way of use of force is likely to work. Nevertheless, better treatment of the Palestinians would likely calm things down a good deal. We have had this discussion before.

This was indeed not a real war, more of a military dramatization staged in the context of a longer low-level conflict. Given the evident cost of this war, sober minds might want to reconsider what the cost of a real war would be, and then reconsider whether war is the right way to resolve this dispute.

[msmcghee]

13. Perhaps I'm missing something here. And I am . .

. . not being sarcastic. But it seems to me that the question of . . whether war is the right way to resolve this dispute . . has always been in the hands of the Jihadists.

In fact, that seems like the uber-reality regarding Israel. Groups are dedicated to using forms of terrorism that require deadly force in defense. That means simply that Israel either use force and collective punishment to control / eliminate that threat - or that Israel accept the constant attrition of her citizens from suicide bombs, missiles, kidnappings, etc.

When I read your words I am struck with the disconnect between us. You have one side that wants to live in peace - and another (several others actually) that are constantly training fighters to attack Israel - who have never stopped attacking Israel except for brief politically advantageous moments - and who have vowed repeatedly to continue attacking Israel "until the last Jew is dead".

And you ask if sober minds on the pro-Israel side might not . . want to reconsider what the cost of (what) a real war would be, and then reconsider whether war is the right way to resolve this dispute.

You writing indicates that you are an intelligent person. Please try to understand that I am trying to find in your answer something other than a desire to see Israel gone from the ME that would explain your response.

Can you suggest to me in any convincing way just what Israel should do in response to the deadly attacks of those who are out to destroy Israel and every last Jew in it? Certainly you're not suggesting that if Israel stops defending herself and allows the Jihadists to kill just a few thousand more Jews without retaliation then they'll throw away their useless weapons and go back to being sheepherders.

You say that . . (now), nothing in the way of use of force is likely to work. Then, what in the way of the use of no force do you think will work?

I saw some seriousness in your preceeding post. Please give a serious response to mine.

[bemildred]

15. Suggesting I want Israel "gone from the Middle East" is a poor

way to start a "serious" conversation.

[msmcghee]

16. Quite the opposite.

What I expressed was that I could not see any alternative to that conclusion from your response. If you recall I started off by saying that perhaps I was missing something - since that was the only explanation I could imagine. I asked you to fill me in on what I was missing.

I was assuming that I must be wrong - and giving you the opportunity to show me how and why that was the case. I emphasized that I was not trying to be clever - that I was asking a serious question - because you seemed to be an intelligent person who was disagreeing with me. When that I happens I try to question my assumptions. I was asking for your help in that task.

Instead, it seems you'd rather play word games. Sorry, I though you were serious. Or, perhaps I did reach the correct conclusion to start with - and this is as serious as it gets.

[bemildred]

17. Nave a nice day. nt

[msmcghee]

18. OK - bemildred doesn't have an answer.

I invite any other "anti-Israeli policy" person here to step in and offer an answer to the question.

If you don't think that the use of force by Israel is (justified, moral, legal, useful, whatever) - then what could Israel do that would not involve the use of force that would cause all twenty-odd of the Jihidist groups dedicated to the destruction of Israel - to get over all that negativity, put down their weapons and seek a peaceful existence with the state of Israel.

Or, is it just easier to stick your fingers in your ears and cry, "War Criminals - war criminals", repeatedly.

[wellst0nev0ter]

39. During 1999-2000 There Were No Suicide Bombings

Against Israeli civilians inside Israel. That was the time when there was no wall, the PA's authority was at its peak, its infrastructure wasn't being undermined by Israeli bombs allowing it to conduct security operations against terrorist groups, both the Palestinian Territories and Israel were building up their economies and there was an honest progression towards a peace deal.

Perhaps you and others who unquestioningly support Israel's failed policies should re-examine that situation and learn from it.

[msmcghee]

40. I do not unquestioningly support anybody . . .

. . or anybody's policies.

My posts have all been addressed to the legal, moral and ethical basis for the policies of each side. If you had paid any attention you would know that I condemn the initiation of force (force not used in defense) by any state, group or person against another.

All you need to do is show me . .

a) where Israel has attacked any Arab group, militia or state when it was not doing so in defense of its borders and / or citizens.

b) any statement by any Israeli leader supporting the destruction of any Arab / Islamic state

c) any example where Israel was attacked by any Islamic / Arab group or state where that attack was defensive in nature

d) any statement by any Islamic / Arab group or state that proclaims a desire to live in peace with the state of Israel - other than Egypt or Jordan who have signed peace treaties with Israel and who are not attacking Israel (other than Arafat who did so for political purposes only and had no intention of supporting his statements)

You show me any of those and you can say that I unquestioningly support Israel.

Until then, you might consider that there are almost sixty years of history where:

a) Israel's enemies have repeatedly attacked Israel and its citizens with the avowed purpose of destroying the state of Israel

b) there are hundreds of statements by Arab / Islamic leaders supporting the destruction of of the state of Israel

c) there are hundreds of examples where Israel was attacked by Islamic / Arab groups or states where the purpose of that attack was to kill innocent Israeli civilians

d) no Islamic / Arab group or state has ever proclaimed a desire to live in peace with the state of Israel - other than Egypt or Jordan who have signed peace treaties with Israel and who are not now attacking Israel

[wellst0nev0ter]

42. Please, If Anything Else, Don't Be Dishonest

You've just accused another poster of wanting to see Israel annihilated because he thinks Israel's recent attacks have been grossly disproportionate. No amount of contrived intellectual veneer can abrogate the fact, and the scorn for a decent exchange it represents.

As for your cute little pop quiz:

a) How many times has Israel attacked Lebanon's army instead of Hezbollah?

b) Don't forget the statement of an Israeli minister who promised to set Lebanon back "20 years".

c) We can argue that Egypt's attack in 1973 was defensive/retaliatory for Israel attacking Egypt in 1967 while a third of it's armed forces was in Yemen.

d) How can one forget the Saudi peace deal of 2002, or does it not count because it includes conditions?

So do you unquestioningly support Israel or not?

BTW:

a.) Israel had a bigger army than the combined Arab forces in 1948, so there was little existential threat there. Tell me another attack to Israel by an Arab state, and I'll show you events for which it was retaliatory.

b.) Israel continues to be THE military power in the region, so all rhetoric from Islamic leaders is just that - rhetoric

c.) How many innocent civilians have Israelis killed?

d.) Have I not mentioned the Saudi peace deal of 2002?

[Name removed]

44. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[wellst0nev0ter]

46. Calling Someone A Terror Apologist Is A Serious No-No

according to the rules. If I can't dismiss you as an "Israeli apologist" then you can't exercise that kind of rhetorical luxury.

I'm sorry your calling me an apologist for terrorists have failed in making me see the light. Maybe when the Palestinians are able to kidnap and detain dozens of Israeli government ministers will I be able to realize how much danger Israel is in. Also if you are looking for a Palestinian Gandhi, Israelis will simply not going to let it happen.

[msmcghee]

47. What is worse is claiming that I did something that . .

. . I did not do.

I deal in ideas - not personalities. I said your post amounted to apologetics for terrorists. That's different from calling you an apologist for terrorists. Maybe you were just having a bad day - but I'll describe your ideas as I see them.

Try not to get so personally invested in promoting such ill-conceived ideas and your ideas will be less likely to get attacked. As far as you seeing some light - I won't be holding my breath.

[wellst0nev0ter]

54. There You Go, Rationalizing Again

You've said what you said, don't try to run away from it.

[pelsar]

51. No Palestinian ghandi....Israels fault? (Pluto is no longer a planet)

you wrote:

Israelis will simply not going to let it happen.

this is the classic accusation in the conflict and its explains why the Palestinians are constantly getting the short end of the stick. And it also explains why the "pro Palestinians" are the Palestinians worse enemy.

by blaming israel for the Palestinians lack of ability to get a real non violence movement going, the Palestinians are refusing to take responsibility for themselves. Its not up to israel to "let" the Palestinians be non violent. If the Palestinians want to get a nation wide nonviolent movement going its up to them, not israel.

Case in point was intifada I, semi non violent, but it did cause things to change. I don't believe the Palestinians ask israel for "permission"

theres a western concept called "taking responsability"....it means not blaming the "other for your problems" and find a way to solve them. Blaming israel for the Palestinians inability to get a non violent peace movement going is really quite humorous.

in that light, i do recall several years ago a full ad in a westbank newspaper signed by many PA officials (including Ashwari) which promoted non violence and an end to the suicide bombers...the next week the same group apologized for the ad and for insulting the martyres....guess israel made them do it.....

[wellst0nev0ter]

53. Sorry, If Israelis Are Going To Shoot Non-Violent Demonstrators

then it's a lot to ask one side to not respond violently as well. Also note that the Palestinians in the territories have been relatively quiet for nearly two decades before the First intifada, yet Israel decided to do nothing.

Responsibility is good, but it goes both ways. When Israelis decide the best way to handle non-violent protestors is to infiltrate and instigate a demonsration and firing upon them with bullets, it's crystal clear what they think about those demonstrations.

[pelsar]

62. read up on intifada I

in case you havent: The protests were relatively non violent (no guns), and limited to the westbank and gaza. The IDF responses did not include hi velocity bullets, but various "non lethal" methods. Perhaps it should be noted that both sides attempted to limit the violence.

The result of those actions led to oslo and israelis accepting a palestenian entity and the concept of a state for them.

intifada II not just delayed that, its violence wiped out the israeli left that was supporting the palestenains.

for reasons unknown you dont seem to understand the difference between intifada I vs II, the character and its affect on the societies. They were very different. Not just in the protests marches, but the character of them, their purposes etc.

inorder to shorten this:

intifada i was the people protesting the occupation...and in return received oslo, a chance to govern their own society and the promise of a better future, a win win situation. The continued occupation was determined by many israelis to be bad.

the "non violent protests in the westbank today are protesting specifically the building of the wall that israelis want, and its is not a cross section of the palestenian society. It is the wall that has stopped most of the suicide bombers, hence its building will not be stopped as its a security measure. Its a win/lose. No wall, more dead israelis.

[msmcghee]

59. I apologize for the post above. For saying . .

. . "Oh, let us all weep for the poor Palestinians who have no choice but to kill innocent Israeli civilians."

That was very callous and uncaring thing to say.

I believe deep down that most Palestinians do deserve our compassion. The average Palestinian has been a pawn in this struggle from the beginning. They have been used by people who are motivated primarily by greed. Sometimes these are other Palestinians - but even these Palestinians typically answer to powerful political forces in other Arab states, people who have much to gain by exploiting their misery.

They have been placed next to Israel by fate and have been placed in the role of martyrs by others who use their Arab culture to exploit them. They are encouraged and led by cowards who would never die for the cause themselves but who have convinced them that their death is better than peace with the Jews. And so they will continue to live in misery and will continue to die before their time.

That is very wrong and I wish them no more pain. They have enough.

[pelsar]

43. actually your quite wrong....time to learn something.

outside of the usual attacks on israelis in the year 2000, the PA was preparing for Intifada II. Unlike intifada I which was spontanous, intifada II was planned in advance and was waiting for the excuse, which came with sharons walk.

for those of us in the IDF during that period, we were told what to expect and infact would watch the "troops train in their villages during the period. And of course if was admitted by Marwan Barghouti, head of the Tanzim in an interview with the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat (September 29, 2001.

and it came to pass, just as we were briefed.....so much for the "peaceful period"......intifada II was a planned attack on israelis and a really dumb idea. It resulted in making the palestenains lives even more miserable....and them losing even more land (to the wall)

[wellst0nev0ter]

45. Glad You Brought That Up

Read the Mitchell Report there was no plan by the PA to launch the second intifada. Keep in mind that initially the demonstrations only had stone throwers and it was violently put down by the Israelis resulting in 4 deaths.

But, no, go ahead. Deny that there was a peaceful period before the Camp David talks broke down. I'm sure the current policy is already achieving that elusive peace for that country.

[pelsar]

50. so the leader of tanzim lied?

Marwan Barghouti?....there are more than enough other quotes to substantiate the planning. And if you really want to get into it, the pattern of kids throwing stones in the beginning, and then bullets coming from the alleys behind was very consistent throughout the beginnings of intifada II in the westbank. Very telling of organization and planning.

(ambulances coming in, delivery additional stones and taking away the wounded, again the pattern was consistant throughout the west bank)

the "peaceful period" was hardly "peaceful"...it was lul in the fighting, as has happened in the past. There was still shootings, killings etc, just on a far lesser scale. The anti semetic/Israeli radio/TV shows were going strong as well..

Furthermore i dont have to deny what i witnessed. The difference between the unplanned intifada I vs intifada II was very obvious.

[wellst0nev0ter]

52. Actually, No Quote You Can Dig Up Can Point To Previous Planning

by the PA. Popular groups like Fatah or Hamas might have been stirring the pot for rebellion prior to Sharon's provacative visit, but other than that the PA had no responsibility for the intifada - period.

Here, I'll help. Show me how the PA was planning and orchestrating the intifada.

[The Magistrate]

55. Two Points, Sir

One general, and one particular.

Non-violent resistance only works if the party so opposed reacts with violence, and the party employing the technique continues to eschew violence in response. Doing this builds a level of moral stature that makes it awfully difficult in time for anyone to believe justice is not on the side of the persons who, despite the violence directed against them, continue to act only a peaceable and civil manner. To say that so long as some party employs violence against persons engaged in non-violent resistance, retaliation must be expected is to miss the point of the exercise. It is certainly understandable that violence be returned in kind, and indeed, that is my personal inclination, but the tactic and strategy of non-violent resistance embodied by The Mahatma is based on a disciplined foreswearing of that option, and holding to that come what may. Nor is the foreswearing of violence in the classic technique limited to relinquishing of guns and explosives: throwing rocks, brandishing sticks, even angry and threatening cries, and violent rhetoric by the leadership, are not employed.

You have pointed to the halcyon days immediately prior to the Second Intafada, and they were indeed perhaps the most peaceable period in this conflict, certainly by my own rather crude standard of counting the dead on all sides. The questions of whether there was planning by the Palestine Authority behind the outbreaks that came to ignite it, or whether it was a purely spontaneous event put past recall by heavy handed Israeli suppression of a riotous mob, are of some interest, but not decisively important in my view. What does seem to me to be important in considering the event is the utter unimportance of the event acknowledged to be its trigger, namely the walk by Sharon on the hill. What on earth is there, really, about that little walk, that required any response, even an angry crowd, at all? The event changed nothing; it had no material effect of any sort, nor could it have had. Yet the reaction to it has had tremendous material effect: several thousands are dead who would otherwise be living still; hundreds of thousands who had some living and prospects are now destitute; the political lives of both peoples directly involved have been poisoned by the increased strength of hard line elements over several years time. A reasonably peaceable and prosperous state, in which there existed real prospects for normalization and accommodation in coming years, was thrown over in a heart-beat, and for what? The intoxication of rage, the poisonous exhaltation of religiousity over material practicality? There simply were no good reasons for pitching a fight then, over that trifle. The consequences of doing so have been disasterous.

[wellst0nev0ter]

58. I Hope I Avoided Any Endorsement Of Violence

If any of my commentary suggested such a thing, I sincerely apologize. Your points about Gandhi and the requirements that a non-violent movement be truly non-violent is irrevocably valid. But in the case of the Palestinians, it has been documented that the Israeli make use of undercover agents in these demonstrations who engages in the type of violence anathema to a truly peaceful movement:

During the clashes, undercover security forces mingled with the demonstrators and began to throw stones at the soldiers and police, demonstrators said. The undercover security forces had provoked the police and soldiers into opening fire with rubber bullets and tear gas. The demonstrators said they had not thrown stones at the soldiers and police.

. . .Military sources charged that Barakeh and the commander of the forces at the scene had not exchanged words; the sources added that the undercover forces had only started throwing stones after Palestinian youths had adopted such tactics. "Stone-throwing by the undercover forces is part of the way in which they operate in such instances," the sources said.

Unless I am proved less literate in my history, I'd imagine if the British had used undercover instigators extensively during Gandhi's protests, his peace movement would have been vastly more difficult and offered more justification for the British to violently put down.

You are also right for saying that the culpability of Arafat's PA in starting the current Intifada is ultimately insignificant in face of the fact that the Palestinians were agitated by Sharon's visit to the Mosque which they interpreted - to the point of extremism - as his way of showcasing Israel continued sovereignty over the disputed area. It's very sad that even the little walk as you call it would inspire such a violent response, but it shows why Arafat was unmoved on the subject of the Temple Mount during the Camp David talks, ultimately ending it rather than relinquish total sovereignty over that place.

[The Magistrate]

60. It Was Not My Intent To Cast Any Aspersion, Sir

Nor, indeed, would an endorsement of violence have troubled me: you will find me objecting to violence only on occassion where it does not seem adviseable on various practical grounds, and knowing my own character and proclivities, it would be dishonest of me to do otherwise. My only intention was to point up the actual technique of non-violent resistance, and some elements characteristic of its true employment and on which its occassional successes are based.

Agents provocateur are a fact of life in political conflict, and it is up to a political movement to recognize and isolate them when present, and over-all conduct itself in a way that makes them stand out as articifialities, and thus neuter their effectiveness. The English used every weapon in the state's arsenal against Ghandi, and there were also, while he was active, wholly genuine Indian militants quite committed to violence against the English. But it was, owing the quality of the rhetoric of the leadership of the Congress Party, and the conduct of the crowds it wielded, quite impossible to alter by any artificial means, or through mis-identification, the perception at large of the movement's peaceable and civil character.

[wellst0nev0ter]

65. Ok, Now I Understand

It's a shame that the various violent factions drown out the few peaceful movements that such manipulations and violent responses to them can be easily swept away and ignored.

[pelsar]

61. the palestenains simply "cant handle responsability?...

that seems to be the "jist" of it:

The palestenians cant seem to get large massive anti violence movement going because israel "stops them"....i hadnt realized that the palestenains need israels permission to get such a movement going. Perhaps if the palestenians reacted across the westbank with non violent protests when sharon had his walk instead of rocks and soon after bullets, things might have been different?

so if israel is to blame for the inability of the palestenians to get a non violent movement off the ground, i guess it must be that israel is also to blame for the palestenians violent reactions as well. Out of curiosity, are the palestenians responsable for anything they do as a society?

Consistant patterns of protest (people/equipment/strategy/) within days of one another throughout the westbank, coupled with explicit explanations from the IDF previous to the actual action points to preplanned organization.....thats simply the way it was.

as i wrote previously: it was not the way it was during Intifada I.....the contrast was black and white. More so, during intifada I the IDF was caught ill prepared in both equipment and tactics, not so with intifada II. Specific units were brought in and the tactics were prepared ahead of time.

[wellst0nev0ter]

64. So Will You Grant Israel Responsibility For Employing Instigators?

You seem willing to lay all blame towards the Palestinians who, unsurprisingly, chose a path of violence against the occupation while exonerating Israelis for its violent action towards the Palestinians - or in this instant against their fellow police officers.

While there may have been grassroots preparation for another intifada, it still remains that there is no evidence that the PA was involved in its planning and implementation. Indeed, even The IDF had to admit that the PA made honest efforts to control the violence within the territories under its control during that time.

It represents a blatant and fundamental violation of the Oslo Agreement, in which the Palestinian Authority undertook to prevent violence in areas under its control.

Following the 29 September disturbances on the Temple Mount, and due to mounting Palestinian casualties, disturbances quickly spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in Arab towns within Israel (such internal incidents are handled by the Israel Police). This recent outburst of violence is the worst the territories have known since the beginning of the peace process. It represents a blatant and fundamental violation of the Oslo Agreement, in which the Palestinian Authority undertook to prevent violence in areas under its control.

[pelsar]

66. i'm sure they do....

The israeli security services are hardly known for the purity....its part of the low level war. Whether i agree or disagree is not the point. A palestenain non violent movement is the palestenian responsability no matter what the obstacles they face. If they so easily quit, thats not saying much for their convictions now is it.
In fact it has yet to "get off the ground" as they say.


and the PAs attempt to prevent internal violence was "spotty' at best....read the whole article.

"your grass routes preperation" as you called it also included "weddings" every night at villages throughout the westbank pre intifada II (we called them weddings because during palestenain weddings there is some shooting in the air-except these were training exercises). If may have been "grass roots" but the sound of an AK-47 could be heard by the PA just as clear as we did.....and since it wasnt the PA, doing training, it was clear where it was going.

(just for the record, the idea of placing israelis within the protester was developed as a way to stop the shooters without having soldiers shoot into crowds, it increased the risk to the israelis but reduced the number of protesters who were being used as human shields from being shot.)

[wellst0nev0ter]

67. The PA Is Hardly Known For Its Purity. . .

it is not an excuse for their shortcomings and outright crimes, so you are in a poor position to make similar excuses for the Israeli government. And that includes their cynical attempts to undermine a peace movement, especially that particular demonstation that included Israeli Jews and that that did not allow any weapons among the participants.

And really, is that your only evidence that the PA is complicit in orchestrating the Intifada? That they failed to repond to gunfire shot in the air and that their efforts in maintaining security was not up to your standards? If anything, the PA is probably just as overwhelmed by the uprising as the Israelis initially were.

[pelsar]

68. i'm not making excuses...

for the israeli govt, nor for th Palestinian society. A peace movement like any movement has many obstacles to overcome, its up to the movement and the movement alone to overcome them.

btw that particular "peaceful protests" are not so pure....attempting to tear down a wall that is designed to protect citizens of israel is not in my eyes considered non violent.

if the idea is to impress upon israelis that they have merit to the non violent principle there are many other ways of influencing us, it has to take into consideration the israeli culture, values and fears in order to make an impression, otherwise its not going to work (and in fact the protests there,dont)

as far as the evidence for the planning of intifada II...well there was Tanzims leader admitting it for one to a British newspaper. There was the coordinated protests across the westbank using a smiler set of operation plans amongst them all. At definitive places, there was the consistent type of people involved, ambulances arriving on schedule loaded with additional rocks (preprepared), etc.

all of this was in contrast to intifada I, which involved whole populations (young/old, various political leanings etc), different types of protests, some with burning tires, some more massive, some with only a few people, some with slingshots, some with rocks, most with nothing, etc. They would appear anywhere and everywhere....

and the Tanzim was the "youngsters" of fatah, which made up the PA.

And there was always the "telltale fact: that the PA always disappeared when the protests started

[wellst0nev0ter]

69. Yes You Are Making Excuses

you just said that the infiltrators that threw rocks were there to prevent the use of weapons among the demonstrators, even though the demonstrators, made up of both Israelis and Palestinians, specifically banned weapons from the demonstrations. And in the post I'm replying to you act as if protesting the wall is itself nullifies the non-violent nature of the demonstration. All you do is make weak excuses for the Israeli side. If there are "obstacles" to the peace movement, a big obstacle is obviously the Israelis. Period, end of sentence.

And once again you confuse statements of leaders of popular movements (the Fatah was disjointed anyways) with the PA, which you still can't prove orchestrated the latest intifada. All you have is the PA security forces impotence in the face of popular protests.

[pelsar]

72. you sound confused...

If there are "obstacles" to the peace movement, a big obstacle is obviously the Israelis. Period, end of sentence.....if the palestenains want a peaceful non voilent movement...its up to them, and their responsability....thats how it works.

blaming israel for the inability of the palestenains to produce such a movement is rather absurd. Israel is not responsable for the workings of the palestenian society, either they can or they cant....sor far they cant....

and i'm afraid your lack of knowldege is showing: during both intifadas fatah and the PA were virtually synonymous with one another.

[wellst0nev0ter]

73. There You Go Again

You say the same thing while ignoring the same facts and expect a different response. The truth of the matter is some Palestinians were attempting a legitimate peaceful movement, but Israelis engaged in a blatant, underhanded and ultimately violent campaign to subvert it. And yet you still can't phathom Israel taking responsibility for those actions.

And the Shin Bet has already concluded that Fatah is not a unified organization capable issuing orders that will be obeyed, so it's a fallacy to say that Arafat's PA has strict authority over the entirety of the Fatah movement.

[pelsar]

81. its called responsability....

for oneself.....when a palestenain sucide bomber blows up, he may be a palestenain, but as far as the israeli is concerned its up to the state of israel to protect its israeli citiizens...this is the foundation for responsable govts and societies.

It doesnt make a different what the shin bet, the settlers, etc do or dont do. If the palestenains cant take the responsability to get a non violent movement going its their "problem." I could give some hints which might help, such as removing the anti israeli media, but thats just a idea. Taking responsability for ones actions and fate are a western concept that is the basis for a productive and successful society. blaming someone else for you inability to do something is a characteristic of a person (group) who is not very succssful, nor will they be. But thats just a personal philosophy, of mine. I suppose for others blaming someone else for ones failure or lack of belief is probably is legit as you seem to believe. (btw in your work, if somebody cant do anything, and they blame someone else for "sabotaging their work, I assume you nod your head and understand-correct?)


and by the way, you might as well blame the various jihadnikim for their inability as well. seems a couple of years ago, asharawi and her friends also tried to start something but had to apologise later for their insulting of the martyres (they had to take a full page ad in a newspaper and take back their initiative).

http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=3387&CategoryId=2

more so if you read the blog...nobody is blaming israel...unlike you...they discussing if its proper or not..... (seems they have a better understanding of what they can and cannot do)

http://www.muhajabah.com/islamicblog/archives/veiled4allah/008691.php

and Fatah?.....perhaps Arafat should hav stopped paying the Tanzim, it might have had an affect, or he could have ordered his forces to "not run away" when the protest started (which he would do every so often for his own political reasons).

but not your getting confusing: so was intfada II organized by fatah or not? (tanzim?)

[wellst0nev0ter]

82. When You Finally Confront The Fact That Israelis Undermined

And used that as pretexts to shoot at peaceful protests, then I'll take your exhortations for "responsibility" seriously.

In case you didn't know, martyrs come in more than one form, including those innocents killed by Israelis.

No matter how big of a microscope they used on Arafat, they could only accuse him of not taking sufficient action to combat terrorism, not of his being complicit in the terrorism itself.

Which means the original point still stands. The PA did NOT organize the latest intifadah.

[pelsar]

85. the "poor palestenians..."

thats my reaction to your posts.....putting the blame on israel for there lack of ability to get together a non violent movement....thats what it comes down to....unlike you i dont look down upon the palestenians. i believe they can do get one going if they believe in it, reguardless of what israel does, they just have to believe in it.

blaming others...is a "losers" mentality......its not really productive to teach or encourage such attitudes

[Andromeda]

48. My hunch is that they'd rather keep

their fingers in their ears and call Israel "war criminals."

[The Magistrate]

19. Without, Sir, Foreclosing My Friend Mr. Mildred

Who can certainly speak for himself, please allow me some response to your queries to him, for though we do take somewhat different postions in this matter over-all, our views on this question may not be too disimilar.

You may recall that shortly after the victories of '67, Mr. Ben-Gurion spoke to the effect that swift relenquishment of the territories over-run in that victory would be the best course for the state he had done more than any one individual to create. The general reaction was that the old man had entered his dotage and was going soft in the head, but his comments look ever more well-founded and prescient as time passes. It is worth recalling, too, that when he was the leader of the state in the '48 war, he made the concious decision not to press on into those areas of the Jordan valley that remained in Arab hands, though certainly it was militarily feasible to do so. The reason for this decision was his awareness from events in previous decades that these were the heartlands of Arab Nationalism in Palestine, and that the population there would never be reconciled to Israeli rule, and that any attempt to extend Israeli rule to those areas would open a running sore in the state that must cripple it from its birth. It was a wise decision, one of the highest expressions of grand strategy, the art of adjusting military action to the achievment of the peace one most desires, anyone made in the whole of the last century. It remains an exceptionally wise decision today, for all that Israeli policy over the last forty years has un-done it.

The arguments for retaining those territories in the Jordan valley pressed at the time of their capture were certainly sound ones, and the decision to retain them understandable. In the sort of conflict Israel then faced and expected to continue to face, one of main-force engagements with the armies of hostile bordering states, that ground provided strategic depth of tremendous potential worth. It gave space for elastic defence, for the marshalling and manouver of reserves, provided a shield for the cities of the coast, the true heartland of the country and prize of any determined assault by armies against the state.

The conditions that made this ground a vital military asset, however, no longer obtain. The chief foe Israel now faces is not the armored divisions of hostile states on its borders, but guerrilla forces whose principal asset is the tenacity derived from mass support among a hostile populace. The most dangerous potential state action, beyond support for these guerrillas with materiel, is strikes by missiles aimed at the chief cities of the country, against which, the sales brocheurs of various armorers notwithstanding, no effective defense exists once the things are in flight, and against which the miles of earth so useful against a ground assault are meaningless.

Indeed, far from being now an asset to the security of the state, the ground over-run in '67, particularly in the Jordan valley, constitutes a tremendous strategic liability for Israel. At the most basic level, it is only by virtue of Israel's possession of this land that its Arab Palestinian guerrilla foes are given the opportunity to strike with any effect against Israel. Israeli administration of this land, a quasi-colonial mixture of over-bearing soldiers and encroaching settlers, provides a constant goad to hatred among the population of the place, already long embittered by defeat and humbled pride. The necessities of a guerrilla suppression campaign that must be pressed daily and indefinitely punctuate the simmering resentments of the populace there with spikes of rage, for in such actions there are always innocents caught up, whether in the explosions or the gunfire or the arrests. Military force is an inherently blunt instrument: there is nothing surgical about several hundred pounds of high explosive, and those near and dear to anyone involved in such a detonation cannot be expected to find any consolation in an enemy's explaination that the thing was managed as closely as possible, and no one intended the death of the child or the wife or the brother who happened to be passing by, or resident in the neighboring apartment, when the thing went off and indeed killed the bomb-maker or the recruiter who was the legitimate target of the operation.

The fact is that guerrilla wars are far more political than military struggles. What industrial plant and roads and communications are to conventional war, mass feelings of anger and resentment and deprivation are to guerrilla war. Just as the national infrastructure is what must be struck down to most profoundly incapacitate the armed forces of a state in conventional war, it is these popular sentiments that must be nullified to incapacitate the armed radicals actively pressing a guerrilla campaign. This cannot be done by military power, or at least not by military power used short of the sort of wholesale frightfulness typical of the ancient imperiums, willing to massacre whole districts to the last suckling babe to drive home the point.

The only strategy available in modern conditions is to take political and economic steps that will mollify a great enough proportion of the hostile populace that it will no longer see any point to supporting the "hard men" who glory in the fight. Since people by and large prefer peace to war, and prefer security and predictability to danger and chaos, there is generally some level of accommodation that can achieve this. In this instance the obvious steps would seem to be liquidation of the settlers' movement and its activities, removal of the soldiers from the Jordan valley, and the establishment of a state of Arab Palestine.

It may, of course, be argued that this would not be sufficient, and one could point to items like the firing of Qassam missiles from Gaza, or the activities of Hezbollah, in support of that view. But neither withdrawl from Gaza nor from southern Lebanon is more than a shadow of terminating the military administration of the Jordan valley. They did not address the greatest and most immediate of the grievances, that directly effects and embitters the most people. And certainly, it is possible that it would not work, that all this course would secure for Israel is a continual low-grade border conflict, killing perhaps a few dozen persons a year. But it is far more certain that the present course, the course that has been pursued for decades without success, will never succeed any better in the future than it has to date. The choice between something that might not succeed and something that certainly has failed may be a hard one to accept, but it ought not to be a hard choice to make.

[bemildred]

20. Well said, Sir.

I would add only that exterminating whole districts is not as simple a matter as it once was, the peasants are more numerous and better armed than in the Roman days, and bombing does not do the job, as we just observed. Meanwhile it is all on display in real-time all over the World.

My thanks for taking the trouble where I would not.

[The Magistrate]

22. No Trouble, Sir

It seemed a useful occassion for a small broadside....

More than one standard exists for judging the legitimacy of using military force, and that sometimes leads to confusion of meaning.

The narrow one is simply whether it is more or less in bounds: is it aimed at a legitimate military objective, are reasonable precautions taken given the circumstances, to avoid or at least minimize harm to non-combatants. Most Israeli military actions, to my view, meet this standard well enough, and the overwhelming preponderance of Arab Palestinian military actions fall far short of it.

The broader one is whether what one is seeking to obtain by the use of military force actually can be obtained by that means, or in other words, is there any real prospect of obtaining something worth the suffering caused, even solely from one's own point of view, by the use of military force. To my view both sides in this conflict are on pretty shaky ground, more often than not, measured against this standard. The Arab Palestinians do not have a hope of achieving success by military means, and their legitimate aspirations for statehood would be far more readily achieved by foreswearing violence altogether, while the Israelis are not going to achieve the long-term security they require by purely military means either, a stalemate at varying intensities being the best miltary force could ever provide them.

[bemildred]

23. And you know I tend to the broader view, Sir, although we might quibble

about this or that. I have little patience with moralistic arguments. As you so rightly pointed out, the question is not what it is allowed, the question is what is wise (a paraphrase I think?)

[msmcghee]

27. I find this post curious.

You say you have little patience with "moralistic arguments". Usually when someone says that it is because they are advocating an immoral position.

One "moralistic argument" that seems to get in your way most is the one where it is morally wrong to attack another entity (that has not attacked you) to get your way - the "moralistic argument" that dialog and negotiation are the only ethically permissible avenues for settling differences - the "moralistic argument" that once you initiate deadly force against another you effectively lose the moral right to argue or win your case - both of which would be rewards for initiating such deadly force.

Has it occurred to you that the reason that some 60 percent of Americans have turned against the war in Iraq is because many of them now believe that we were deceived - that Iraq presented no imminent threat to us and that we therefore attacked a nation without moral provocation and thereby greatly diminished the moral standing of our nation in the eyes of the world.

What you seem to be advocating - is that if you think your desires are important enough - then you can attack someone else to get those desires fulfilled. This is exactly the same argument the BFEE has been making - and you apparently agree.

It is exactly the same argument Israel's enemies have been making. War is OK if that's what it takes to get what you want.

It is that belief that is responsible for the more than a hundred thousand mostly innocent persons who have died in Iraq and are still dieing there every day.

It is that belief that has caused the violent deaths of hundreds of thousands of both Israelis and Palestinians in the territory over the decades.

I have always considered the initiation of the use of force to be the most immoral and destructive anti-peace act a person or a nation can take. I have always considered peace in the world to be a liberal / progressive ideal and goal.

That's why I find that belief so repugnant - especially when I find it repeatedly expressed by members of a Democratic discussion group. Was the outrage expressed here over our invasion of Iraq just anger at the BFEE? Was it just a convenient way to win some political points?

If we on the left can't represent the moral path to the use of our military and the protection of their moral standing in the world - how can we expect any other nation to follow our example - much less expect other Americans to vote for our candidates?

[bemildred]

28. It's not really that complicated.

I just consider that arguments based on self-interest are more effective than arguments based or morality. If you can convince a person that what he is doing is stupid, not in his interest, you are more likely to get results than if you tell him you think he is bad. It carries more weight. You can apply it to anyone. It's not that I oppose arguments based on morality, it's that I think morality is properly based on self-interest, broadly construed. Thus you will see me argue that the Lebanon war was stupid, most of the time, rather than that it was evil, even though I would affirm both.

[msmcghee]

29. That's interesting . . . and pragmatic.

I can appreciate that.

I have always considered that it is in everyone's interest to be moral and live in a world with others who are moral. In that way you are not faced with people trying to take your property - perhaps trying to kill you to take your land. And you are not faced with the terrible decision of having to defend your life and property with lethal force.

Just what about the Lebanon war was evil in your opinion?

[bemildred]

30. What was good about it? nt

[msmcghee]

33. I don't mind answering your question first.

I don't think there's anything good about war. It is a destructive way to settle differences that results in much expense and human suffering and unhappiness. Invariably the costs and unhappiness are far greater than the worst possible negotiated settlement would have produced.

There are however, based on the moral principle that I've described previously - that one doesn't initiate the use of force against others - ways to see war as more or less bad.

It would be bad for those who initiate force, who start conflicts that require a violent response, to be rewarded for that. That is a result of self-interest. I don't want to live in a world where such immorality is rewarded - or be identified with those who offer those rewards.

I find the comments of many here at DU to qualify as a form of reward for Hizbullah - a small PR victory in the face of the massive destruction visited on Lebanon. I find both of those highly unfortunate - even though I doubt that the thoughts expressed in this forum even register in the ME generally.

I find it unfortunate in that I always assumed that the political left was the peaceful left - not the cheerleaders for those who start wars. (I received my political / moral grounding as a Viet Nam War resistor.) This experience has caused me to think carefully about the left in this country and where it is going - and to wonder if I want to go along with what I consider immorality - an attitude that it's OK to violently attack others if you hate them enough.

Now, I asked you just what about the Lebanon war was evil in your opinion?

[bemildred]

34. Many were killed, many were injured, much blood and treasure

was thrown in the toilet, much was destroyed, nothing good or useful was accomplished. I consider these things self-evident. Israel is not a puppet on a string and the "Hizbullah made us do it" argument will not fly. Just because one person acts like an asshole, it does not absolve everyone else of responsibility for their own actions. Hizbullah did not destroy Lebanon, the IDF did. One could as well argue that the IDF rocketed N. Israel as that Hizbullah bombed Lebanon. Both sides in the war understood perfectly well what was going to happen before it started, and they went ahead and did it anyway. The really obnoxious part is that great harm, economically, politically, and militarily, was done to Israeli interests by the war as well. Nobody won, everybody lost, and it was completely unnecessary.

[msmcghee]

36. I was really more interested in what was evil . .

. . not what was bad or obnoxious. But I see now that's what you meant by evil. I hoped you were going for some deeper philosophical meaning.

However, while ignoring morality I see you had no problem framing your answer in terms of blame. You seem to blame both sides but Israel more. That is what I find particularly maddening. Not that you assign blame somewhat equally - but that you have no concept of morality with which to assign that blame. You wear moral blinders that allow you to judge blame simply by looking at the destruction done by each side to the other. Conveniently, that allows you to assign the major part of that blame to Israel.

The war occurred in a context of the last six years. Part of the agreement when Israel left Lebanon was that the border region would remain a demilitarized zone and that the Hizbullah fighters there would disperse. Instead they proceeded to build up their presence. They added reinforced bunkers, advanced communications, thousands of offensive missiles, etc.

During this period Israel repeatedly warned the UN about what was happening and warned of the dangers of a repeat war in the future because the UN resolutions were not being followed. Of course the UN had observers throughout the area and knew full well what was happening.

Israel's overflights were no doubt both reconnaissance flights to try to keep track of the extent of the buildup - and warning flights to Hizbullah and the residents that Israel has a strong Air Force - so don't play with fire.

All of Israel's warnings were ignored. UNFIL characterized the overflights as provocative - which shows the extreme anti-Israel position of the UN - who was supposed to be a neutral observer to see that the UN Resolution that called for demilitarization of the border area was being followed.

So, now by this July you had a heavily armed zone on Israel's northern border in violation of UN resolutions. Hizbullah crosses the border and attacks a patrol killing three, kidnapping two and injuring the rest. Israel immediately goes in to rescue them with a tank. Hizbullah destroys the tank killing three more and begins firing missiles at Israeli positions along the whole border as well as into nearby towns at civilians - and it escalates from there.

At least two of those actions, attacking the first patrol on Israel's side of the border and firing rockets into civilian areas - were blatant acts of war. Any sovereign nation on earth who could have - would have responded with force.

Hizbullah initiated the use of force against another nation. They are responsible morally for all the deaths and destruction that followed. When you say that Israel responded with "too much" force under the circumstances - that is a matter of judgment. It is not immoral to have bad judgment. Neither is it immoral to use too much force in one's defense.

The very idea of too much force in one's defense is nonsense. If someone attacks you with deadly force your job is to stop them and reduce their capability to the point that they can't do it again. Based on available weapons and military organization on each side that is a difficult question to answer definitively to have any assurance of being correct. The penalty is extremely great if you underestimate. That's why a defender can be expected to use overwhelming force if they have it - especially to stop an ongoing attack against that state's civilians.

Expecting Israel to not hit every target that had any connection at all to Hizbullah's capacity to wage war - including command infrastructure in S. Beirut and highways, bridges and airports that could be used to replenish supplies from other Arab sources - is ridiculous. Israel had every right to stop the hundreds of missiles being fired every day at her citizens. How Israel chose to do that was up to her government - not the UN and not the American far left.

As far as hitting civilian targets in Lebanon. Part of defensive war is convincing the enemy's civilians who may support the aggression against your nation - that they will suffer greatly if they don't withdraw that support. That is why Dresden was firebombed and that is why we used the A-bomb on Japan. The 3 to 5 hundred civilian deaths suffered in the 30 day conflict were miniscule compared to what could have happened if Israel had attacked Lebanon indiscriminately.

It is easy to second guess those decisions now. However, I would say that the terrible destruction and loss of life those caused are lessons to those who would gamble with the lives of their own citizens and the infrastructure of their nation - by attacking others with deadly force. You can expect any nation to try to optimize the kill ratio in their own advantage - to have vastly more enemy dead than your own - that's what war is about.

That is why war should be avoided at all costs. That is why it is so immoral to attack another - no matter how much you hate or despise them. Force is not to be used in a world where peace is valued. Period.

Who knows what decisions will be made by those defending their people that will cause extreme and even total destruction in the nation that initiates the conflict. It's always better to negotiate and not use force against others. It's always better to seek peaceful relations with one's neighbors - and not their destruction.

I hope Lebanon, Hizbullah and other Arab militant leaders have learned something from this - not because I want to see Lebanon humiliated and Israel the winner, although that's the best to be expected - but because I hate war and the vile egos that always see their own glorification as justification for the deaths of others. In my experience only the threat of overwhelming deadly force is sufficient to quell those egos. Anything less only encourages them.

To the extent that you blame Israel for what happened instead of Hizbullah - you are encouraging war and the deaths of many thousands more in the months ahead.

[bemildred]

37. I have no interest in "deep philosophical meaning".

At not least not when it comes to these issues. Israel clearly has more power and more control of what happens and what does not, thus it earns a larger share of the blame for the mess. That is not to deny that it has considerable weaknesses, or that it's fears are not well grounded, and that does not imply that Israel's implacable foes have no failings of their own to be held accountable for.

Each is to be held accountable for his own actions. In a way, that is one of the most annoying things about this dispute, nobody wants to take responsibility for their own doing. No matter what anybody does, it's always someone else that made them do it.

Now, you will forgive me, but I must say adieu.

Edit: from July thirteenth:

While there were some loons in Israeli politics that favored George's plunge into Iraq, I agree that there were plenty that were sensible enough to see if for the folly that it was, and that it would not be good for Israel; and I don't agree with the notion that Israel goaded George into doing it. I do hold the neocons and pnacers, many of whom are Jews, responsible, but that just means those fellows are guilty fools, and says nothing about Jews or Israelis in general or in particular, otherwise.

There is no question in my mind that Hiz'bullah deliberately picked this fight. To my mind that is all the more reason to keep a cool head and not overreact. Wiser heads might well ask why Hiz'bullah decided to start a war now? The current IDF offensives are foolish and violent, and Israel will regret the day it elected that fuckwit Olmert and allowed Halutz and his friends to run amok like this. Uncle Sugar is tied down in two other wars already and everybody else is pissed off and unsympathetic, which makes it not a good time to start a regional war.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=124&topic_id=133852#133900

So that you can see I am not just second-guessing after the fact.

[msmcghee]

38. It's easy to understand your distaste for . .

. . "moralistic arguments" and "deep philosophical meaning".

Such concepts are the only way to illuminate the question of right and wrong in human affiars. I find it disturbing that someone who identifies with the left would so easily dismiss such concerns. I always thought the RW was more comfortable equating morality with whatever you happen to want at the time.

When your thoughts on the matter are thus illuminated - they appear to be completely lacking in moral substance. i.e. your position is morally bankrupt and is simply anti-Israel. Thanks for engaging.

[The Magistrate]

57. To Expect Morality In The Actions Of States And Radical Bodies, Sir

Is to expect fish to engage in bicycle races: they are creatures really not suited for the activity.

The fact is that just about all human endeavor is undertaken in self-interest, and appeals to morality made in mostly vain efforts to disguise this. It is perhaps the height of moral bankruptcy to blink this fact for purposes of debate, and root vituperation in the willful blindness one must engage in to do so. If one views truthfulness as a virtue, then hewing to one's awareness of the amoral character of humans, and particularly of humans in conflict with one another, takes on the lineaments of a duty, difficult at times to persevere in, but essential if anything is to be accurately described and discussed.

[pelsar]

63. and there lies the solution:

and their legitimate aspirations for statehood would be far more readily achieved by foreswearing violence altogether,

let me explain why, with some history:

intifada I was a people protest, limited to the territories, with limited violence. This was clear to every IDF soldier who was there. When it was clear that it wasnt going to end, and the reservists got tired of being the "bad guy"...a gray protest started: Reservists stopped showing up for duty...kids came home and were asked by their parents whats going on, or they told about the moral dilemmas.... In the end, it became clear that a palestenain state and them having their own independance was the future. Not all israelis believed this, the country was split about 55/45....but it brought about oslo and its promise. The left believe that the palesteanins were sincere, it was a way to protect the morality of the country.

Intifada II destroyed that belief and the israeli left as well. Its not a matter of which agreements were broken, both sides broke numerous aspects, it was the way it was handeled by the palestenains-organized violence and the attacks upon all of israel, not just limited to the westbank and gaza. Reserve callups soon had over 100% reporting, volunteers and those that "had ended their service" came back.

The bottom line is that using violence against israel will get them nowhere, it hasnt in the past, and its not going to change. More than half of the israeli population would love to help the palestenains get their own state, but they have to believe the palestenains wont use their new found freedom to further attack israel. Gaza does not give us that confidence. Lebanon doesnt either. Land for peace doesnt seem to be working. What would?...non violent protests. The IDF cant handle it, the soldiers would eventually revolt as they did in intifada I, and the palestenians would internalize the acceptance of israelis as people too. The would learn about civil rights, etc something their own society badly needs for its own secure future.

It is infact a win win situation....but its up to the palestenians to put in into action.

[msmcghee]

21. Thanks for the very well-thought-out response.

It deserves some time for me to fully consider it. In the meantime, I'd hope to hear from some others, perhaps pelsar or Behind-the-Aegis, as to how they think that would work - Israel leaving the West Bank.

I have read some claims that such a move would be foolish without some guarantees for Israel - and the question of who has standing to make such guarantees, whether they could even partially enforce them, etc.

But I will not form my conclusions in that same direction until I take some time to really consider this possibility on my own - and hopefully to have the advantage of some others' views who are certainly more knowledgeable on these matters than I am.

I'll now be re-reading your post and thinking about it and preparing a response worthy of it.

[pelsar]

24. the view from israel:

Times are now getting interesting in that Israel is now surrounded with countries/societies, each having a different history with israel, be it peaceful or war...and in each of those we can understand the dynamics, to a certain degree:

Egypt gained enough in the 73 war to be able to tell israel: no more war. A strong enough central govt to keep it that way.

Jordan, simply realized that fighting was a losing propostion....period. (forget the honor bs) and made peace.

Lebanon would probably love to, but does not have a strong enough central govt,...and lost its southern strip, first to Fatah, then to israel, then to Hizballa and perhaps now to the UN.

Gaza was left to the Palestinians, with a weak govt

The west bank is a jigsaw of militias, weak govt authority (incl israel)
___________________

What is clear is that for peace to hold out, a strong central govt must exist. One that is willing to defeat on the battlefield those that attempt to rise up (jordan in the 70's, Egypt constantly fighting the MB). When it doesn't exist, militias/jihadnikim fill in the void.....and thats the problem in a nutshell.

Israel leaving gaza was great from an israeli point of view. It made it clear to us, who's in charge, and its not the settlers, not the "national zionist" etc but the govt giving orders to the army. it was a relatively "safe" move in that gaza is contained, it can be "re invaded", bombed etc.

From a Palestinian point of view, gaza was a mixed blessing. By having control over their own territory they no longer had the excuses of the occupation for their failures, their weak govt was fully exposed as is their lack of ability to 'plan for the future" and get things done (the obvious being expanding trade via egypt so as not be dependant upon israel). But far more important is their lack of will and or ability to stop the kassams. Gaza for israel was the "test case."

Imagine if you will the Gaza chaos in the westbank.....its no wonder when ever i ask the "pro Palestinians" what should israel do if kassams start flying from the west bank, that they don't answer.....because outside of re invading, little can be done.

Its very true that the occupation fuels the anger of the Palestinians, and in fact the wall has shown that there is an increase number in attempts, but far far fewer actually make it through, virtually zero in fact.

However even a stable Palestinian govt may not be enough: what if Hamas really takes control and turns palestine into Iran II. Dont forget these were the guys who sent kids into mine fields to clear them during the iran/iraq war. That will not bring peace to the region....Would the Palestinians be "happy" with their women in potato sacs?, is that a better life (home grown dictator vs occupation?)

Leaving the west bank in fact guarantees absolutely nothing, nor can anything be guaranteed. The problem with leaving is that it will very difficult to return as once israel leaves it wont take much for the Palestinians to turn every other apt into a sniper/mortar position. And rooting them out would require blasting the whole building. I have no doubt that without the Palestinians having a strong central govt, a consensus, the above scenario is a given (not the fantasy someone here called it)

______

that said, the next question is "can a militia, fed by a foreign govt be defeated?"....for sure it cant on the battlefield. As its been shown the IDF or any other army will only be killing civilians, the militia in fact doesn't really exist and will quickly disappear. What can be done and we shall now see if it works or not (please excuse the "coldness of the writing). Destroy the infrastructure so much, that the supporting population will have no choice but to get rid of them. Note that as long as the locals aren't disturbed too much, they will put up with a local terrorist group, after all confronting them is dangerous (as i have witnessed in gaza). Terrorist groups will kill the locals that resist them as easy as the outside enemy.

This is very much in the "experimental stage" as dealing with "non-state actors" that attempt to live "side by side with a local govt, while shooting across the border is a new phenomenon. What works and what doesn't is yet to be seen....

[The Magistrate]

25. Our Views On This, Sir, Are Probably Not Too Far Apart

It is not my contention that the course outlined above will surely bring a favoreable outcome, only that the present course practically gaurantees a dark result, and the one proposed might produce a better one.

It is certainly possible that withdrawl from the Jordan valley would produce a chaos, at least initially, and would excite the armed bodies considerably in the short term. But even so, their activities would be more easily dealt with by Israel than they are at present. Viewed coldly, the Qassams are no more than a nuisance device. The real danger is infiltration of persons bearing explosives into populated areas. A boundary of the sort erected in the security barrier, particularly without the necessity for passage through it of communication to settlements of Israeli citizens on the other side, ought to be adequate to prevent success of attempts to do this. The proper response to the Qassams seems to me to fall short of full-bore invasion, but rather to lie in surveilance and rapid response against teams employing them, supported on occassion by strikes against locations of manufacture, where these can be determined, and against the leadership and musterings of groups employing them.

The benefits of this course would come in the long term: it is loosely analagous to a naval blockade in conventional war, being a sort of political blockade aimed at reducing the supply of fresh grievance that is the fuel of guerrilla activity as surely as oil and essential raw materials are to conventional war.

One effect would likely be on popular opinion outside the immediate theater of conflict. It would be clear to any fair-minded observer that Israel had in fact made a great concession, and so any continuation of violence against it would be very hard to justify. Ideologues of various stripes would no doubt continue to do so, but they would get nowhere near the audience or applause they do now. It would also be hard to argue against any measured Israeli military response to continued violence, since again, it would be clear that Israel had done just about all anyone could reasonably expect a state or a people to do in such a matter to remove real grievance.

Another effect would likely be on Arab Palestinian society. A peaceful life would at last be at least in reach for most people there. People would know some security: there would be no worry of future land confiscations, no daily galling of check-points and encounters with alien soldiery. People who honestly feel they have nothing to lose are dangerous, and the surest way to draw their teeth is to give them something to lose: it is far more efficacious than trying to frighten them into viewing simply being alive as something they might lose. It could have the effect of greatly reducing popular support for the "hard men", whose activities, after all, would threaten to unsettle things and upset the apple-cart most would prefer to see upright on its wheels.

It might well take years, and uncomfortable years, for these effects to grow in magnitude, but in a conflict that has already shown the capability to endure over generations, there seems little point in gauging things by the short-term, and insisting on a quick result.

[msmcghee]

26. I have carefully considered your response.

Again, I thank you for putting so much thought into it. It is well-thought-out ideas like this that I am most interested in exchanging.

I would say that generally, you make several good points - each of them interesting to consider. For example, you point out that the land of the West Bank no longer has strategic military value for Israel - who now faces a guerrilla force and popular resentment instead of armor and infantry from attacking states.

I would say however, that I find pelsar's opinion compelling - that, if Israel pulled out, and without a strong PA government, that there would soon be as many mortar and sniper emplacements in the Arab towns of the West Bank as there are B & B's in Ireland. And I'm sure you would agree with pelsar's prediction that they would be impossible to remove without killing many Palestinian civilians - as recently was illustrated in S. Lebanon.

A look at any map will show that this would immediately give Israel well more than twice the length of border exposed to potentially hostile forces with missiles as currently exists. Both of the other borders - Lebanon and Gaza - already provide missile firing locations. The recent experience with Lebanon shows that such exposed borders are likely to lead to the deaths of many non-combatant Arabs.

I'd like to believe as you do - that a withdrawal from the West Bank is a better option than the status quo. I can understand the desire to do something - anything - except continue down the current lousy path. It seems to me however, that Israel would be trading a given bad situation for probably a much worse one - which I believe is why Israel has not taken this approach. Pelsar says that such an outcome would be a given - not a guess - and his words ring true for me.

At least with a constant and even oppressive military presence - there's a chance that some few Palestinians might reject the call for continuous war against Israel. In any case, the IDF has a better chance of preventing attacks against Israel from the area while they have a presence there.

Granted, this is the aim of the Jihadists, who derive their power and financing from Israel's presence. I'm sure they would be quite disappointed if Israel pulled out permanently - depriving them of their source of power - and that they would do whatever was necessary to get Israel to come back in - to face their newly fortified firing positions among the houses and apartments of the West Bank. I believe that was Hizballah's strategy recently - and it seemed to work well for them. I would think there are several groups on the West bank who have their fingers crossed right now - hoping that Israel will give them a chance for a repeat performance.

I admit that I could be wrong about this - but this is how I see it after looking carefully at the argument from both sides. If you (or anyone else) see new weaknesses in my position please point them out. It is a very difficult question to address. It seems there are at least several thousand Palestinian militants whose job it is to keep it that way.

[The Magistrate]

70. My Expectation, Sir

Is that the immediate result of such a withdrawl would probably be a certain amount of rocketry and sniping. But it is far from clear to me that this would be a worse situation, either immediately or over the long haul, than continuation of the present policy.

As you acknowledge, the Israeli presence in the Jordan valley benefits the "hard men" greatly, so greatly you agree they would view a withdrawl as a set-back, and bend their efforts to reversing it by provocations. That, to me, constitutes a powerful argument for adopting such a policy, and hewing to it despoite provocations, as doing what your enemy does not want you to is a pretty sound guide to strategy, much better than continuing as your enemy would prefer you to do is.

It is no part of my suggestion that Israel, having withdrawn from the Jordan valley, and that no further than the current course of the security barrier commenced under Sharon, should cease to defend its citizens on its soil from attack, or conduct its defense without great energy, should doing so be warranted by events. Surveillance and intelligence operations should certainly be maintained; persons attempting to position and fire rockets into Israel should be engaged decisively; facilities for the manufacture of the things, or where munitions are stored, should be assailed, and leading lights of militant bodies continuing to press such attempts should be treated as combatants in an on-going war and killed when they are spotted.

The great benefits of this course are that, for most fair-minded persons, it would throw the onus of continuing the violence squarely on the militant Arab Palestinian bodies, and that it would remove a great deal of the justified daily discontent afflicting ordinary Arab Palestinians. These things would tend in time to operate to diminishing the support enjoyed by the militant bodies, both throughout the world and among Arab Palestinians. Israel's security, and its diplomatic position, both would be improved.

[bemildred]

71. Well said, Sir. nt

[Behind the Aegis]

31. Interesting points.

Here are some of my thoughts on the occupations.

I am going to start with Lebanon, since it is the most recent. To simply expect Israel to "pack and go home" is not realistic. Were they to do so, the chances are the same events would unfold again. I say this because, interestingly enough, the same thing happened before when Israel went to war with Lebanon. However, then it wasn't Hizb'allah, it was the recently-expelled PLO that pulled the same stunt resulting in Israeli action. A civil war ensued, with Lebanon having two occupiers, Israel and Syria. My personal opinion is that the reason Syria was so involved is because they needed an ally in order to attack Israel again. I can only hope that another civil war will not happen and that the Syrian/Iranian backed Hizb'allah will not seize power and use Lebanon as a client state for those two nations.

The Shebaa Farms and the Golan Heights are another matter all together. It is very clear that Syria has no intention, at this juncture, of ever having a peace with Israel. The GH are strategically dangerous to Israel. The Shebaa Farms is nothing more than a "chess pawn excuse" of the Syrians and their clients, Hizb'allah.

Finally, there is the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Gaza was "un"occupied, yet, the attacks against Israel continued. Israel started the process by disengaging, yet no one was happy. The anti-Israeli propaganda continued as did the attacks. Strategically, Gaza is not all that critical, the West Bank, however, does have some strategic value. This is why Israel would be foolish to "up and leave," besides, even if they did, I have the feeling that people would still complain!

In my view, the real problem is that Israel has no one to negotiate with on these matters. Syria refuses to negotiate with Israel, thus the Shebaa Farms and the Golan Heights remain occupied. Lebanon refuses/is too weak to reign in Hizb'allah, therefore, it is likely there will be more attacks from that area and more engagements. Recently, the Lebanese government has also said they will not negotiate peace with Israel, despite being offered an olive branch. Finally, there is Gaza and the West Bank, with whom is Israel supposed to negotiate with?!? The Palestinian Authority is in chaos, killing each other. We hear about "ceasefires" from Fatah and Hamas, yet the other militant groups will not join. Therefore, when those groups attack from the lands that Hamas and Fatah are supposed to "control," and Israel responds, she is blamed for breaking the ceasefire! It is a "no-win" situation for Israel. When it comes to those two groups of land, who is Israel supposed to negotiated with? They negotiate with Abbas, Hamas won't accept it. They negotiate with Hamas, Islamic Jihad will not abide and the "militant" version of Fatah, the Al-Asqa Brigade will not oblige. The biggest issue Israel faces is she is trying to negotiate with too many factions, none which agree with each other, therefore, leaving Israel with no one to talk with about these matters and the constant scapegoat.

[Lithos]

75. His awakening was the 56 war

His decision to not go on in 47/48 had more to do with not over-extending the fragile Israeli army by entering into areas which they were not as invested in. But the 56 war really shook him up for when he toured Gaza following the Israeli advance, he made a comment about how the Palestinians did not abandon things like they would have done a short time earlier. The implication was that it surprised him and that there had been a fundamental shift in how the Palestinians not only viewed themselves, but how they viewed their relationship to the area.

L-

[pelsar]

32. guess some prefer protest with guns going off....

with the bullets coming back down and killing people...

It's nice you all are sitting around singing Kum Bah Yah together now.

true its doesnt make for good PR....

israelis prefer to discuss their problems from the different angles and find solutions....

[bemildred]

35. That is not it.

It's that it would have been more useful if you started to think and talk things over before participating like sheep in another stupid war and bombing the shit out of a bunch of innocent people in Lebanon (again).

[Lithos]

74. SAMS

Well, Hezbollah arsenal contains Iranian supplied SA-7 and SA-18 shoulder fired missiles. I remember reading reports they used at least the SA-7, but because it is based on rather old (40 year old) technology, it probably only proved minimally effective.

L-

[bemildred]

76. Yes, I've also read that Israeli pilots took corrective action to avoid

being shot at, staying out of range. I would not expect the SA-7s would be worth much. It's the helicopters I was thinking of, F-16s are a lot more difficult. If you had the RPG-29s, I would think something effective against helicopters would be within reach too, witness Iraq and Afghanistan, and the sort of thing you would want, given the nature of the fighting in the South. But I don't remember anything of that sort. It may well be nothing, some simple explanation. Israelis don't use helicopters much? Hiz'bullah had nothing of that sort? The IDF outsmarted them somehow? It was just that if I was fighting the sort of war Hiz'bullah was fighting, I'd have wanted some sort of counter to close air support, and I didn't read of anything like that.

[Lithos]

77. The thread I just posted

Included a citation that at least one helicopter was shot down by an anti-tank missile. I suspect there were more, but that the Israeli's probably chose to limit their use to set piece situations to limit such opportunity fire.

L-

[bemildred]

78. Yeah, I forgot that one. Duh.

Still no SAMs though.

[Lithos]

79. SAMS require radar and an infrastructure

Which probably was not in the best interest of Hezbollah as it would have played to Israel's strength - namely the airforce. SAMs require special vehicles, radar, training and the like (plus the money to do all of this) in addition to the need to have a fair number of them to be effective.

It is not something to do halfway which is as good as Hezbollah could have managed given their limited resources.

[bemildred]

80. Good point.

Had not really thought of that. Never considered that all the unguided stuff might be deliberate. The use of TOWs and laser guided stuff fits that too. Given Israeli excellence in avionics, you could be much better off avoiding radar or other active sensors.

Low-tech can have advantages.

Edit: I was just thinking about how much I would want to do something about the CAS, and not really considering the consequences. I expect cost could be a factor, too.

[pelsar]

84. helicopters were used intensively.....a lot at night

the attacks ones mainly (apaches and cobras) far less used were the supply helicopters which are larger less maneuverable and with little in the way of protection. The one shot down (by anti tank weapon) had just dropped off troops, and was in its most vunerable state....just lifting off.

3 more were lost in accidents on the israeli side of the border.

The IAF is saying very very little about the SAMs, i dont believe there was anything other than should fired missles and given the fact that the bombing was mostly stationary targets they could be eliminated without going very low (gps directed bombs....).

[The Magistrate]

14. Your Comments Are Much Appreciated, Mr. Pelsar

It is good to see comments from a person with local knowledge indicating some appreciation of the corrosive effects of occupation duty on a military force over time. This has struck me many years as the most serious and least heralded threat to the future security of Israel, which, unfortunately, must in the last analysis depend on military efficiency for the foreseeable future.

[cracksquirrel]

41. Great reading here

This is by far the most civil and intelligent thread on this subject I've read in weeks. By all means keep it up.

[Englander]

49. Indeed, I've just read the Magistrates post, #19.

That certainly qualifies as an intelligent contribution, I'd include bemildred's & wellstonevoters'
posts in that description of being intelligent contributions, if I may give credit where it is due...

[The Magistrate]

56. Your Compliments Are Much Appreciated, Mr. Englander

And doubtless not only by me, but also by the other gentlemen you have named.

Thank you, Sir.

[number6]

83. just wait till the Hezbollah party of Iraq wins ...

a majority of seats in parliment ...

Bush-ee can tell us how well things are going there ...