Humbling of the supertroops shatters Israeli army morale

[scarletwoman]

Interesting, in-depth report from the UK Times on the conduct of the war with Hizbullah from the Israeli side:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2330624,00.html

The Sunday Times August 27, 2006

Humbling of the supertroops shatters Israeli army morale

HUNDREDS of feet below ground in the command bunker of the Israeli air force in Tel Aviv, a crowd of officers gathered to monitor the first day of the war against Hezbollah. It was July 12 and air force jets were about to attack Hezbollah’s military nerve centre in southern Beirut.

Among the officers smoking tensely as they waited for news, was Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz, 58, a daring fighter pilot in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war who had become chief of staff a year earlier and now faced the biggest test of his career.


<snip>

As the war unfolded his optimism was brought crashing down to earth — and with it the invincible reputation of the Israeli armed forces.

In five weeks, their critics charge, they displayed tactical incompetence and strategic short-sightedness. Their much-vaunted intelligence was found wanting.

Their political leadership was shown to vacillate. Their commanders proved fractious. In many cases the training of their men was poor and their equipment inadequate. Despite many individual acts of bravery, some of the men of the IDF were pushed to the point of mutiny.

The whole article is 3 pages long, but I highly recommend going to the link and reading the whole thing -- it's a fascinating inside look at the political and military repercussions resulting from the attack on Lebanon. Like our own troops in Iraq, the IDF reserves in particular were grievously short-changed by their leaders.

sw

[beam me up scottie]

1. It is like what happened to our troops.

“All the long-range rockets have been destroyed,” Halutz announced proudly. After a short pause, he added four words that have since haunted him: “We’ve won the war.”

Even as Halutz was declaring victory, 12 Israeli soldiers from the Maglan reconnaissance unit were already running into an ambush just over the border inside Lebanon near the village of Maroun a-Ras.

“We didn’t know what hit us,” said one of the soldiers, who asked to be named only as Gad. “In seconds we had two dead.”

With several others wounded and retreating under heavy fire the Maglans, one of the finest units in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), were astonished by the firepower and perseverance of Hezbollah.

[Fredda Weinberg]

2. I've heard this all before

This is exactly what happened after the Yom Kippur war. Golda Meir & Moshe Dayan paid a political price but only a few year later, Sadat stepped forward to make peace, in part because he didn't want to repeat the debacle of invading Israel.

[scarletwoman]

3. Yes, well, maybe not everyone ELSE has.

I just thought it was an interesting article. If there are historical parallels to be drawn, those would be interesting as well.

sw

[Fredda Weinberg]

4. This summary is consistent w/my memories

The October 1973 War had a devastating effect on Israel. More than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days of fighting. The loss of equipment and the decline of production and exports as a consequence of mobilization came to nearly US$7 billion, the equivalent of Israel's gross national product for an entire year. Most important, the image of an invincible Israel that had prevailed since the June 1967 War was destroyed forever.

Considering the disadvantageous conditions under which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered the war, its ultimate achievements were outstanding. Of the several factors which turned the tide, undoubtedly the most significant was the heroic performance of the IDF's reservists. Pitched into combat at literally a moment's notice, Israel's citizen-soldiers saved the country from military humiliation. That accomplishment exerted a profound effect on Israeli strategic planning. Although in later years, the conclusion came to be questioned, the performance of the IDF reservists in 1973 was considered at the time to be a vindication of the IDF's force structure as a whole. Hence, whereas several other dimensions of Israeli security thinking were subsequently reviewed and in some cases revised, the IDF's retention of its traditional framework of military service was not affected.

The June 1967 War had given Israel in general and the declining Labor Party in particular a badly needed morale booster, but the events of October 1973 shook the country's self-confidence and cast a shadow over the competence of the Labor elite. A war-weary public was especially critical of Minister of Defense Dayan.

In its interim report of April 1974, the Agranat Commission, a body established after the war to determine responsibility for Israel's military unpreparedness, claimed that it couldn't take Moshe Dayan's military background into account, and that it should judge him as a "civilian" defense minister. As such, the commission concluded that Dayan did not bear any personal responsibility, and that his ministerial responsibility was a public and political question rather than a judicial one. Dayan offered his resignation to Prime Minister Golda Meir, but it was not accepted. The commission put the blame on the Israeli military, and called for the dismissal of David Elazar, then army chief of staff.

http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_ykwar_result.php

[PATRICK]

11. The time for the change was then

and Carter offered a solution with results that last today in eliminating Egypt as an active enemy. The facts are that israel cannot survive or 'win" military in perpetuity against a ring of enemies. No nation really can, especially a small one. The price in a small population is always too high except for miracle wars. The sociological and psychological factors are likewise unsustainable. The Cold War image of armed eternity and even MADD has vanished on the big scene and the oil game itself will become a monster thrashing about causing chaos in its own decay. You can blame the hardliners of a particular strategy but the commitment to "wage peace" and change all the destructive paradigms may not be possible for a small nation suddenly finding the military option gutted as a sane solution.

It does need democracy in the region, world support and enforcement of peace, for generations if need be.
It never got such help and attempts have been corrupted. The vulnerability ids always there. A minority in an increasingly balkanized relationship with all Muslim neighbors(now having bombed the Christians of Lebanon away from the sympathies and regional experience). The adaptability of enemies in the majority population. Arabs within Israel itself necessitating a pluralistic society, NOT a theocracy. Military solutions especially the traditional ones, can only keep the inevitable down. This is not South Africa but if the time to learn the truth has not run out completely then they need real world support for the entire regional problem and complete change. The idealism comes at an increasingly higher toll but the toll will be paid and Israel no more at the end of the century unless they stop the lockstep war response conditioned tragically into the foundation of their nation. If you truly supported any small nation or the plight of their adversaries as well, you would never ask them to try that unilaterally and alone.

Also, the nation cannot be, but is, divided in that foolish left/right mirage that guarantees the worst of all policy outcomes(as elsewhere in the world). Anyone living in such a country should realize that is not viable for a difficult survival situation. Time is not on their side and no grand ME aggression by the US is going to do anything but make matters worse, faster. Blaming Sharon and the cruel agenda of the hard right, that alone, will not lead automatically to the best choices and those choices must reverse the isolation and global division that also make Israel non viable.

[Porcupine]

12. It's Peace or Diaspora.

Israel can no more surround itself with enemies and expect to survive than any man alone could. Eventually US attention and budgets will turn from it and they will have to account for their actions real and percieved.

If they do not make an honest peace satisfactory to their neighbors they had best go into the shipbuilding business. Right now the threats to push Israel (the nation of people) into the sea are idle boasts. For 1900 years "next year in Jerusalem" was an idle boast also.

[tocqueville]

15. Just wait for peak oil

The only chance for Israel to survive is to go back to the 1948 borders, which are the only legal borders and pay compensation to the Palestinians. They could then regain moral authorithy within the international community.

It's only the US today which is interested in Israel as a police in the ME. But the day the Saudi fields are dry, the interest will drop rapidly, unless sand becomes a fuel. Sooner or later the "Arabs" will get nuclear weapons, thus creating a new balance of power permitting to use conventional weapons. And then Israel doesn't stand a chance. The "Arabs" see the problem generation wise. It took them 400 years to throw out the crusaders, but they did. In the worse case we'll have a local nuclear holocaust, but the result is the same... for Israel. The "Arabs" will survive.

[Porcupine]

18. Arab nations will channel anger/frustration when revenues drop

at Israel. Currently their populations live highly subsidized lives based upon exploitation of oil revenues. When the oil money stops coming in those populations are going to freak. Guess who the most handy target is?

[tocqueville]

6. well sadly Dien Bien Phu comes to the mind

the French underestimated the Viets. Or Khe San ?

But the most amazing are the proportions : 2000 men bogged down 30000 with a vastly superior fire capacity. They destroyed 46 tanks, a helicopter and severely damaged a warship. They wounded 400. They probably lost themselves 500 men, but won the battle.

[tocqueville]

7. yep but this time there is no Sadat

and the US won't pump billions in "aid" to Nasrallah to keep him quiet.

[azurnoir]

10. No, but others will

if the US was smart we would pump aid to the Lebanese government, but unfortunately we very likely do not have the money or it is earmarked for elsewhere.

[tocqueville]

13. check this and weep

Lantos wants aid to Lebanon frozen 49 minutes ago

JERUSALEM - A congressman said Sunday he would ask the U.S. administration to freeze the $230 million aid package to Lebanon proposed by President Bush until the Lebanese government takes control of its borders with Syria and prevents arms smuggling to Hezbollah guerrillas.

Rep. Tom Lantos (news, bio, voting record), the top Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, spoke after meeting with senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Lantos said he told Olmert the U.S. aid package to Lebanon was important, "but that this package should be withheld until the Lebanese government displays responsibility."

"A porous Syrian-Lebanon border will only invite the repetition of Hezbollah attacks in the future. Hezbollah must not be allowed to rearm again," he said.

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20060828/ap_on_go_co/israel_us_congressman_1

[IntiRaymi]

14. Sounds like the USA has given up on attempting to win hearts and minds.

And another question that comes up is this:
Why has Mssr Olmert decided to undercut President Bush's initiative?
Is there a basic principle that I am missing here?

[tocqueville]

16. I think Olmert is a whimp

he was the best they could get when Sharon got comatose. But this shows very deep contradictions within the Israeli society.

[Douglas Carpenter]

21. actually in 1971 Sadat offered Israel a peace deal very similar to what

it ended up getting much later after war. Israel refused.

Reference: Scars of War Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy by Shlomo Ben-Ami, page 134-136. I should add that this is attested to by several prominent Israeli historians including Benny Morris in Righeous Victims: The Zionist/Arab Conflict 1881-2001.

[Fredda Weinberg]

22. A peace deal or an "interim agreement"?

And was withdrawal to the pre-1967 border a non-negotiable part of that "agreement"?

No wonder Golda Meir rejected it. In the end, Israel negotiated a peace treaty with recognized borders - and withdrew from Sinai, with all those oil wells.

[Douglas Carpenter]

23. according to Shlomo Ben-Ami (former Israeli Foreign Minister)

page 134, Scars of War - Wounds of Peace:

" In fact, Sadat's response to Jarring went even further; it indicated that Egypt wanted an Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab lands, but it did not link Egypt's readiness for peace with withdrawal from other fronts. Sadat was in effect anticipating the premises upon which he would strike a separate deal with Israel at the Camp David summit."

from page 135, "But Golda Meir's intransigence derailed the last initiative as well. It is difficult to imagine greater gulf than that which existed between the resourceful peace strategist, the compulsively creative and far-sighted visionary statesman that was Sadat, and the trivially immobile government led by Mrs. Meir."

[eccles12]

5. What should shatter their morale are their acts of terrorism against

a civilian population and the destruction of the beautiful Lebanon. Having leaders like those in Israel and the US today is enough to shatter morale anywhere.

[oblivious]

8. 80 to 90% of Israelis approved of the IDF action and 75% wanted more.

Polls suggest that 90 per cent of the population believe that the response to Hezbollah has been right and three quarters of those surveyed think that the military campaign should be be prosecuted more vigorously.

It wasn't just the leaders.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,542-2295265,00.html

[Hardrada]

9. I agree with your view.

I hope they can count ALL the cost.

[IndianaGreen]

17. The racism is that IDF felt inherently superior to their opponents

“Evidently they had never heard that an Arab soldier is supposed to run away after a short engagement with the Israelis,” said Gad.

As the US found out in Vietnam, and is finding out in Iraq and Afghanistan, the feeling of superiority over an enemy that was ethnically and culturally different, was shattered by the realities of a war of aggression fought on behalf of United States interests in neutralizing Hezbollah before a US attack on Iran.

[Andromeda]

19. For the most part the IDF is better trained

and more skilled than their counterparts. In that sense they are mostly superior militarily.

Hezbollah is a proxy of Iran and provided with all the weapons they need to wage an endless war. This makes Hezbollah more dangerous than, say, the Lebanese army who couldn't shoot their way out of a paper bag. They are committed guerrilla fighters charged with a radical ideology which values death more than life. They melt into the Shia populations, hide in their underground structures and store weapons caches in their secret tunnels.

The U.S. didn't know what they were getting into in Vietnam because they didn't know who the enemy was---or where they were. The same thing happened in Lebanon but the Israelis have an advantage the U.S. didn't have.

It's their neighborhood.

[Englander]

20. That's a good article.

Which I don't get to say very often with regards to the Sunday Times, or any Murdoch-owned papers.

This war of choice has been a disaster for Israel, Olmert/Peretz have been shown to be inexperienced,
the deterrent power of the army has been shattered, & the targets chosen by the Israeli forces has
laid them open to charges of committing war crimes.

[scarletwoman]

24. Yeah. Normally I wouldn't bother citing the Times, but I was impressed by

this particular piece. Just goes to show that an individual journalist can sometimes rise above the slime of the organization employing him or her.

sw