By Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondent
New revelations about the circumstances under which Israel and the United States reached a secret understanding on the Israeli nuclear program, and the Richard Nixon administration came to recognize Israel's policy of "nuclear ambiguity," appear in an article published this weekend in Washington. The article, in the current issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, was coauthored by Israeli historian Avner Cohen, who wrote "Israel and the Bomb" (1998), and William Burr, an expert on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Cohen and Burr reveal internal documents of the Nixon administration about contacts with Israel over the nuclear issue, including Israel's official notification to the U.S. that it would not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The "nuclear understanding" reached in 1969 between then-prime minister Golda Meir and Richard Nixon ended a decade of American pressure on Israel to stop its nuclear program. In the '60s the Americans sent inspectors to the Dimona nuclear reactor, and officials in the Johnson administration sought to condition the supply of F-4 Phantom fighter planes to Israel on its signing the NPT. Israel refused and adhered to its vague pledge "not to be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East."
Nixon's entry to the White House in January 1969 heralded a change in U.S. policy. Cohen and Burr reveal that the administration worked up documents on the ramifications of a nuclear-armed Israel, the contents of which remain classified. According to documents that have been declassified, the administration was of the opinion before Meir's first Washington visit, in September 1969, that Israel was already in the possession of nuclear weapons and was capable of deploying and launching Jericho ground-to-ground missiles. Based on that assessment, the U.S. State Department recommended that Nixon pressure Meir to pledge that "Israel would not possess nuclear weapons, would sign the NPT, and would not deploy missiles." Cohen and Burr say it is not known whether Nixon tried to do this, but that "subsequent actions indicate that he did not."
Meir and Nixon met in private at the White House on September 26, 1969. The precise contents of their conversation remains a blank, but it is known that it led to an understanding between the two countries. According to internal memoranda by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, Nixon had made clear to Meir that it was in America's interest that "Israel make no visible introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear test program."
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