Increasingly, it seems to me that the US military has overextended itself in Central Asia. While we accomplish essentially nothing there, sandwiched in between Russia and China who both border this region directly, we are stirring up paranoia and feelings of encirclement in Russia.
Why extend our power everywhere in the world, even where we are bound to fail?
The answer our government is in effect giving is, "Because there is terrorism all over the world, the US military has to be everywhere."
Obviously, no other country is going to see it this way.
Richard Weitz
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY SUMMER 2006
http://www.twq.com/06summer/docs/06summer_weitz.pdf"How long the Russian government will endorse the substantial U.S. military presence in Central Asia remains unclear. Moscow initially accepted the deployments because U.S. forces could fight local Islamic extremists more effectively than Russia and its local allies could. More recently, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Colored Revolutions that deposed pro-Moscow governments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have led influential Russians to view the continued U.S. presence as a major source of instability. In February 2005, the Russian Foreign Ministry pressured the Kyrgyz government to reject a U.S. request to station AWACS aircraft at Ganci.9 Since then, Russia’s state-dominated media has repeatedly urged Central Asian governments to crack down on U.S.-supported civil liberties groups.10 Alexander Vershbow, the departing U.S. ambassador to Russia, said that, to draw Central Asian states closer to Moscow, some Russian officials had launched a “concerted and coordinated effort to foster the impression that the United States is trying to undermine the regimes in the region.”11 Pushing too hard for U.S. disengagement, however, could antagonize Washington, aggravate regional instability, and alarm Central Asians seeking to balance the great powers. Moscow confronts more pressing security challenges in the Caucasus, especially Chechnya, and would prefer not to divert resources to fill the security vacuum that would follow a U.S. withdrawal. Russians worried about China’s growing influence in Central Asia also favor
a counterbalancing U.S. presence in the region.12"China’s Growing Role
"To many observers’ surprise, Central Asia’s newly independent states have
not become objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing but rather a major unifying element in Sino-Russian relations. The two governments cooperate more closely in Central Asia than in any other world region. Through the multilateral SCO and their extensive bilateral dialogue, Russian officials acknowledge China’s legitimate interests in Central Asia, while Beijing has institutional mechanisms to promote its regional objectives in close cooperation with Moscow. China also does not want to jeopardize security ties, including purchases of advanced Russian military technologies, by challenging Russian policies in a region of still limited importance for Beijing. Because Chinese leaders share many important goals with Russia in Central Asia, they have been able to benefit from Russian initiatives in these areas and redirect resources to other priorities. Similar to Moscow, Beijing is concerned about the spread of threatening ideologies such as Western democracy and Islamic fundamentalism. Periodic waves of violence linked to ethnic separatism in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, an area constituting one-sixth of China, have aroused fears about the effects of Central Asia’s post-Soviet independence
on the 10 million non-Han Chinese in Xinjiang. Members of the large Uighur communities in Central Asian countries have participated in anti-Chinese terrorist groups. China has taken several steps to induce Central Asian governments to curb separatist activities by Uighur, or “East Turkestan,” activists. Beijing has signed bilateral agreements with them on border security, military cooperation, and counterterrorism with provisions for joint law enforcement operations, police training, and intelligence sharing. Unsurprisingly, given their own harsh repression of antigovernment protesters in 1989, Chinese officials wholeheartedly backed the Uzbek government’s military crackdown in Andijon against “the three forces of separatism, terrorism, and extremism.”13 Similar to their Russian counterparts, Chinese officials have looked uneasily at the elevated U.S. military deployments in Central Asia since September
2001. Ganci’s location only 200 miles from the Chinese-Kyrgyz border,
combined with Washington’s long-standing military cooperation with Japan
and Taiwan and its growing security ties with India, invariably has stimulated fears of encirclement and containment. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders thus far have avoided directly challenging the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Beijing’s ambivalence reflects its recognition of the advantages of having the United States suppress the region’s terrorist movements and promote the stability required to develop Central Asian oil and gas resources. Chinese leaders also likely remain uncertain over Beijing’s ability to manage the consequences of a comprehensive U.S. military disengagement. Although China’s power projection capabilities are growing, its capacity to intervene militarily in Central Asia still lags far behind that of the United States or Russia."
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