Here is the schematic diagram Fledermaus posted that I referred to.
Fledermaus also posted a quote from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 1986 issue where it was clearly stated that Chernobyl DID have a containment building. Here is his post:
Before the accident many Western analysts had assumed that the Chernobyl reactors had no containment buildings As attention was focused on the plant, however, it became apparent that the design does include a containment system somewhat like that used for boiling-water reactors(one of two types of light-water reactors). The system was designed around the assumption that the most serious accident will be a rupture of one of the large pipes in the colling circuit; as the diagram shows, these are located in concrete-walled compartments. If a pipe ruptured, the released radioactive steam would be directed from thees compartments to pool of water located on above the other in the basement. The steam would condense as it bubbled through the water.
This sort of containment reflects a design philosophy common to light-water reactors as well- focused on a rupture of large pipes , and assumes that the emergency reactor cooling system would be successfully activated in the event of such a rupture, preventing sever fuel damage.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Aug-Sep 1986
-What Happened at Reactor Four, by Gordon Thompson
http://books.google.com/books?id=ngYAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA27&lpg=PA27&dq=chernobyl+reactor+schematic&source=bl&ots=W41F3qgb0N&sig=2ixVHNSiHEPG6Vy0RjZPUZ8liNY&hl=en&ei=gNz3TfK9G-qv0AGZzqCcCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CGkQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=chernobyl%20reactor%20schematic&f=falseOur ever over-eager FBaggins responded with this claim:
That error was corrected in the same magazine just a couple months later. Think anyone wonders how you ended up still believing the mistake? You're desperately googling around trying to find some evidence that your earlier statements were not in error.
Far simpler to just accept that you were wrong. Sorry.
In spite of repeated requests to provide a proper cite, Baggins never did.
He was forced to add a bit of information however, that allowed me to track down and check his claims.
You can see the entire exchange here:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x273992The claim made by FBaggins was "that error was corrected".
In fact, it was not. The statement in the previous issue of BAS was not specifically challenged at all, and the wording appears to be carefully chosen to avoid a specific discussion with dissident opinion that might center around the idea of Chernobyl and its safety systems, including its containment.
What Baggins points to is an article where Blethe, speaking for a "special American panel" that examined the accident, felt it was important to share the "preliminary" findings of their report before the Russians provided their report to the IAEA.
His third bullet point deals with the issue of containment.
He doesn't say that the Chernobyl reactor has "no containment" but rather that it had "no containment building over the reactor". That is the closest thing to a direct statement on the subject that the article contains, although there are several other areas where the reader is left to infer that Chernobyl reactor #4 had no containment.
In the earlier Aug-Sep 86 issue of BAS that Fledermaus referenced (it was a special issue on Chernobyl) there was several discussions of the matter, including an article titled
"The US Media Slant" by William Dorman and Daniel Hirsch, where the media was taken to task for uncritically exaggerating immediate fatalities at the behest of the Reagan administration spokesmen in a Cold War PR campaign to discredit Soviet technology and expertise.
The same article however, reports that The US nuclear industry appeared to be distancing itself from the Soviet accident to avoid having tighter regulations imposed. It goes on to tell us that
...The New York Times, belatedly but to its credit, pointed out some three weeks after the accident: “Nuclear proponents and industry officials have tried to minimize Chernobyl’s relevance to American power plant operations by contending that American units have better features.” The article quoted a mailing to reporters from the Atomic Industrial Forum as flatly stating that Chernobyl had no containment structure, and cited industry sponsored advertisements claiming that many Soviet reactors – including those at Chernobyl – lack the steel and reinforced concrete containment structures common to US reactors.
Similar views were advanced by spokespersons for the Electric Power Research Institute – Chernobyl “was not encased in a reinforced-concrete containment building, as is required of reactors in the United States” and therefore “there was nothing to to stop” radioactivity escaping from the plant – and the Edison Electric Institute: “We have not and will not have a Chernobyl-type plant accident here”
<snip>
The impression conveyed by the news media during the early stages of the accident was that Americans had little to fear from a Chernobyl-like disaster. Virtually absent in news columns as well as editorials was the perspective that the real lesson to be learned from Chernobyl was the fallibility of complex technology, not Soviet backwardness.
In particular, editorial writers seemed quick to accept the industry’s contentions about the total lack of containment at Chernobyl. As early as April 30, the Los Angeles Times told readers: “Minimum safety standards … clearly have not been met in the Soviet Union, where most nuclear reactors – apparently including the ill-fated plant at Chernobyl – do not have containment structures of the sort that are almost universal outside Russia.” A May 2 editorial in the San Jose Mercury News echoed these views with the conclusion that “the USSR simply has not built safe reactors” According to the Mercury the Soviets “have been exposed as reckless with the atom”.
The article goes on several more paragraph detailing examples where the containment issue and the overall state of Soviet nuclear technology were used to misrepresent the level of safety practiced by the Soviets. It finally concludes with the assertion that “
while uncertainty remains about the nature of containment at Chernobyl, it is clear that flat claims of “no containment” were overreaching.”
The next article
“A nuclear power advocate reflects on Chernobyl” states;
...A central question is the relevance of the experience at Chernobyl to the Western world’s lightwater reactors – in particular, whether the massive, and quite leak-tight, containment structures around such Western reactors would have mitigated the consequences of a Chernobyl-like accident. Although important arguments have been made that the Western containments are more substantial than the Chernobyl containment, I am inclined to await detailed comparison before answering this question.”
I stand by my earlier assessment that the idea and term "containment" was redefined by the nuclear industry to aid an effort to scapegoat the Russian nuclear program and technology in order to protect their profits. I can add that this also served political objectives related to Cold War tensions. It is clear that observers of the nuclear industry of the time saw it that way also.
The nuclear industry use of propaganda techniques never ends...