Safe & Clean

[Statistical]

Twenty-five killed and four missing in West Virginia. Six dead, dozens missing in China. How many more must perish in coal mines before the green lobby ends its opposition to a safer energy source?

More than 100 Americans have died in coal mines since 1984. Over that same period, not one American has died in a nuclear energy accident. In fact, no American has ever been killed in an atomic energy accident — and that includes any sailor in a Navy that makes extensive use of nuclear fission to power its fleet.

Worldwide, only 56 deaths are directly traceable to a nuclear energy accident. And all of those were the result of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster that has correctly been blamed on poor Soviet engineering and design, not atomic power's inherent risk.

When properly harnessed, nuclear power is a clean, steady source of renewable energy. It doesn't sling out ash, generate acid rain or emit mercury or arsenic. It has been safely used for decades in the U.S., Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Belgium and France. The last two use nuclear energy to meet more than half of their electricity needs.

On this side of the Atlantic, coal provides roughly half of America's electrical power and serves as an indispensable link in our energy chain. With 275 billion tons in recoverable reserves, no other nation is as rich in coal. We have enough to meet domestic demand for 250 years.

....

http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=529510

[safeinOhio]

1. I'll support nuclear energy

as soon as it becomes safe enough for private insurance companies find it safe enough to insure. Strange that they will insure coal plants. I think it can be made safe, but not until then and my yard stick on safety is in insurance actuaries that use complex stats to measure risk.

[Statistical]

3. Insurance companies do insure nuclear reactors. They have for 40+ years.

$10 billion worth of insurance.

[kristopher]

5. And what would the cost of a Chernobyl scale disaster in the Hudson Valley be?

We'd have to abandon the entire valley and New York, do you suppose that would use up the entire 10B or do you think there would be a little left over?

Seriously, how in the world can you fix your mouth to say things like that?

[Statistical]

9. What is the cost of a driver plowing into a crosswalk and killing 20 people.

Most states require no more than $50,000 insurance. Would $50,000 cover the death benefit for 20 people?

Insurance for no other industry covers ALL possible outcomes just ones with more than 0.000000000001% probability.
TMI was a meltdown but the potential damage was contained by safety features.
Price-Anderson hasn't cost taxpayers a single penny.

How much insurance are wind farms required to carry? Is it enough to handle the potential damage is 1000 turbines all broke at the same time? Of course not hwoever the likelihood of that happening is virtually nil (but not 0.0%) just like a so called "Chernobyl" event on a negative void reactor.

Physics tells us a Chernobyl positive feedback event can't occur on a negative void reactor. It simply can NOT happen. Absent proper operating conditions a negative void nuclear reactor will simply stop. It requires those conditions to be present to OVERCOME the negative coefficient of fission and continue to operate.

[kristopher]

10. There you go claiming nuclear is perfect again...

It isn't. Neither I nor anyone else that is concerned about a Chernobyl SCALE failure of nuclear plant is unaware of the difference in design between Chernobyl and Pressurized Water Reactors. What we are concerned about is the human element that *can and inevitably always does* lead to failure of complex systems.

Your focus on the technological differences from Chernobyl is a red herring designed to allow you to say "It simply can NOT happen". Well human failure CAN happen. It can happen in component design, it can happen in system design, it can happen with operators, it can happen with maintenance. If there is one lesson that history is absolutely clear on it is that COMPLEX HUMAN SYSTEMS FAIL.

For those who are not familiar with what you are talking about I suggest further reading in passive safety components of nuclear safety systems. Systems fail.

Why is the Price Anderson Act needed?

The Act performs one function - it transfers risk of a level that is normally required of an industry to the public. No such legislation or subsidy is required for any other industry.

You say that the "Price-Anderson hasn't cost taxpayers a single penny." That is a naive and irresponsible claim. A gift in kind is a cost. And when the public is on the hook for a risk, that is a gift in kind - the functional equivalent of cash. Additionally there is a cost in the form of a market distortion. Other BETTER technologies are at a competitive disadvantage when this MATURE 50 year old industry must *still* be propped up with public resources.


Taxpayer Subsidies for Nuclear Costs
Consider first the way that most nuclear-cost studies ignore taxpayer subsidies that cover many nuclear costs. The largest of the ignored subsidies is for nuclear insurance. The European Commission (consistent with the WNA and Cato-Institute figures) recently showed that, if commercial reactors had to purchase full-insurance-liability coverage on the market, this would triple nuclear-generated-electricity prices (European Commission (EC) 2003; World Nuclear Association (WNA) 2008; Heyes 2002).

Yet a majority of the nuclear-cost studies exclude full-insurance costs, presumably because they are not market costs but mainly government/taxpayer subsidies. Without these subsidies (and liability protection), however, utilities agree they would never use risky atomic energy, e.g. (Scully Capital Services Inc. 2002; Heyes 2002; Spurgeon 2008; Slocum 2008; American Nuclear Society (ANS) 2005; Rothwell 2002; Energy Information Administration (EIA) 1999; Brownstein 1994).

Why not? Insurance rates reflect this high risk, given that the government-calculated, lifetime-core-melt probability for all US-commercial reactors is 1 in 5 (Makhijani 2007; Smith 2006; Shrader-Frechette 2007).

Reflecting various responses to this core-melt risk, commercial reactors fall into three camps regarding liability coverage. The vast majority of reactors are in the first camp (e.g., in China, India, Iran, Pakistan), where operator nuclear liability is 0.

One-third of reactors (many in western Europe and the US) are in the second camp, where operator liability is minimal. US reactors have the highest (minimal) liability, $10.8 billion—roughly 1.5% of government-calculated, worst-case-accident damages of $660 billion (Smith 2006; Shrader-Frechette 2007). The third camp includes 13% of reactors (in Germany, Japan, Switzerland), all having government-guaranteed, unlimited liability (World Nuclear Association (WNA) 2008; Schwartz 2006). All countries thus reduce nuclear-industry risks/costs by transferring them to the people, either directly, to those who live nearby, or indirectly, through taxpayer/government subsidies (Energy Information Administration (EIA) 1999).


Because a majority of the 30 nuclear-cost studies (mentioned above) trim taxpayer-subsidized, nuclear-liability-insurance costs from their energy-cost calculations, they may encourage flawed economic signals, inefficient markets, questionable research ethics, and unequal treatment. It seems inconsistent and unethical for assessors to trim (and not disclose) full-nuclear-liability costs that increase taxpayer risks (Heyes 2002; UK Department of Trade and Industry (UK DTI) 2007), while because of the associated financial risks, the US Securities and Exchange Commission requires disclosing lack of nuclear-liability limits to investors (Brownstein 1994).

K. Shrader-Frechette, "Climate Change, Nuclear Economics, and Conflicts of Interest"

[Statistical]

11. " if commercial reactors had to purchase full-insurance-liability coverage on the market"

If any industry had to purchase full-liability for any possible eventuality no matter how remote it would massively increase costs.

Once again a car can cause millions upon millions of dollars in damages both to property and liability in form of injury & death.

Most (all?) States limit liability insurance to potential events that have at least a small chance of occurring. It is unlikely but still possible that I will cause $50,000 in damages with my car. The likelihood that I will cause $10 million dollars in damages is not 0.00% however it is so infinitesimally small that I am not required to insure against that.

Thus I am not required to have $20 million of liability insurance (coverage for all eventualities) for my car I am required to have $50,000 (coverage for almost all eventualities).

Similarly nuclear utilities aren't required to have $600 billion they are required $10 billion.

This phenomenon isn't limited to nuclear industry. It applies to all industries. No industry anywhere on the planet purchases or is mandated to purchase insurance against all (including extremely unlikely) eventualities

Another example is people who's homes are below 100 year flood plain are required to purchase flood insurance. However people above the 100 year flood plan don't have a 0.000000000000000000000000000000000000000% chance of being in a flood. However the extreme unlikelihood that a flood will occur above 100 year flood plain is so remote that a flood insurance mandate for all homes provides no value to the public.

[kristopher]

12. Your assertion is given the lie by the existence of the Price-Anderson Act.

[Statistical]

13. No it isn't.

Price-Anderson simply limits insurance to eventualities that have at least a remote chance of occurring.

There really is no need for govt backstop provided by P-A other than anti-nukers like yourself.

Take worst case scenario no matter how remote for say an oil refinery, a massive explosion killing thousands and destroying hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property. The refining companies assets & insurance can't pay that. The refiner would pay out claims up to insurance then file bankruptcy.

The govt would likely step in (Katrina, 9/11) and provide a backstop.
P-A simply codifies that relationship that exists defacto in any other industry.

Nuclear utilities are more insured (by private insurance paid annually by utilties) than any other entity on the planet.

The only purpose P-A provides is:
a) reassurance that public would be taken care of in a one in million event (which they would anyways just look at 9/11 fund).
b) prevent people like you from imposing stupid and artificially high insurance requirements.

I will agree that nuclear utilities should have $600 billion in insurance when you (and every other driver) has $10 million in liability insurance (or whatever is the absolute maximum amount of damage/claims that could arise) and every other industry on the planet has insurance equal to the highest possible damage regardless of the likelihood.

You simply want to impose a standard that is not required for any other industry on nuclear energy for the sole purpose of bankrupting it.

[kristopher]

14. No other industry needs it because no other industry has the potential liability

And potential liability is a part of the risk equation.

You can dissemble all you want, the facts are clear and unambiguous. The only "imposed standard" is the shift of liability from the nuclear industry onto the backs of the taxpayers.

[Statistical]

16. All industry has potential liability.

Insurance required on airlines was inferior (couldn't pay more than 1% of total claims) to damage caused in 9/11.
Homeowners above 100 year flood plain are not insured against floods yet will qualify for billions in federal disaster relief every year.
A individual driver can cause millions of dollars in damages/liabilities but is only insured to $50,000 (or so depending on states). While the individual accident claim may be "small" the aggregate potential uninsured liabilities is staggering (all potential damage by all drivers minus the covered damages).

NO OTHER INDUSTRY ON THE PLANET IS INSURED AGAINST ALL EVENTUALITIES. NONE. NOT A SINGLE ONE.

You simply want to hold nuclear to a standard that no other industry in the world is held to, has ever (in history of mankind) been held to, and never will be held to.

Combined the aggregated uninsured damages caused by drivers exceeds that of worse case nuclear scenario yet are not insured.
The economic damage of 9/11 exceeds $2 TRILLION (3x that of a worst case virtually impossible nuclear event) yet airlines weren't required to carry even 1% of the insurance to cover that.

Ever hear millions upon millions of dollars is paid out to disaster victims without any flood insurance. The flood insurance wasn't mandated because the govt determined that the likelihood of a major loss although not 0.000000000% was so remote it didn't warrant insurance.

That is just three examples but the concept applies across all industries and events. No industry anywhere has liability insurance equal to the maximum potential claim.

[kristopher]

18. Try the caps lock next time you repeat yourself, maybe that will help.

Why is the Price Anderson Act required for nuclear power, but not for wind, solar, natural gas, coal, wave, current, tidal, geothermal or any other technology?

Because the potential liability is so FUCKING LARGE.

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Volume 1181 Issue Chernobyl
Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment, Pages 31 - 220

Chapter II. Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe for Public Health

Alexey B. Nesterenko a , Vassily B. Nesterenko a ,† and Alexey V. Yablokov b
a
Institute of Radiation Safety (BELRAD), Minsk, Belarus b Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
Address for correspondence: Alexey V. Yablokov, Russian Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospect 33, Office 319, 119071 Moscow,
Russia. Voice: [phone]; fax: [phone]. [e-mail]
†Deceased


ABSTRACT

Problems complicating a full assessment of the effects from Chernobyl included official secrecy and falsification of medical records by the USSR for the first 3.5 years after the catastrophe and the lack of reliable medical statistics in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Official data concerning the thousands of cleanup workers (Chernobyl liquidators) who worked to control the emissions are especially difficult to reconstruct. Using criteria demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) resulted in marked underestimates of the number of fatalities and the extent and degree of sickness among those exposed to radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. Data on exposures were absent or grossly inadequate, while mounting indications of adverse effects became more and more apparent. Using objective information collected by scientists in the affected areas—comparisons of morbidity and mortality in territories characterized by identical physiography, demography, and economy, which differed only in the levels and spectra of radioactive contamination—revealed significant abnormalities associated with irradiation, unrelated to age or sex (e.g., stable chromosomal aberrations), as well as other genetic and nongenetic pathologies.

In all cases when comparing the territories heavily contaminated by Chernobyl's radionuclides with less contaminated areas that are characterized by a similar economy, demography, and environment, there is a marked increase in general morbidity in the former.

Increased numbers of sick and weak newborns were found in the heavily contaminated territories in Belarus, Ukraine, and European Russia.

Accelerated aging is one of the well-known consequences of exposure to ionizing radiation. This phenomenon is apparent to a greater or lesser degree in all of the populations contaminated by the Chernobyl radionuclides.

This section describes the spectrum and the scale of the nonmalignant diseases that have been found among exposed populations.

Adverse effects as a result of Chernobyl irradiation have been found in every group that has been studied. Brain damage has been found in individuals directly exposed—liquidators and those living in the contaminated territories, as well as in their offspring. Premature cataracts; tooth and mouth abnormalities; and blood, lymphatic, heart, lung, gastrointestinal, urologic, bone, and skin diseases afflict and impair people, young and old alike. Endocrine dysfunction, particularly thyroid disease, is far more common than might be expected, with some 1,000 cases of thyroid dysfunction for every case of thyroid cancer, a marked increase after the catastrophe. There are genetic damage and birth defects especially in children of liquidators and in children born in areas with high levels of radioisotope contamination.

Immunological abnormalities and increases in viral, bacterial, and parasitic diseases are rife among individuals in the heavily contaminated areas. For more than 20 years, overall morbidity has remained high in those exposed to the irradiation released by Chernobyl. One cannot give credence to the explanation that these numbers are due solely to socioeconomic factors. The negative health consequences of the catastrophe are amply documented in this chapter and concern millions of people.

The most recent forecast by international agencies predicted there would be between 9,000 and 28,000 fatal cancers between 1986 and 2056, obviously underestimating the risk factors and the collective doses. On the basis of I-131 and Cs-137 radioisotope doses to which populations were exposed and a comparison of cancer mortality in the heavily and the less contaminated territories and pre- and post-Chernobyl cancer levels, a more realistic figure is 212,000 to 245,000 deaths in Europe and 19,000 in the rest of the world. High levels of Te-132, Ru-103, Ru-106, and Cs-134 persisted months after the Chernobyl catastrophe and the continuing radiation from Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu, and Am will generate new neoplasms for hundreds of years.

A detailed study reveals that 3.8–4.0% of all deaths in the contaminated territories of Ukraine and Russia from 1990 to 2004 were caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe. The lack of evidence of increased mortality in other affected countries is not proof of the absence of effects from the radioactive fallout. Since 1990, mortality among liquidators has exceeded the mortality rate in corresponding population groups.

From 112,000 to 125,000 liquidators died before 2005—that is, some 15% of the 830,000 members of the Chernobyl cleanup teams. The calculations suggest that the Chernobyl catastrophe has already killed several hundred thousand human beings in a population of several hundred million that was unfortunate enough to live in territories affected by the fallout. The number of Chernobyl victims will continue to grow over many future generations.

[Statistical]

19. Chernobyl was a positive void, graphite moderated reactor.

I agree they should not be allowed in the United States.

Oh wait........ They aren't.

Try again.

TMI was our Chernobyl and it resulted in not a single loss of life.

After 50 million operating hours. P-A hasn't had to pay out a single claim.

[kristopher]

20. You forget the caplock.

But as least you eliminated the attempt to impress everyone with your jargon.

Perhaps you'd also like to repeat the discarded analysis of claiming that the chances of an incident with the LWR deisgn resulting in core damage is one in one million per year of reactor operation.
It has certainly been floated around here a great deal after all; and I suspect that if I were to do a thorough search of the Nuclear Enegy Institute's website and the webring of nuclear fans, that is the only reference I'd find. Of course, that ignores the reassessment done in the 80s which showed that the chances of the average reactor in the US was closer to 1 in 3,000 per year of reactor operation.

The bottom line is that given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating nuclear power plants in this country, we can expect to see a core meltdown accident within the next 20 years; and it is possible that such an accident could result in off-site releases of radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at Chernobyl. -
NRC Commissioner James Asselstine Congressional testimony 1986

Speaking directly to the point of contention between us Karlheinz Orth, of the nuclear division of Siemens AG said to a safety conference in 1988:

The importance of passivity is overestimated. Every reactor concept is based on certain inherent safety features and also depends on active and passive engineered safety features.... Where reliance is placed solely on inherent safety features or on purely passive engineered safety features, it would not be possible for an operator to select or even influence the final condition of the plant....There is no reason to leave today's mature LWR technology only in order to experiment with ... half-developed but 'alternative' concepts. Preferences established by publicity can be no substitute for operational experience.

[joshcryer]

22. The high safety number is with regards to new nuclear reactors.

But you knew that and are trying to mislead people yet again.

[kristopher]

23. The high number PREDATES the lower number, Einstein.

[joshcryer]

24. You don't understand risk assessment.

Your sources are outdated and irrelevant.

[kristopher]

25. The 300X higher number you like to quote was rendered invalid by the 80s NRC analysis

The bottom line is that given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating nuclear power plants in this country, we can expect to see a core meltdown accident within the next 20 years; and it is possible that such an accident could result in off-site releases of radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at Chernobyl.
- Congressional testimony of NRC Commissioner James Asselstine, 1986 on reassessment that changed the probability of a severe core damage accident from 1/1,000,000 per reactor year to 1/3000 per reactor year.



If there is one thing that I have learned through the investigation, it is this: Nuclear power plants are very large, very complex systems that cannot be completely accurately modeled. Dangerous transients cannot be incurred deliberately so that the actual plant response to all events can be experienced and tested....Current plant performance statistics must not be accepted as “good enough” because they may not be good enough for the future, and one accident is one too many. - TMI investigator

[Statistical]

26. Core Damage Frequency DOES NOT EQUAL radiation release.

Core Damage Frequency DOES NOT EQUAL radiation release.
Radiation release DOES NOT EQUAL Chernobyl.

Your 1/3000 claim is dubious at best but for the sake of the post I will work with it as if it were true.

That means that likelihood of a SINGLE core damage event will occur over lifetime of all nuclear reactors (60 years) is 5%.
This is 5% per reactor or 5% per year. This is 5% for a single event among all reactors over their entire lifetime (60 years).

Even if that 5% happens (95% chance it won't) that doesn't mean that any radiation will be released. If radiation was released it doesn't mean it could be on the scope and scale of Chernobyl. So trying to equate a 5% lifetime CDF with Chernobyl once again is a false analogy.

If CDF is 1/300th per reactor year then there is a 5% chance over life of entire reactor fleet that a single event will occur which may not release radiation.

Hell asteroids are a higher risk.
To put this lifetime risk into perspective the likelihood of a Tunguska class (or greater) impact event is about 2%-3% per century.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunguska_event

The impact in Tunguska in 1908 was the equivalent of a 5 to 30 Megaton detonation (roughly 250 to 1500x that of Hiroshima).

BTW Both European Commission and EPRI put CDF at much less (5 x 10^-5 and 2 x 10^-5 respectively)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_damage_frequency

Probabilistic risk assessment for Gen III+ reactors (with higher emphasis on passive safety and passive cooling) but CDF much lower than current reactors. The ESBWR (which can cool decay heat with no pumps or electrical power) has a CDF of 3 x 10^-8. That is a likelihood of a core damage event of 1/380,000,000th (one 380 millionth) per reactor per year. A fleet of 500 ESBWRs operating for 120 years would have a 0.2% chance of a single core damage event over their combined lifetime.

So while nuclear power is safe we can do better. We should rapidly replace coal plants and then existing nuclear reactors with GEN III+ reactors.

[kristopher]

27. That isn't my claim it is the head of the NRC testifying before Congress.

Get a fucking grip on reality.


The bottom line is that given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating nuclear power plants in this country, we can expect to see a core meltdown accident within the next 20 years; and it is possible that such an accident could result in off-site releases of radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at Chernobyl.

- Congressional testimony of NRC Commissioner James Asselstine, 1986 on reassessment that changed the probability of a severe core damage accident from 1/1,000,000 per reactor year to 1/3000 per reactor year.

[Statistical]

28. Taken completely out of context.

Still even if it was factual that is 5% chance of a single event over 60 year lifespan that may not even result in radiation release.

What he was saying is that "AT PRESENT SAFETY LEVEL" the Congressional Inquiry was on issue of safety lapses in nuclear reactors.

The safety record has improved substantially since then. His assessment wasn't that nuclear can NEVER be safer than it was in 1983 but rather lack of safety adherence was creating an avoidable danger.

[kristopher]

29. Times 104 reactors = about 1 in 5.

Ignore that header it doesn't even make sense to me.

[joshcryer]

34. Or about the same odds of you dying right now if you're over 50.

:shrug:

[Name removed]

36. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[joshcryer]

37. No, you.

I forget you're a high school student.

[kristopher]

30. From your link

"Assuming there are 500 reactors in use in the world, the above numbers mean that, statistically, one core damage incident would be expected to occur somewhere in the world every 40 or 100 years, respectively."

That sounds pretty close to what the NRC commissioner testified to.

[Statistical]

31. Well now you are changing the scope from US (104 reactors) to some future with 500+ reactors.

Of course EVEN THEN that means one core damage event not one radioactive release.

Core Damage Event != Radiation Release.

Still this highlights why we need EVEN SAFER reactors like the GenIII+ designs with a CDF rate a magnitude lower.

As number of reactors increase to maintain same level of safety we need even safer reactors. This is because the system as a whole has a probability of failure that is:
c = cdf rate
n = number reators
y = timeframe in years
f = failure rate

f = 1 - (1- c)^(n * y)

We should build safer nuclear reactors because we have the technology, expertise, and knowledge to do so now. This is the dividend of 40 years of research and operations.

Furthermore, core damage frequencies for these (GenIII+ reactors are generally in the range of 1 core damage event for every 15-20 million years of operation (6e-7 core damage events per reactor year for the EPR) and 1 core damage event for every 300-350 million years of operation (3e-8 core damage events per reactor year for the ESBWR).<1> Generation II reactors are known to have core damage frequencies as high as 1 core damage event for every 100,000 years of operation (1e-5 core damage events per reactor-year for the BWR/4).<1>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_III_reactor

So the same scenario but with GenIII reactors.
500 reactors over next century. The likelihood a core damage event (not radioactive release) would be

f = 1 - (1 - 3E-8)^(500*100)
f = 0.2%

[kristopher]

32. There are nearly 500 reactors in the world right now.

So that stat is valid. As it was taken from your link, I presumed you had read it.

You are now making claims that are directly contradicted by the testimony quoted, however he was very specific about the potential for a chernobyl scale release IN the US with the present fleet.

The modeling you are relying on is not a good predictor and you know it - that is why the insurance companies will not accept it.

While we have a record of several hundred plants, that isn't a lot in terms of establishing a statistical base for prediction. Therefore they approach the problem by evaluating individual components and the human potential for failure in given circumstances - not a very convincing foundation for such an incredibly important prediction given that they can't even predict the outcome of a NASCAR race (or any other sporting event) using the same kind of handicapping approach - and they are a hell of a lot less technically complex and involve far fewer human points of criticality than our nuclear supply chain and fleet.

[Statistical]

33. LOL.

50 million operating hours in US and 150 million operating hours around the world is "insufficient statistical base".
You didn't fail Probability & Statistics 101 you simply never took it. :rofl:

Still even IF we accept your bogus 5% lifetime failure rate (104 reactors over 60 years @ 1/3000th CDF per reactor year) that is 5% of a CORE DAMAGE event not 5% of a radiation release and certainly not 5% for a radiation release the size of Chernobyl.

Is the chance of a Chernobyl sized release 0.00000000000000000000000000000%? Of course not but it sure as hell isn't 5% either.

BTW: Do you have asteroid insurance? Likelihood a megaton sized impact event is about 2%-3% per century. I am sure you are terrified of that too right?

[kristopher]

35. Yes, it is insufficient.

The problem is that even though there is time racked up, the variety of events that can be simulated is extremely limited compared to the potential failures that the real world presents in such a complex system. If they were all identical, including subcontracting, component manufacturing, and personnel there would be a much more representative sample. It was precisely the fact that they changed from the type of analysis you are suggesting to a more plant specific probabilistic manner of risk assessment that resulted in the change from 1/1000000/reactor year to 1/3000/reactor year.


If I recall correctly, you made the same point about limited data when you were trying to defend the insurance subsidy.

[Dogmudgeon]

15. Not to mention the reinsurance market

"No insurance company will insure a nuke" ... except all of them.

And if they don't specify that they insure reactors, they DO insure energy company property.

In EVERY other industry, a company can declare bankruptcy and escape paying claims. The nuclear energy industry has the much-maligned Price-Anderson Act, which prevents that -- if a company goes under,the claims must still be paid. First, the P-A fund pays, then the government pays, and gets repaid out of the replenished fund. This supposedly non-performing nuclear accident fund has paid out claims against it consistently. Has Massey Coal, or any coal company, ever paid claims promptly and in full?

And negligence is not subject to absolute statutory limits, anyway. Case law is FULL of these decisions. Nukes get no special breaks.

The No Nukes crusade never tires of proclaiming that nuclear energy is so self-evidently bad that no argument is necessary. Yet nearly ALL the anti-nuke stuff I have ever seen depends on one nonsense argument or another to make it "sellable", as if fear mongering alone wasn't enough.

Why make stuff up if all that is required is straight reportage?

How do anti-nuke urban legends -- or are they malicious lies? -- even keep going?

--d!

[kristopher]

17. That distinction is clearly made upthread.

[TheWraith]

21. Um, no. Who told you that nonsense?

In the ridiculously improbable event that Indian Point were to get past all of it's safety systems and melt down, New York City would still be at least 20 miles outside even the worst case scenario for a radiological exclusion zone.

[abqmufc]

4. So this is OK then????

I just spent the week in the area around Monument Valley, UT; Mexican Hat, UT. The tailings still exist over 40 years after the mill closed.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/umtra/mexican_hat_title1.html


The area around the former mill and the 2000 open uranium tailing piles on Navajo Nation are left to impact the ecosystem including cattle (most ending up in your local supermarket) and humans (an entire generation of Navajo men are dead from cancer due to exposure from uranium in piss pore mining conditions. The US government deems the area not populated enough. Yet at least 10 sovereign Tribes are impacted, 10 National Park and Monuments are impacted and the drinking water for most of the Western United States.

We can fool ourselves and say we will do it 'right' this time...but then again why should we believe that when one only needs to drive on the back roads between Albuquerque, New Mexico through the Navajo Nation and up into Southern Utah to see the reality of what nuclear energy means with respect to mining, transport (of materials), milling, and disposal. The legacy of "clean nuclear" is still in tailing piles all around the Colorado Plateau impacting the Colorado River, San Juan River, Green River and the aquifers - the water for the entire Western United States. The area saw the worst nuclear accident in the United States but little are aware of it.

http://www.ratical.org/radiation//UraniumInNavLand.html

[hunter]

6. I'll play.

What do you want to know about ugly, exploitive Southwest coal and uranium mining? I've walked that dirt.

If we banned coal and uranium mining today the coal power industry would whither and die within a year or two.

But we've already mined enough uranium, created enough plutonium, stockpiled enough thorium, that we could keep a nuclear power industry running for at least a century or more.

[wtmusic]

7. There were a lot of mistakes made early on

Really awful disposal practices, atmospheric testing, careless handling (cancers caused by which killed a high percentage of workers at Los Alamos).

Nuclear energy doesn't mean the same thing it did 40-50 years ago. We need to do our best to clean up after ourselves, and move on - there's too much at stake.

[NNadir]

8. I'll support dangerous fossil fuels when they pay claims on any of the people they kill.

I guess you love dangerous fossil fuels because they don't fucking bother to have any insurance for the people they kill.

Wunderbar!

It sounds like a great environmental policy: Let insurance company practices determine what fucking makes sense.

If you would like to produce a single case in the 50 year history of commercial nuclear power where a single claim was valid, that would be swell.

But you can't and you won't because you have a completely arbitrary criteria that is completely rote and knee jerk.

[kristopher]

2. Not so much...

Nuclear power has a fatality rate that is more than 9X that of wind power, and that doesn't include the hundreds of thousands of deaths from Chernobyl.


Taxpayer Subsidies for Nuclear Costs
Consider first the way that most nuclear-cost studies ignore taxpayer subsidies that cover many nuclear costs. The largest of the ignored subsidies is for nuclear insurance. The European Commission (consistent with the WNA and Cato-Institute figures) recently showed that, if commercial reactors had to purchase full-insurance-liability coverage on the market, this would triple nuclear-generated-electricity prices (European Commission (EC) 2003; World Nuclear Association (WNA) 2008; Heyes 2002).

Yet a majority of the nuclear-cost studies exclude full-insurance costs, presumably because they are not market costs but mainly government/taxpayer subsidies. Without these subsidies (and liability protection), however, utilities agree they would never use risky atomic energy, e.g. (Scully Capital Services Inc. 2002; Heyes 2002; Spurgeon 2008; Slocum 2008; American Nuclear Society (ANS) 2005; Rothwell 2002; Energy Information Administration (EIA) 1999; Brownstein 1994).

Why not? Insurance rates reflect this high risk, given that the government-calculated, lifetime-core-melt probability for all US-commercial reactors is 1 in 5 (Makhijani 2007; Smith 2006; Shrader-Frechette 2007).

Reflecting various responses to this core-melt risk, commercial reactors fall into three camps regarding liability coverage. The vast majority of reactors are in the first camp (e.g., in China, India, Iran, Pakistan), where operator nuclear liability is 0.

One-third of reactors (many in western Europe and the US) are in the second camp, where operator liability is minimal. US reactors have the highest (minimal) liability, $10.8 billion—roughly 1.5% of government-calculated, worst-case-accident damages of $660 billion (Smith 2006; Shrader-Frechette 2007). The third camp includes 13% of reactors (in Germany, Japan, Switzerland), all having government-guaranteed, unlimited liability (World Nuclear Association (WNA) 2008; Schwartz 2006). All countries thus reduce nuclear-industry risks/costs by transferring them to the people, either directly, to those who live nearby, or indirectly, through taxpayer/government subsidies (Energy Information Administration (EIA) 1999).


Because a majority of the 30 nuclear-cost studies (mentioned above) trim taxpayer-subsidized, nuclear-liability-insurance costs from their energy-cost calculations, they may encourage flawed economic signals, inefficient markets, questionable research ethics, and unequal treatment. It seems inconsistent and unethical for assessors to trim (and not disclose) full-nuclear-liability costs that increase taxpayer risks (Heyes 2002; UK Department of Trade and Industry (UK DTI) 2007), while because of the associated financial risks, the US Securities and Exchange Commission requires disclosing lack of nuclear-liability limits to investors (Brownstein 1994).

K. Shrader-Frechette, "Climate Change, Nuclear Economics, and Conflicts of Interest"