From: Energy Market Manipulation and Federal Enforcement Regimes
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1c9f4e27-376a-49c8-a244-25730c4bbbe8&Witness_ID=ce982bca-8b3e-442c-9b63-1f8dd8aa13d11
SUMMARY
The speculative bubble in petroleum markets has cost the economy well over half a trillion dollars in the two years since the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs first called attention to this problem. That speculative bubble in energy commodities has cost households, on average, about $1500 over the past two years in increased costs for gasoline and natural gas.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have failed to protect the public because they were slow to recognize the problem and are not looking for the real causes, examining a narrow set of abuses that ignore the much broader problem in the commodity futures markets. The Federal Trade Commission’s recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking implementing the expanded powers it was given under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 appears to be repeating the same mistake that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission made in implementing the provision of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that gave it expanded powers.
The overall pattern of prices supports the proposition that they have run up beyond anything that is justified by the problems in the physical market.
- We have a commodity that is vulnerable to abuse, in a new market that has been under-regulated from its birth.
- Public policy adopted in 2000 further reduced regulation and opened the door to counterproductive, if not outright manipulative, behaviors and pushed prices higher.
- We have a clear theory about how consumers could be hurt in this market.
- The problem is that both the structure of the market and the behaviors of market players are biased in favor of higher prices and against consumers.
- We have evidence at the micro levels of a pervasive pattern of past abuses and rumors about suspicious behavior in the current market.
The economic analysis does not support the claim that these markets operate efficiently to establish prices.
- Risk premiums, which raise the price substantially (10 to 20 percent), are high and rising.
- Prices are well above the underlying costs of production.
- The operation of financial markets is no accident. Trading reflects the rules that are established – by law and through self-organization.
- The majority of transactions take place in markets that are largely unregulated.
- These over-the-counter markets, reported in unaudited, unregulated indices, are a major factor in setting the price of natural gas. And these unaudited, unregulated markets have behaved very poorly in recent years, with numerous instances of misreporting of prices.
- The abuses include a wide variety of practices including manipulation facilitated by large positions, lack of transparency, structural advantages enjoyed by large traders or the exercise of market power, insider trading and self-dealing, trading practices that accelerate market trends, perhaps causing them to overshoot.
It would be reassuring if we could blame the current speculative bubble on the blind ignorance and ineptitude of the regulatory agencies with oversight responsibilities. If that were the case, we could just fire the commissioners and secretaries and clean up the problem. Unfortunately, there is a more fundamental problem that must be addressed.
Commodity futures markets have ceased to provide their proper function of helping to smooth the functioning of physical markets for vital commodities like energy and food. Instead they have become engines of speculation that feed volatility, amp up volume, and increase risk that increase prices and drive physical (commercial) traders or out of these markets.
Public policies have made these markets the playgrounds of the idle rich, while consumers suffer the burden of rising prices for the necessities of daily life. We have made it so easy to play in the financial markets that investment in productive long term assets are unattractive. We must turn down the volume by imposing more stringent conditions on these markets.
The most blatant mistake occurred when Congress allowed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to forego regulation of over the counter trading in energy futures – creating what is known as the
Enron-Loophole. Because there is no regulation of this huge swath of activity, regulators have little insight into what is going on in energy commodity markets. We must not only close the
Enron-loophole, but ensure vigorous enforcement of registration and reporting requirements.
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CONCLUSION
Vigorously enforced registering and reporting requirements will chase the bad actors out of the commodity markets and the margin and tax policies will direct capital out of speculation and into productive long term uses. Creating a class of idle rich speculators, who are immune to the business cycle, was a huge mistake. Allowing this huge log of money to pump up the volume, volatility and risk has cost consumers dearly.