BBV: Computerworld Weighs In

[welshTerrier2]

here's a link to the article:

http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0,10801,88178,00.html?nas=PM-88178

want to write a letter to the editor ... her email is:
[e-mail]

Computerworld has totally missed the point with their article on BBV ... while a brief mention of a verifiable paper audit trail was made, they appear to be entranced by technological gibberish ...



<snip>

Ted Selker, an associate professor at MIT's Media Lab, professes to be "as worried as the next guy about security." But he maintains that verification can be provided without paper, and he has developed what he claims is a secure voting architecture that uses multiple redundant software components.

<snip>



what good is redundancy when only one company controls the software ?? no mention was made, of course, of Diebold's relationship to the Republican party ...

the article fails to provide any reason whatsoever to oppose a voter verified paper trail ... it's virtually cost free and eliminates a substantial amount of risk and a substantial amount of mistrust ... there's no reason not to do it !!

the article did bring up an interesting point that may not get enough attention:



Selker said IT professionals need to get involved locally, but he wants to broaden the conversation to include how technology can improve other parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration.

"In 2000, between 1 and 3 million votes were lost in registration database problems," he said. "It's the top place votes get lost, and we're not focused on this."

[RedEagle]

1. Vested Interest

Please note that most scientists who proclaim a non-paper alternative, have a vested interest in that alternative.

In addition, these so called "solutions" still leave vote counting in the dark and provide no independent audit trail.

No guarantee whatsoever that there aren't two programs running- what you see and "verify" and what is used to report the "results."

It's also a very expensive game of trying to keep ahead of hackers. Who benefits from continual system updates? You got it. Money in the bag in perpetuity.

[Eric J in MN]

2. redundancy without paper can mean copying errors

What the machine records and what it displays can be different.

Even if the machine shows you on-screen what it supposedly recorded doesn't make it so.

A machine can record the wrong candidates in 3 formats if there is a bug
or fraud.

[govegan]

3. Computerworld is a total piece of garbage.

They stopped being relevant years ago, and they have always been little more than a collection of vendor press releases.

They have seldom displayed any critical analysis and in depth knowledge of computer technology.

And, no, I am not going to read the stupid article.

[lysergik]

4. While its an article that shows mainly the "other" side..

This is an important thing to keep in mind.

"there aren't very many coders who understand elections and not very many elections people who understand code."

Erik Nilsson hit the nail on the head squarely with that comment. That is so very true, elections officials make these decisions based on a 3rd parties findings and don't actually understand the internal workings of these devices yet they go around parading and building them up on a pedestal. This is a major problem that we are faced with.
"People are looking at the security of electronic voting machines from a purely technical point of view, but security is a combination of physical, legal and procedural measures," said Williams. He said a paper audit trail isn't needed and would introduce logistical problems.

That is such a false statement, people are looking at the security of these systems from all angles; internal, external and anything in-between which could invalidate the voting process and cause erroneous results. These "logistical" problems that Mr. Williams speaks of is the argument of "paper jams", which if you think about it is a pretty lousy argument with todays technology. If there is a paper jam, you put a spare printer in place, no harm, no foul.. you continue on.

Ted Selker, an associate professor at MIT's Media Lab, professes to be "as worried as the next guy about security." But he maintains that verification can be provided without paper, and he has developed what he claims is a secure voting architecture that uses multiple redundant software components. Selker said IT professionals need to get involved locally, but he wants to broaden the conversation to include how technology can improve other parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration.

"In 2000, between 1 and 3 million votes were lost in registration database problems," he said. "It's the top place votes get lost, and we're not focused on this."

And as Red Eagle said, most of the opponents of a paper trail have come up with a solution and now have a vested interest in these devices and could stand to make a good amount of money for their technology, if it really existed and could be trusted. Paper is simple and easy, there are no tricks and voters can see who/what they voted for. MIT has really dropped the ball on this issue and many of their top IT people have gone to supporting a non-paper solution.

But once again..

"there aren't very many coders who understand elections and not very many elections people who understand code."

and in the end that is the important thing to remember.

Computerworld is a technical magazine, not a political publication. They presented this issue from a techy stance and gave the other side of the story, while presenting a very small part of our side (Dill). Rebecca Mercuri was also not included in this story.

Simson Garfinkel has written a similar story and said that in fact his story could have been more complete and should have included other proponents of a VVPB. We can't expect everyone to write articles out there that only agree with one side of the story, but we can do our best to open their eyes to our side of the story and give all the information we have collected to aid them in the research and presentation of facts in their publications.