This is from my notes from when the first half of the Senate Intelligence Committee report was issued:
On July 9, 2004 the Senate Intelligence Committee released the first part of their report on pre-Iraq war intelligence. The report said most of the judgments used in the National Intelligence Estimate to justify the Iraq war were either overstated or not supported by the raw intelligence reporting. Prewar intelligence regarding Iraq's threat to the United States was neither reliable nor accurate.
The second part of the Intelligence Committee’s report was supposed to deal with how this bad intelligence was used and manipulated to sell the war. The Republican controlled Senate Intelligence Committee decided to hold the second part of the report until after the November elections.
I recorded the Democratic members' press conference July 9, 2004 on C-Span and transcribed what they said (its on VHS tape and I don't know any other way to share it online):
Senator Jay Rockefeller: I have one comment I need to make, and that is that if we're serious about doing intelligence reforms, why do we have to be somehow limited by the fact that the leadership in the Senate and the House are saying that we're out of here after 20 legislative days? We could work through August. We can work through September. We can come back after the election. We routinely did that in previous years, often working up until December 22nd.
This is the most dangerous moment in American history, the most devastating event in American history was 9/11. And the thought that somehow we can't get this done before the end of the year simply escapes me as an adequate rationale to honor the families of those who died and to protect the families and people who are still living, but may be in a lot more danger.
Senator Ron Wyden: I think it is absolutely imperative that the second part of our report come out before the elections. The American people have a right to know how that faulty intelligence was used. The reason why is because bad intelligence and bad policy are not mutually exclusive. You can have both. I happen to think that’s what you had here. You had faulty intelligence that was then independently compounded by an administration looking for every conceivable rationale for going to war.
So, a lot of people in Washington are betting that part two of this report won’t come out before the election. I just hope that the Congress insist that it does, that all of you and others are aware that the heavy lifting for the Committee is still ahead and we have got to get that second part that deals with how intelligence was used out.
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It was really a question of basic math. We didn’t have the votes (laugh from Sen. Feinstein) in order to have them both come out together. I think it would have been in the public interest to have it come out together. It was just that simple.
I’ll also say though, that between now and November there is ample time to get this out. There is ample time to make sure that the two are linked.
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I do think that it is so important to the country - this question of how intelligence was used - that we’ve got to find a way to get this out. I think if people understand - first that its doable and how important it is - we’ll get it out before November.
Senator Diane Feinstein: I agree with Senator Wyden.
I think the great bulk of the work has been done. I think probably 80% or more there. The rest is just taking these findings and relating them to how they were used by the administration. That’s pretty easy to do because you have the statements made publicly and those statements had to be based on intelligence. The only, I think, question mark in all of this is are there things the administration saw that we didn’t see? I mean, we know the president receives a daily brief that we don’t see. Otherwise, if there are any other items that they have received that we don’t have, that will have to be brought out in this study.
Senator Durbin wrote this in the July 9, 2004 Washington Post:
The Senate intelligence committee report scheduled to be released today reveals in stark terms that in many key areas, the prewar intelligence regarding Iraq's threat to the United States was neither reliable nor accurate. And the report tells only half of the story.
What's missing is the ways intelligence was used, misused, misinterpreted or ignored by administration policymakers in deciding to go to war and in making the case to the American people that war with Iraq was necessary. The intelligence committee leadership chose to defer these issues to a second report -- one that will not be released until after the November elections.
While failures by the CIA and other intelligence agencies are a significant part of the problem identified in this inquiry, the responsibility -- and the blame -- for the prewar intelligence debacle is much broader than described in today's report.
Link:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37952-20... 
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