There's a well-sourced chronology of intelligence fiddling at
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=24889 with links to stories like this one in The New Yorker:
THE STOVEPIPE
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How conflicts between the Bush Administration and the intelligence community marred the reporting on Iraq’s weapons.
Issue of 2003-10-27
Posted 2003-10-20
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?031027fa_fact
How did the American intelligence community get it so wrong?
Part of the answer lies in decisions made early in the Bush Administration, before the events of September 11, 2001. In interviews with present and former intelligence officials, I was told that some senior Administration people, soon after coming to power, had bypassed the government’s customary procedures for vetting intelligence.
A retired C.I.A. officer described for me some of the questions that would normally arise in vetting: “Does dramatic information turned up by an overseas spy square with his access, or does it exceed his plausible reach? How does the agent behave? Is he on time for meetings?” The vetting process is especially important when one is dealing with foreign-agent reports—sensitive intelligence that can trigger profound policy decisions. In theory, no request for action should be taken directly to higher authorities—a process known as “stovepiping”—without the information on which it is based having been subjected to rigorous scrutiny.
The point is not that the President and his senior aides were consciously lying. What was taking place was much more systematic—and potentially just as troublesome. Kenneth Pollack, a former National Security Council expert on Iraq, whose book “The Threatening Storm” generally supported the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein, told me that what the Bush people did was “dismantle the existing filtering process that for fifty years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information. They created stovepipes to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership. Their position is that the professional bureaucracy is deliberately and maliciously keeping information from them.
Despite the interpretation in that last paragraph, I see no reason why the question of whether the "stovepiping" was consciously encouraged is illegitimate.
There's ample evidence at the americanprogress chronology to support the picture of WH wilfully ignoring intelligence warnings, pushing the stories they wanted pushed and blanking out contrary advice.
It seems one major point of difference between the CIA and the Administration's own intelligence network was to do with Chalabi and the INC. According to the very in-depth story at
http://www.alternet.org/mediaculture/19210 (
Ahmed Chalabi's List of Suckers By Douglas McCollam, Columbia Journalism Review. Posted July 12, 2004) "Chalabi seemed to have an "endless stable' of defectors to talk with reporters [Chris Hedges of The New York Times says] "He had defectors for any story you wanted". The CIA was suspicious of anything connected with Chalabi, possibly regarding him as an Iranian spy.
For more links on Chalabi defector trial baloons, try searching google on
chalabi khodadaOne other story I noticed recently is:
Missing in Action: Truth
By Nicholas D. Kristof
New York Times
May 6, 2003
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/unmovic/2003/0506missing.htm
I rejoice in the newfound freedoms in Iraq. But there are indications that the U.S. government souped up intelligence, leaned on spooks to change their conclusions and concealed contrary information to deceive people at home and around the world. Let's fervently hope that tomorrow we find an Iraqi superdome filled with 500 tons of mustard gas and nerve gas, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 29,984 prohibited munitions capable of delivering chemical agents, several dozen Scud missiles, gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, 18 mobile biological warfare factories, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles to dispense anthrax, and proof of close ties with Al Qaeda. Those are the things that President Bush or his aides suggested Iraq might have, and I don't want to believe that top administration officials tried to win support for the war with a campaign of wholesale deceit.
Consider the now-disproved claims by President Bush and Colin Powell that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger so it could build nuclear weapons. As Seymour Hersh noted in The New Yorker, the claims were based on documents that had been forged so amateurishly that they should never have been taken seriously. I'm told by a person involved in the Niger caper that more than a year ago the vice president's office asked for an investigation of the uranium deal, so a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy reported to the C.I.A. and State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged.
The envoy reported, for example, that a Niger minister whose signature was on one of the documents had in fact been out of office for more than a decade. In addition, the Niger mining program was structured so that the uranium diversion had been impossible. The envoy's debunking of the forgery was passed around the administration and seemed to be accepted — except that President Bush and the State Department kept citing it anyway. "It's disingenuous for the State Department people to say they were bamboozled because they knew about this for a year," one insider said.
Another example is the abuse of intelligence from Hussein Kamel, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and head of Iraq's biological weapons program until his defection in 1995. Top British and American officials kept citing information from Mr. Kamel as evidence of a huge secret Iraqi program, even though Mr. Kamel had actually emphasized that Iraq had mostly given up its W.M.D. program in the early 1990's. Glen Rangwala, a British Iraq expert, says the transcript of Mr. Kamel's debriefing was leaked because insiders resented the way politicians were misleading the public. Patrick Lang, a former head of Middle Eastern affairs in the Defense Intelligence Agency, says that he hears from those still in the intelligence world that when experts wrote reports that were skeptical about Iraq's W.M.D., "they were encouraged to think it over again."
(If you're interested in Kamel, make sure you see
http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/kamel.html , on Glen Rangwala's site, which has the full text of Kamel's interview online, and many quotes from Bush/Blair which show how badly they misused his information in public statements.
Also, Rangwala's Iraq page has lots of WMD facts at:
http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html , "Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons". )
(Edit: tidying up and url checking..)