We know Iraq is a mess--here are some thoughts on what to do about it.

[G_j]

Four-Point Turn

by Gareth Evans and Robert Malley

Enough with the hand-wringing talk about quagmires. We know Iraq is a mess--here are some thoughts on what to do about it.

http://tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/10337

Gareth Evans is president and Robert Malley is Middle East program director of the International Crisis Group. ICG's Iraq proposals are at www.crisisweb.org


Editor's Note: With the abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S. and UK forces capturing the headlines, it’s important that progressives focus on transition plans that serve Iraqis' best interests. The International Crisis Group lays out four critical steps that go beyond both the Bush and the Brahimi plans—assuming the United States is going to stay.

--

The June 30 deadline for the transfer of power in Iraq is unrealistic, unworkable—and virtually unavoidable. Scrapping the deadline, as some have suggested, is not the answer. What is needed is to redefine what the deadline represents. One would hope that members of the United Nations Security Council had this in mind yesterday when Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN special adviser, outlined his plans for Iraq.

For a start, it would be best to give up the fiction that the June 30 deadline has anything to do with "transferring sovereignty." As a legal matter, sovereignty is already vested in the Iraqi state and "embodied" in its interim institutions. But as a practical matter, the sovereign power exercised by the new Iraqi government will be incomplete, and to pretend otherwise could do lasting damage to the very notion of sovereignty in Iraqi eyes. That does not mean the June 30 deadline should be ignored. By now, too many Iraqis have come to expect it, and too much U.S. credibility is invested in it; even Iraqis originally skeptical of the timetable would be quick to denounce its overturn.

Instead, the deadline should be seen as a meaningful opportunity to narrow the growing gap between the occupation's governing institutions and the Iraqi people. Four interrelated steps, based on—but going beyond—Mr. Brahimi's ideas are required.

First, political responsibility for the transition should be handed to the United Nations, acting through an appropriately empowered special representative. Before June 30, the UN would be charged with appointing a provisional government. After that date, it would exercise certain residual powers to supervise the political process, break any deadlock between Iraqi institutions and act as a check on Iraqi executive decisions that may exceed its limited mandate. The powers of the special representative would be strictly those needed to maximize stability and ensure national elections in January 2005.

..more..

[Wright Patman]

1. Why should the UN

do anything unless the U.S. gives up control of Iraqi resources?

Without that, "sovereignty" is always going to be a joke and that's why the insurgents won't stop fighting. That oil is worth $4 trillion by conservative estimates.

[G_j]

2. that is what Kucinich wants

and I agree

[Karenina]

4. Hmmm...

Is that the day the U.S. wants the SoFA signed???? :shrug:

[IrateCitizen]

6. Great observation, Karenina!

The US is hoping to get it's SoFA signed by Iraqi "authorities" prior to the 6/30 "handover" of "sovereignty". Thus far, there has been a good bit of resistance to this that has prohibited it from happening.

We can only hope that this agreement does not happen, and that the US is effectively forced out militarily on 6/30.

[Martin Eden]

3. The dicey part

This paragraph attempts to reconcile the balance of power between Iraqi sovereignty and U.S. military might:

Finally, security arrangements should be redefined by a Security Council resolution that re-authorizes the U.S.-led multinational force from June 30 until an elected government takes office and decides its future. But recent violence in Falluja and elsewhere demands one big change. In future, the force should require the approval of the Iraqi provisional government for major offensive operations. Of course, operational matters involving force protection and responses dictated by immediate events must continue to be a matter for the military command alone. But where strategic choices are involved and the multinational force is acting after deliberation, it is both possible and necessary to coordinate with the Iraqi government if the deadline is to involve any meaningful power shift.

"In future, the force should require the approval of the Iraqi provisional government for major offensive operations."

I'm trying to envision U.S. military strategic choices being contingent on Iraqi approval, and I just don't see Bush agreeing to such an arrangement. It doesn't equate to an Iraqi government being in control of our forces, but I sincerely doubt the Bush administration would agree to any such constraints on the use of its power. It would be too much like granting actual sovereignty.

[T_i_B]

5. Great article!

Here's some more quality stuff from the Guardian on the subject

http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,1093074,00.html

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1093236,00.html