http://www.observer.com/20061218/20061218_Joe_Conason_opinions_conason.aspA Real Exit Strategy: Talk to the Enemy
By Joe Conason
Before the publication of the Iraq Study Group report, predictions abounded that the committee, chaired by James Baker III and Lee Hamilton, would offer little new and nothing radical. Bipartisan mush in soft covers seemed the most likely product of any Washington group whose first imperative was unanimity.
Yet the former Secretary of State, the retired Indiana Congressman and their establishment colleagues exceeded those cynical expectations in several important ways. Bland as their language is, they certainly assessed the overall failure of the Bush administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East, from the President’s abandonment of the Arab-Israeli peace process to his distraction from securing and rebuilding Afghanistan. They criticized his aversion to diplomacy. And they urged him, in the strongest terms, to adopt a new policy of engagement with adversaries in Syria and Iran.
That emphasis on diplomacy became the focus of media coverage—along with the report’s rejection of both immediate redeployment of American troops and indefinite commitment to their presence in Iraq. Much discussion ensued about whether the report did or did not contemplate a timetable for withdrawing U.S. forces and how those forces can bolster the shaky government in Baghdad.
What deserved far greater attention, however, was the most important of the Baker-Hamilton committee’s conclusions: namely, that there is no military solution to the American dilemma in Iraq, and that the only way out is negotiation. In the study group’s report, most references to this reality appear under the euphemistic category known as “national reconciliation.” The section of recommendations for security and military forces, for example, begins with a clear admonition: “There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq.” Which is obvious enough, except to a few politicians and commentators urging an impossible escalation of tens of thousands of additional troops. Then the same section goes on to urge the Iraqi government—as the report repeatedly does throughout its 100 pages—to “accelerate the urgently needed national reconciliation program to which it has already committed.” In other words, any changes in military policy are ancillary to negotiations among the warring factions (and their foreign sponsors). Actually, the report is quite explicit in demanding that the authorities in Baghdad and Washington sit down with their armed opponents to talk about every relevant issue—including the date for the withdrawal of American troops.
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