The Growing Hubris Over Missile Defense Capabilities (CDI)

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Summary analysis by Victoria Sampson, Center for Defense Information, Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, U.S. Army, Ret.

A small amount of confidence and self-promotion in Washington is often a good thing, but too much can be deadly. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, charged with developing a multi-layered system that could defend the United States, its allies, and troops abroad from missile attack, has gone too far.

U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of MDA, said at a conference in late March, "We could certainly shoot down an incoming missile if we needed to."

He was referring to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system, which is supposed to protect the continental United States against an ICBM attack. With 11 interceptors fielded so far in Alaska and California, supporters have cited an emergency missile defense capability.

This bravado is perplexing; during flight testing, the GMD system intercepted the target in only five out of 10 attempts -- and this was under highly scripted circumstances that do not reflect a realistic attack. Plus, there hasn't been a successful flight test with an intercept, even of an artificial target, since October 2002.

Obering's statement raises obvious questions: if the MDA system is capable of engaging an incoming hostile missile, why hasn't that that been demonstrated by a realistic test already? Shouldn't the interceptors function properly during flight tests that cost $100 million each? And finally: on what is Obering basing his confidence in the system?

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Missile defense has a spotty test track record to draw upon; poor developmental practices; weak designs for key components; a lack of security; and the likelihood that the system will not mesh together as planned.

About the only thing it does have is an appalling amount of faith in itself. Is this enough to warrant continuing the premature deployment of an insufficiently developed and tested GMD system to counter an unlikely threat when programs that deserve a higher priority are undefended?

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