http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20040530/pl_nm/iraq_rumsfeld_pentagon_dc&cid=615&ncid=1480<snip>
Even before the Iraq war some senior officers chafed under the guidance of Rumsfeld and his team, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone.
Retired officers and defense analysts said the problems have worsened during a war in which critics accuse Rumsfeld's team of neglecting to provide enough troops to stabilize Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein (news - web sites), botching the planning for the postwar period, and failing to anticipate and later comprehend an insurgency that threatens the mission with failure.
"The war itself has led to, rightly or wrongly, the feeling among many in the military that they're not receiving competent direction, that it is too ideological, and that a lot of their military efforts have been wasted by what they regard as poor, inept planning for the stability phase," said Anthony Cordesman, a former Pentagon official now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The military, particularly the Army, has been strained mightily in maintaining troop levels in Iraq far higher than the Pentagon had forecast. Faced with a relentless insurgency, the Pentagon ordered 20,000 troops to remain three months longer than promised, and scrambled to find ways to maintain the current count of 138,000 troops there through the end of 2005.