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Wired MagazineAlmost three weeks after federal orders to find less toxic chemicals to break up oil in the Gulf of Mexico, no progress has been made. The same dispersant chemicals are still being used. British Petroleum barely tried to test an alternative, and the EPA’s own testing results on the toxicity and effectiveness of alternatives are slow in coming. Experts say the tests will only provide a bare minimum of data, far less than they’d like for managing the unprecedented use of dispersants. Nothing is clear, except that too little is known. ...
Many questions surround dispersant use. They’re toxins on their own, their effects on sea life are largely unquantified, and whether they’d work in the gulf as elsewhere is unknown. Nor had dispersants been previously deployed in the volumes needed in the gulf. Their injection directly into the wellhead, a mile beneath the sea, is also unprecedented. Depth and pressure and temperature might alter the interaction of dispersant and oil in unanticipated ways. None of these questions could be answered. The specific choice of dispersant, however, seemed a more tractable matter, and generated controversy from the start. BP chose two formulations of Corexit, one used during the Exxon Valdez oil spill and another developed in its aftermath. According to EPA data on other dispersants approved for emergency use, 12 were better than Corexit at breaking down gulf oil, at least in laboratory tests. BP argued that Corexit was far better studied than the alternatives, which is true — but the role of former BP executive Rodney Chase as a director of Nalco, Corexit’s manufacturer, raised suspicions.
With public concern growing and the amount of Corexit used approaching one million gallons — it now stands at 1.21 million gallons — the EPA changed course May 20. Agency officials said no damage had been seen, but the massive quantities and many uncertainties justified finding an alternative. They gave BP 72 hours to find a less-toxic, equally effective alternative to Corexit. Three days later, BP reported that no suitable alternatives existed. EPA chief Lisa Jackson called their response “insufficient,” and accused the company of being “more focused on defending your initial decisions than on analyzing possible better options.” She also announced that the EPA would assess dispersants on its own, and subsequently ordered BP to cease surface dispersant use and cut subsurface use dramatically.
“We said, we are going to do our own science, and also directed BP to conduct more in-depth science of their own. That’s where we are at this point,” said EPA deputy press secretary Brendan Gilfillan. With Coast Guard help, BP conducted tests of some alternative dispersants — including Dispersit, which ultimately didn’t meet the EPA’s toxicity requirements — early in May, but the results were neither released nor shared with the EPA. Joannie Docter, president of Globemark Resources, the manufacturer of JD 2000 — one of five dispersants that met the EPA’s toxicity standard — said she was told by BP on May 18 that only Corexit would be used in the gulf. At the time, BP hadn’t even tested JD 2000, which happened only after the EPA’s request. BP’s rejection letter “says there’s not enough information,” said Sinclair. “They did the testing after the fact.”
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http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/06/dispersant-confusion/