From the North American Congress of Latin America (NACLA)
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STORM OVER COLOMBIA
In July 1997, the paramilitary group known as the United Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC) went on a grisly killing spree in Mapiripán, a small coca-growing town in southeastern Colombia. According to eyewitness accounts, the paramilitaries hacked their victims to death with machetes, decapitated many with chainsaws and dumped the bodies—some still alive—into the Guaviare River. At least 30 people were killed, though the true number of dead may never be known. Carlos Castaño, the self-anointed leader of the AUC, immediately and unabashedly took credit for the massacre.
But Castaño did not act alone. Human rights observers immediately noted the complicity of the Colombian armed forces in the Mapiripán massacre. The paramilitaries used an army-guarded air strip to land from their stronghold in northern Colombia and from which to launch their attack. Nor did the authorities respond to repeated calls by a local judge to stop the attack, which lasted six consecutive days.
Evidence later emerged suggesting that the role of the Colombian military in the massacre was in fact much deeper, and in March 1999 Colombian prosecutors indicted Colonel Lino Sánchez, operations chief of the Colombian Army's 12th Brigade, for planning, with Castaño, the Mapiripán massacre. This is not surprising, given that the links between paramilitaries and the Colombian army have been well established. According to a February Human Rights Watch report, half of the Colombian Army's 18 brigades have undeniable links to paramilitary groups.
In recent weeks, evidence has emerged suggesting that weeks, if not days, before the Mapiripán massacre, Colonel Sánchez received "special training" by U.S. Army Green Berets on Barrancón Island, on the Guaviare River. While it cannot be said that U.S. forces were directly involved in the massacre, or even knew that it was being planned, the events offer compelling evidence that U.S. equipment, training and money can be easily turned to vile purposes in what Human Rights Watch has called a "war without quarter."
http://www.nacla.org/art_display.php?art=296
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U.S. Military Aid and Oil Interests in Colombia
...The real costs of pipeline protection
According to a report from Witness for Peace, the potential outcomes of the Bush administration’s proposal to spend $98 million on protecting the pipeline are alarming:
1. The $98 million aid allocation represents the first step down a slippery slope toward major U.S. military investment in infrastructure protection in Colombia.
U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson said the Caño-Limón pipeline is just one of more than 300 Colombian infrastructure points of strategic interest for the United States. How many of these will Congress and U.S. taxpayers be asked to protect?
2. Fully protecting even just the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline is an impossible task.
The Colombian Brigadier General in charge of protecting this pipeline said he would need a soldier for every three feet of pipeline to provide adequate protection. To prevent bombings would require a massive increase in funding beyond anything being discussed in Congress.
3. Funding a military with a history of gross human rights violations may implicate the United States in further abuses against civilians and could discourage much needed professionalism.
Units and aircraft charged with protecting Caño-Limón operations participated in a massacre of eighteen innocent civilians and have yet to be held accountable. Witness for Peace documents several allegations of ties between the 18th Brigade, the police, and the right-wing paramilitaries (AUC) in Arauca—in line with the trend of paramilitary-military ties described by the U.S. State Department in their annual Report on Human Rights Practices.
http://www.afsc.org/latinamerica/peace/military-aid-oil.htm