seems the day of reckoning has been postponed (perhaps by the "conundrum" in interest rates). I don't believe for one minute that the threat has been alleviated in any way.
Heh, wonder if Greenspin is eating his words on what a wonderful tool they are for providing additional liquidity to the markets yet? That additional liquidity seems to biting him in the ass these days. :evilgrin:
Couple of old interesting articles I came across while looking for the one that made that prediction for 2004.
http://www.prudentbear.com/archive_comm_article.asp?category=Guest%2BCommentary&content_idx=25048A "Behind the Curtain" Look at Fed Desperation and Intervention Wizardry
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Greenspan cannot control where all the Fed's stimulus will go or whether it will be productively put to use. America's manufacturing base has dropped from 30% down to less than 15% of the work force since 1970, and real productivity growth has slowed from an average 2.5% a year from 1947 to 1973 to somewhere closer to 1% a year since then. Manufacturing and productivity growth provide a vital bedrock for the creation of jobs and for the service economy. America has changed enormously in terms of such factors as demographics (immigration since the 1960's has been massively tilted towards less skilled Third World peoples, and California is now majority Mexican in origin), its level of savings (now nearly zero), trade policy (running historically high trade deficits), size of government (growing at about two to three times the rate of the overall economy with 60 percent devoted to entitlements), and energy self-sufficiency (declining). When Americans get extra spending power, they frequently buy goods made overseas rather than "buy American" and reinvest in American industry. They keep going further out on personal and corporate debt, yet no country has ever been able to perpetually borrow its way to prosperity. Too many corporate leaders unwisely use the time that "stimulus" buys them to subsidize malinvestment and overcapacity (currently 25%) or to carve out more perks for themselves rather than pursue the disciplined and prudent investment policies required for sustainable growth. Last but no least, Greenspan's liquidity pump has major hose leaks even on the asset level. James Puplava notes the beginning of a trend similar to the 1970's, where investors started losing confidence in "paper" (to include credit-related financial instruments) and started shifting their investment focus towards "things" (commodities). (5)
Regardless of intermarket spillovers and malinvestment issues, keeping the real estate and stock market asset bubbles inflated remains a top priority for Greenspan. His lowered interest rates help to reduce market rates of return on capital and support financial models with higher valuation multiples for the stock market. The S&P 500 is trading at about 32 times trailing one year Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) earnings, and is still more overvalued than where most bear markets in American history have begun. Housing prices are straining historical relationships to income levels and rent rolls. American banks tend to be highly leveraged, and they desperately need for real estate and the stock market prices to stay propped up. Americans have more of their wealth in their homes than in the market, and rising housing prices have somewhat offset bear market losses over the last few years. Since consumer spending constitutes about 75% of gross domestic product, the Fed is worried that a sharp drop in both home values and stock market prices could trigger a "negative wealth effect," scaring people into spending less. This could slow down the economy. This in turn could create a vicious circle involving more layoffs, more bankruptcies, and more foreclosures. This could cause more asset prices to come down, resulting in even more fear and even less spending, leading to a steady downward spiral effect. (6)
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Bears worry that if Fed intervention and national media spin doctoring were to stop tomorrow, and if free markets and normal intermarket relationships were allowed to work themselves out, 30 year bonds would sink, interest rates would rise back up towards high single digit or double digit levels, gold would rise to over $600 an ounce, the S&P would drop by over 50%, housing prices nationwide would crack by at least 20%, and the dollar would slide another 20-30%. (8)
It is possible that deep down inside, Greenspan agrees with the Bear viewpoint, but is concerned that if any market corrects too quickly, it could precipitate a crash, spook the other markets, and shock the economy into a downward spiral? Greenspan, and the Wall Street firms and banks that are closely intertwined with the Fed, would all prefer a "soft landing." An example of a "soft landing" market is one that declines at a steady angle, zigzagging between parallel top and bottom channel lines on technical charts. This is the kind of bear market the S&P has in fact been through in the last three years with the help of interventions. A soft landing market allows major banks and Wall Street insiders time to adjust their most vulnerable positions, tweak some profits out of up and down market swings, and
pawn their riskiest "matured" positions off on Mr. and Mrs. John Q. Misinformed Public. (9)
THERE MAY BE AN EVEN DARKER SIDE TO THE DARK SIDE
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A major rogue wave detonator that could bring the markets quickly crashing down involve unregulated derivatives. Derivatives now total an estimated $127 trillion, or roughly 13 times the size of the U.S. economy. A large portion of derivatives are unregulated and unlisted, and they are typically created and valued by computer models. Derivatives are essentially time sensitive "bets" designed to leverage reward and shift risk. Their creators assume "normal" market behavior in which people and institutions act rationally without excessive fear or greed and have the financial strength to settle their contracts under all conditions. Major banks and Wall Street firms promote derivatives because under normal conditions they are extremely profitable. America's largest banks, which hold perhaps a third of all derivatives, can use unregulated credit derivatives to get around conventional reserve and margin requirements to support ever expanding lending activities. Hence, the "derivatives" lobby has enormous power on Capitol Hill. (11)
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To get a truer understanding of Greenspan's predicament, one must first appreciate his contradictions. Here is a man who frequently uses the term "soft landing" in his Congressional testimonies, yet he has lobbied to keep the derivatives market unregulated and beyond the scrutiny of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In doing this, he has defended a financial system with escalating levels of risk that encourage the opposite of soft landings. Greenspan once wrote a pro-gold and pro-hard money paper in 1966 titled "Gold and Economic Freedom" while a member of Ayn Rand's libertarian, pro-laissez-faire inner circle, yet he has helped to suppress gold in favor of pumping out more fiat money currency and has frequently used heavy-handed central bank interventionist policies while Fed Chairman. He publicly decried "irrational exuberance" in market valuations in late 1996, yet he refused to raise margin rates to constrain speculators and has presided over one of the largest credit and monetary expansions and speculative stock market bubbles in history. (13)
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A review of derivates casualties in the last decade may give us a better feeling for the growing level of risk permeating the financial system, and the credibility of financial industry leaders who reassure us that they have everything under control. (The loss numbers that follow are typically rough estimates). In 1993, mismanaged derivatives caused Wisconsin's State Investment Board to lose $95 million. They lost for Japanese company Showa Shell Sekiyu over $1 billion and cost German company Metallgesellschaft $1.3 billion. In 1994, suddenly rising bond interest rates lost $1.6 billion for the leveraged bond positions managed by Orange County Treasurer Robert L Citron and put Orange County, California into bankruptcy. 1994 was also a bad year for Proctor and Gamble ($157 million derivatives loss) and Air Products and Chemicals ($122 million loss) which also made leveraged bets on interest rates. The following hedge funds took hits (estimated losses in parentheses): Askin Capital Management ($420 million), Argonaut Capital Management ($110 million), and Vairocano Limited ( lost $700 million or 60% in six months, blowing a good six year track record). In 1994 PaineWebber spent $268 million to bail out a money market fund marketed as a safe and secure investment, and Bank of America and Piper Jaffray (now owned by US Bancorp) took similar actions. In 1995, a 28 year old trader named Nick Leeson lost $1.3 billion, wiping out Barings Bank, a 233 year old British institution. In 1995, Fenchurch Capital Management lost $1.3 billion or 50% in three months, blowing a six year 21% a year track record. In 1996, the trading losses hidden by Joseph Jett at Kidder Peabody were enough to cause GE to sell his company to PaineWebber. Kidder Peabody sued Jett for nearly $100 million in damages. Following the Asian and Russian debt crises of 1997 and 1998, the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management blew up ($3.6 billion bailout required) when normal intermarket relationships went haywire; at one point the fund had $3 billion in equity leveraged to $140 billion in debt and $1.25 trillion in derivatives, totally beyond what it disclosed to its capital sources. Three Nobel laureates were on its staff. It required a Fed-orchestrated bailout by 14 banks and Wall Street firms to avoid a financial system melt down. Continuing with the casualty list: Michael Smirlock's leveraged Shetland fund ($300 million loss) in 1998; got sued for hiding $71 million in losses by the SEC. Michael Berger's leveraged Manhattan Investments lost over $400 million in 1999. During a 13% dip in the Dow in 1997, Everest Capital lost $1.3 billion or 50% of its funds. Everest burned the Brown, Yale, and Emory university endowments. In the 1997-2000 period the casualty list included some top hedge fund celebrities: Victor Niederhoffer completely blew up his $130 million fund in three trading days in Oct 1997, Julian Robertson's Tiger Management suffered a combination of losses and withdrawals that dropped his fund from $22 billion to $6 billion by 2000; Robertson had made a 32% average annual return for 18 years, then suddenly dropped 43% in less than six months and decided to retire. Soros Fund Management suffered perhaps a $3 to $5 billion loss by May 2000 blamed in part on unusual Nasdaq volatility. In 2001 Enron, which had morphed from an energy company into a derivatives trading firm and de facto hedge fund, imploded and wiped out $70 billion in shareholder equity and tens of billions in debt. In Jan 2003, a Japanese hedge fund called Eifuku Master Fund, which was up 70% in 2002, lost over 98% of its $200 million capital in only seven trading days. (15)
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Dragon at the Back Door
by Jim Willie CB
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/willie/093003.htmlsnip>
Phase #1 of the currency market correction process was totally ineffective. The last 18 months accomplished absolutely nothing in the way of remedy. No trade imbalance of substance exists between the USA and the European Union, yet this initial completed phase was marked by a 30% appreciation in the Euro versus the USDollar. The USA endures a truly monstrous trade gap with Asia, yet adjustments to all Asian currencies have been resisted. In fact, the word “monstrous” could be substituted with "colossal", "significant" or "spectacular" and in reality serve to minimize the situation. No effect whatsoever was realized on reducing the size of the US trade gap with Asia.
Phase #2 is when the real damage is done, when severely harmful effects are felt inside the US Economy, when the press & media are awakened from slumber, when the public outcry for government action is called for, when job loss accelerates, and when dim-witted (but politically favorable) official financial and executive decisions are made. In this more dangerous phase, watch for the USDollar and USTBonds to decline together, unlike in the initial phase. The dragon is at the back door, but few have noticed.
The primary characteristics of the damaging phase #2 will be many:
A) IMPORTED ASIAN PRODUCT PRICE INFLATION EFFECT
B) RISKS DUE TO ASIAN DEPENDENCE UPON CAPITAL AND MFG
C) ASIAN CENTRAL BANK RESERVE HEDGING RESPONSE
D) LAGGED FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY EFFECT ON PRICE LEVELS
E) INCIPIENT TWO-SIDED PRICE INFLATION THREAT TO USTBONDS
F) LIKELY ERRORS WITHIN FED RESPONSE, DESPERATION SETS IN
G) MULTIPLICITY OF POSITIVE EFFECTS ON GOLD
My constant refrain has been and continues to be: the level of economic understanding, policy and counsel is so abysmal that a galloping recession (or worse) is the most probable scenario, accompanied by price inflation in certain sectors. This country does not admit its errors. It does not detect nor correct its errors. Instead, it compounds its errors by more serious errors. We have no understanding of money or inflation or currency. We regard money much the same as water in pipes to irrigate a field, rather than the output of a day’s work. Hence, our fields are flooded and we urge more water to be delivered. The costs and consequences of many years of ineptitude, speculation, fraud, and political sellouts are soon to demand correction by the powerful free markets, which are more powerful than any set of governments. Reconciliation is overdue.
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In a most amazing field trip in mid-September, Treasury Secy Snow traveled to China for the expressed purpose of requesting that Chinese leaders raise the prices on their entire portfolio of exported products to the Untied States. Inept economists and workers alike harbor some deranged notion that a higher Yuan exchange rate will both reduce our bilateral trade gap and restore jobs. No such thing will occur. Instead, the trade gap will increase, even as imported products rise in price, signaling the arrival on price inflation.
Over two decades of monetary inflation has been exported to Asia, which has paid for our federal deficits and trade gaps. The end result is that they now own significant portions of our entire debt structure. More importantly though, with the end of the USTBond bubble and the end of the Asian Central Bank defense of the highly overvalued USDollar, we have entered phase #2. We next import inflation. The rise of Asian imported product prices marks the beginning of the reversal of that monetary inflation export.
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The financial zone is now subject to lost monetary control by the Federal Reserve, fully indicated, and very predictable, with encouraged speculation, and desperate unremitting money pumping. In time even his supporters will object to his policies. This Greenspasm knows only one response tactic, to print more money. He will respond to any USTBond threat by monetizing more purchases of the same, even as foreigners and Americans are selling. He will attempt to offset their large-scale selling.
In time, I expect an all-out panic by Greenspasm and the entire Federal Reserve institution. Their power has been eroded. Their policies are fast becoming ineffective. In the future, I expect them to be widely regarded as toothless and powerless to stop the crisis. Everything they do now contributes to conditions which are due to develop into crisis, to intensify the pressure gradients, and to fan the flames of fires which will engulf the USDollar.
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