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And his latest barb at bush probably won't help much.
To read a pretty non-biased paper on what the hell I am yapping about:
www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/watsonpaper.pdf
China in Latin America: Reasons for greater Chinese interest
Beijing has shown an increase in interest in Latin America although it remains a region of lesser interest to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) than East Asia, Europe, North America, Central Asia, or Africa. Latin America provides some 4% of China’s imports while it receives 3% of Chinese exports.3 Chinese involvement in Latin America is not, however, new; it began in the 1960s when Cuba recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China instead of Taiwan. After that ideological connection, nevertheless, Latin America-PRC ties began with Chile’s 1970 and Mexico’s 1971 shifts in recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Over the next fifteen years, the other major states4 gradually moved from Taiwan to the PRC side regardless of the type of regime in power in Latin America. The question of regime type is noteworthy for what it did not signal: Latin American states, ranging from Argentina’s guerra sucia governments to Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile did not let Beijing’s communist ideology preclude diplomatic and later financial ties. This reflects the pragmatic nature of the relationship over a relatively long period of time.
China’s most important strategic interest is and will remain the United States. Beijing will not cross a line threatening that connection for fear it would jeopardize the economic growth required to sustain the Chinese Communist Party’s political monopoly.
From Beijing’s side, however, the ties appear considerably more dangerous. The current CCP leadership’s objective is to avoid harming its intricate relationship with the United States, which helps sustain China’s phenomenal economic growth. Moving overtly and obviously into Washington’s traditional sphere of influence would risk the relationship with the United States. Venezuela does offer some petroleum options to China, particularly the orimulsion projects.
Nevertheless, Venezuela’s petroleum is not the type that the PRC can easily refine, limiting its use to China and restraining Venezuela to meeting a mere 1.1% of the Chinese petroleum needs.7 Caracas has sought to buy arms from China but few actual transfers have occurred. Chinese-Venezuelan ties are more noise than actions at this point. And most of the noise originates from President Chávez Frías’ desire to alienate Washington, rather than from Chinese aspirations to consolidate power in the region.
(basically, I think his bush is devil only will make matters worse for his country as the US will now have another reason to hint to the chinese not to do more business with him. It just seemed undiplomatic.)
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