Reply #3: The report mentioned something like Voter's Choice, but see this: [View All]

[Bill Bored]

Kip, I'm not sure how Voter's Choice (e-voting option) prevents the selling of votes but we can discuss this.

I think the PIN numbers should be supplied by the BoEs to ensure that there will be no dupes. I'm sorry this was never fully discussed on DU, but perhaps it's too complicated. That said, see what you think of these ideas:

I can envision a scheme using something akin to public/private key encryption to allow voters to verify their own individual votes without revealing them to anyone else. The latter would encourage vote selling.

Picture this:

Two databases, one public and one private.

The public one would be available to everyone via the Internet, kiosk, printout somewhere such as a newspaper, etc. as you say. It would contain all the votes with no voter IDs except for the PIN number for each ballot which is issued to the voter and printed on the ballot at the time the ballot is cast.

Each voter could then verify her vote in the public database, but there would be no way for her to prove that it's hers since she can't prove that the PIN number actually belongs to her. So, no vote selling is possible.

The private database contains the same information as the public database PLUS the voter's actual name, address, or other form of voter ID. This private database is ONLY accessible via a BoE intranet and only if a voter challenges the recording of her vote as shown in the public database. In that case, the ballot can no longer be secret, but otherwise it shall be secret.

If the voter believes that her vote was recorded incorrectly in the public database, she has the option of going to the BoE, presenting her voter ID, and looking up her ballot in the private database, which would contain her name, her PIN number and her ballot as cast. I like your idea of the checksum on the jpg and all that.

If any discrepancy is found by the voter, the voter can prove to the BoE that the vote was recorded incorrectly in the public database by showing them the record in the private database with her name and the same PIN number associated with it, and of course, her actual voter ID to prove who she is. But again, she can only show ALL this information to the BoE since no one else has access to the private database. Therefore, no one else is able to know for whom the voter voted (to prevent vote selling).

Now let's say the voter says her vote was different than that recorded, even though both databases match. It's her word against the databases. But there is one more way the vote can be verified that every one should be able to agree upon and that's the voter-verified paper ballot, or audit trail. As long as the same PIN number is printed on that piece of paper, and the BoE retains that record permanently, the voter can ask to see her individual VVPAT or VVPB which should put the matter to rest as it will be considered the official vote. I think you also mention this in Voter's Choice.

So what differences are there between this and the e-voting part of your system?

This one has the advantage of not being able to sell votes (except possibly in collusion with BoE insiders who are the only ones with access to the private database).

It has a possible disadvantage of the government (BoE) being able to tell who the citizens have voted for. I would think a law that prohibits access to the private database for purposes other than challenges by voters might solve this one, and there may be other ways to keep the BoEs' hands off of the data such as some form of voter-authenticated access.

So what do you think?

Personally, I think these sort of schemes will be very hard to implement, may still not be trusted by the voters, and do not ensure that enough voters will even take advantage of them. But I do like the idea of this form of random auditing where thousands or millions of voters have the ability to see that their votes were actually counted as cast. It would certainly deter fraud and that's what it's all about.

Peace.