Reply #5: Stephen A. Cambone [View All]

[troubleinwinter]

Stephen Cambone, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s right-hand man, was for the first time caught in the glare of media attention as part of the congressional inquiry into Iraq prison abuses. (1) Under sharp questioning from senators on May 11, 2004, Cambone vigorously defended both Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith, the then-undersecretary of defense for policy. Cambone’s attempt to split hairs on whether the Geneva Conventions were applicable to intelligence gathering in Iraq and his awkward defense of the role of military intelligence in interrogations put him at odds with the U.S. Army general who first investigated abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.

As the first-ever undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Cambone will likely come under increased fire as the prison scandal unfolds. Some of the most intense questioning of Cambone centered on whether the Geneva Conventions were “precisely” respected. What “precisely” Cambone knew and when he knew it, and what precisely was the role of military intelligence will be questions that Cambone will be required to answer.

Cambone was director of strategic defense policy during the Bush I administration, working under then-Defense Secretary Cheney. A long-time a promoter of missile defense systems, Cambone went on to serve as the staff director of the two congressional commissions—one on missile defense and another on space weapons—chaired by Donald Rumsfeld in the late 1990s.

The two Rumsfeld commissions focused on the issues at the top of the wish lists of national security militarists and large military contractors: the ballistic missile threat to the United States and U.S. space-based defense capabilities. In the tradition of Team B, the unstated agenda of these commissions was to turn up pressure on the administration to support new weapons programs and substantially increase major military spending. (2) Both commissions received funding from defense spending bills—in effect using taxpayer revenues to subsidize them. But perusing the backgrounds and connections of the individuals charged with overseeing the commissions, Rumsfeld and his right-hand man Stephen Cambone, most observers at the time believed that the conclusions were preordained.

After Rumsfeld was named defense secretary, he made Cambone his special assistant. Then, in March 2003 Cambone was appointed the first-ever undersecretary for intelligence—a position that “will allow the Defense Department to consolidate its intelligence programs in a way that could undermine CIA head George Tenet’s role,” one defense analyst noted. (3) While Cambone was directing the two Rumsfeld commissions, he also participated in two national security strategy and military transformation commissions sponsored by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP). The institute’s 2001 report, Rationale and Requirements for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, and PNAC’s Rebuilding America’s Defenses were blueprints for Rumsfeld’s promised “revolution in military affairs.” Several other PNAC associates, in addition to Rumsfeld himself, also served on the Rumsfeld commissions, including Paul Wolfowitz, Malcolm Wallop, William Schneider, Jr., and James Woolsey. Both the NIPP and PNAC studies seem to have served as blueprints for the defense policies initiated by the administration of George W. Bush with respect to nuclear policy, national security strategy, and military transformation.

http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1066