Reply #29: Disagree... not on the decision to pull necessarily [View All]

[salin]

but on the results of the results in Iowa. Gep is expected to win (proximity), Dean coming is expected. If one of the candidates knocked him to third (or worse), then that does real damage.

Thus if either of those had a shot at pulling an "upset" (in this case coming in second), they should do it for the longer momentum.

On the other hand - especially for Clark - if there is no chance, put resources where there is a chance. The SC strategy I have read about makes some sense.

Not sure though that Clark didn't have a chance for a strong showing, in which case it could have been a chance to slow the Dean momentum.

Lieberman, on the otherhand, appears to be in full retreat. The campaign was overconfident for months - relying on a) strong name recognition and b) belief (based on pt a) of powerful fundraising apparatus. Almost as if they arrogantly relied on these aspects - focused on the DC (inner beltway) fundraising as part 1 of the campaign, without really assessing the developments of the other campaigns. Lieberman's supposed appeal - is his appeal to middle america, to moderate america, to the land of fiscal responsibility. Lieberman doesn't have the 'excuse' of entering the campaign late, and thus having less apparatus in place and fewer funds (due to shorter fundraising time), and thus needing to be much more strategic (surgical?) in investing initial campaign resources as does Clark.

I think this move hurts Lieberman. And I think the fault lies with the campaign's inability to really guage what was happening with other campaigns - including the preceived void that pulled Clark into the race. Thus they couldn't adjust their own strategies quickly enough to shift and be competitive.

I find irony that the candidate most vocal of the flaws of Gore's campaign strategy, appears to be suffering from... poor campaign strategy.