"WINNING: Hamas Crushed By Miscalculation"
"In Gaza (the smaller of the two Palestinian territories) Hamas, the Islamic terrorist group that has controlled the Palestinian enclave since 2007, has suffered another defeat in its most recent war with Israel. Once more Hamas thought it had it all figured out only to discover that the Israeli military superiority represented more than weapons and well-trained troops. Defeat in the latest six month war was due to being outmaneuvered by Israeli tactics that exposed the weaknesses and ruthlessness of Hamas and left the rulers of Gaza much worse off than when they began. This time Hamas thought they could win the media war by encouraging civilians (via free food, publicity and cash payments for those injured or killed) to try and physically force their way through the security fence and into Israel. It didn’t work and so far over 150 Palestinians have died. One Israeli has been killed, by a Hamas sniper using a long-range 12.7mm Iranian sniper rifle. Hamas lost dozens of members, many of the promising young leaders, These men were in the crowds to urge the largely male (and teenage) force to keep going in the face of tear gas, rubber bullets and real bullets for the few who made it through the fence. This was all captured on video, from both sides, and it did not reflect well on Hamas, which lost more support from its few remaining Arab allies (and donors). This included Egypt, which also closed its border to Gaza as well as increasing efforts to find and destroy Hamas smuggling tunnels into Egypt.
Another Hamas defeat, that was not unexpected, was new Israeli technology which made it very difficult (and apparently, for the moment, impossible) to dig tunnels under the security fence and into Israel. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the Israelis had no intention of invading, as they had in 2014. That war was another major disappointment for Hamas and they failed to realize that the Israelis learned more from the 2014 war than Hamas did. Six months into this latest war Hamas is faced with more unrest among the nearly two million Palestinians it rules. Hamas is under even greater pressure from its rival Fatah, which rules the West Bank. Egypt, which had brokered numerous efforts to achieve peace with Israel, is pressuring Hamas to make peace with Fatah and form a unified Palestinian government, even though everyone believes Hamas would no longer be in charge of Gaza, or anything else, because the group has become so unpopular with most Palestinians. Everyone in the Arab world wants Hamas and Fatah to merge. But the long record of failure means that would cost Hamas its control over Gaza where most Palestinians are decidedly anti-Hamas. In fact, the only ally Sunni Hamas has is Shia (and non-Arab) Iran which is currently calling for Iranian Shia to replace the Sunni Arabs who have always controlled the most sacred Islamic shrines in Mecca. Because of this latest war against Israel Hamas has less support in Gaza, fewer Arab allies, less cash and is generally despised by the Arab world.
Hamas has a history of defeat whenever it went after Israel and this latest defeat shows that the failed 2014 war and earlier defeats were evidence that Hamas was all talk and no hope of victory. Consider what happened in 2014. Back then Hamas declared victory at the end (in August) of another war (lasting 50 days) with Israel. It's traditional in the Arab world that, if you fight Israel and still have possession of your capital at the end of hostilities, you can declare that the Arabs won. No matter how many battles your troops lost, if you can still issue a press release declaring victory after the shooting stops, it counts as a win. Apparently, the reasoning is that because the Israelis had the ability to utterly crush you, but were stopped by steely Arab resolve, it was an Arab victory. This particular charade is growing threadbare with over-use, and this time around, even many Arabs are openly disappointed with the Hamas "defeat" or "lack of victory."
https://strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20181007.aspx
